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ABSTRACT 
Aims: This study has three aims: 1) to measure the impact of the Vietnamese Voluntary Health 
Insurance (VHI) programme on out-of-pocket (OOP) costs of health care after correcting for care-
seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection biases; 2) to measure the effect of the VHI programme 
on socioeconomic-related inequality in out-of-pocket costs; and 3) to measure the role of VHI in 
preventing catastrophic health care costs. 
Data: This study is based on cross-sectional household survey data collected from three provinces of 
Vietnam: Hai Phong, Ninh Binh and Dong Thap. A total of 1,650 adults and 1,101 children were 
randomly selected and interviewed during the year 1999. Individual level data were available on the 
cost of health care in the last three months, the insurance status, personal and socioeconomic 
variables, health status and health care utilisation. In the sample, 1,192 individuals felt sick at least 
once in the last three months, and 985 of them sought care.  
Methods: The standard regression approach of measuring the average impact of VHI does not correct 
simultaneously for care-seeking and insurance-seeking biases. Also, the standard approach of 
measuring vertical equity in financing fails to account for the unmet need for care. This thesis 
proposes an improved approach, based on Heckman’s selection model, to estimate the impact of 
insurance on the cost of health care, after correcting for self-selection biases. To measure 
socioeconomic-related inequality in health care costs, a need standardised concentration index was 
proposed. This approach standardises for differences in the level of need between individuals, in turn 
controlling for the unmet need for care. Progressivity analysis was carried out using Kakwani’s index 
of progressivity. Finally, the incidence of catastrophic health care costs was modelled using probit 
equations that accounted for self-selection biases. 
Result: Analysis shows that insurance is negatively associated with expected cost of care, and this 
effect becomes more pronounced after correcting for selection biases. Need-standardised 
concentration indices demonstrate that insurance makes the distribution of health care costs more pro-
poor. Kakwani indices suggest that insurance reduces the regressivity of financing. Finally, the study 
finds that VHI is associated with a lower probability of financial catastrophe. 
Conclusion: Membership in the Vietnamese VHI appears to have a protective effect on health care 
costs; this effect is augmented after controlling for selection biases due to unobserved characteristics. 
Insurance membership also appears to reduce the regressivity of health financing and the incidence 
and intensity of catastrophic health care costs. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Out of pocket (OOP) payment is the predominant mechanism of health care financing in most 
developing countries. This is a regressive form of financing, due to its alignment with the 
level of health care use, rather than the socioeconomic status of an individual. The 
consequence is a disproportionately high cost burden on the poor (Xu et al 2003; O’Donnell 
and van Doorslaer 2005 and Jutting 2003). To reduce the negative impact of OOP costs, 
many developing countries have embarked on formal and informal risk pooling mechanisms 
that decouple the relationship between financial contributions and level of service use. One 
such mechanism is Voluntary Health Insurance (VHI), which provides formal means of risk 
pooling for countries with predominantly informal economies (Witter et al 2000). 
The aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate, and improve on, the current methodological 
practice of measuring the impact of VHI on the individual level cost of health care, and the 
distribution of the cost burden across the socioeconomic gradient. The thesis uses Vietnamese 
VHI as a case study; however the focus of the study remains methodological. The dataset 
used in this thesis was initially analysed by Dr Matthew Jowett for his PhD studies at the 
University of York. The findings of this earlier analysis that are relevant to the current thesis 
were published in Jowett et al (2003). The current thesis argues that the earlier analysis by 
Jowett et al had the following limitations:  
1. The analysis was limited to individuals who sought health care. Hence the findings 
could not be generalised to all individuals who were ill. 
2. Potential bias associated with care-seeking self-selection decision was not taken into 
account during the analysis. 
3. The insurance probit model used to control for insurance-seeking self-selection bias 
did not use unique identifying variables. 
In chapter 4 of this thesis, the study aims to correct for the potential limitations of Jowett et al 
(2003). The other two analyses, presented in chapters 5 and 6, are new and were not part of 
Dr Jowett’s study. 
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The remaining chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 will discuss the context of health 
care financing and OOP payments in developing countries. Section 1.3 will briefly outline the 
context of Vietnam and the VHI programme (further details will be discussed in chapter 2). 
Section 1.4 will highlight the methodological challenges in measuring the impact of VHI on 
the cost of health care and what this thesis aims to add to the literature. Section 1.5 will 
outline the research questions addressed in this thesis, and section 1.6 will discuss the 
organisation of the thesis. 
1.2 Health care spending and OOP payments in the developing 
countries 
Health sectors in most developing countries have been struggling to provide their populace 
with accessible and affordable care. The situation has been particularly challenging owing to 
recurring funding crises, lack of governance capacity and institutional weakness (Tabor 
2005). The aggregate health sector spending of low- and middle-income countries is only 11 
percent of the US$3 trillion global expenditure on health care. In sharp contrast, the world’s 
poor bear 93 percent of the global burden of disease (Preker and Carrin 2004). Individual 
government spending on health care tends to average around 2% of the GDP in most 
developing countries, which may translate to as low as $11 per person per year for the least 
developed countries (Butz 2005). This is significantly lower than the minimum financing 
standard of US$30 to US$40 per person per year recommended by the World Health 
Organisation to finance essential health care interventions (WHO 2001). Furthermore, Lionel 
(1997) found that the distribution of these limited resources tend to favour the urban hospital-
based services; as a result the public health subsidies are inequitably distributed to the 
advantage of the rich who can more readily access hospital care. Consequently, the primary 
health centres in rural villages tend to suffer seriously from lack of resources and adequately 
trained medical staff. 
In situations where the public sector budget is constrained, health care is mainly financed 
through OOP payments. World Development Indicators (2000) suggest that, in the period 
1990-98, OOP expenditure accounted for 66% of the total health expenditure in the 
developing countries (reaching 77% in South Asia). When access to care is dictated by OOP 
contributions, the potential for the domestic financial pool to run into an inescapable vicious 
cycle of debt and repayments is very high. It is estimated that globally more than 44 million 
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households face catastrophic health care payments every year, pushing more than 25 million 
households below the poverty line (Carrin, Evans and James 2005). In addition, because 
ofanticipated high OOP payments, the poor tend to delay seeking care until disease severity 
has progressed so far that more prolonged and expensive treatments are required (Carrin 
2002; Waddington 1989; Fabricant et al 1999). 
1.3 The context of Vietnam: VHI and cost of health care 
Vietnam introduced health sector reforms in the 1980s, which resulted in the introduction of 
user fees for which was previously free of charge. The health care system was deregulated in 
1991, allowing health professionals to practice privately and private pharmacies to be opened. 
In 1993, Vietnam introduced its health insurance programme, which included compulsory 
health insurance for civil servants, and voluntary health insurance for formal and informal 
sector employees, the unemployed and children. In 1998, about 12% of the Vietnamese 
population was covered by the insurance programme, with a little over half covered by the 
VHI programme (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). The focus of this thesis is on voluntary 
health insurance; hence, unless explicitly specified otherwise, the term health insurance will 
imply voluntary health insurance. 
van Doorslaer and van Doorslaer (2007) observed that, among Asian countries, reliance on 
OOP payments was highest in Vietnam and India, where more than 80% of the total 
expenditure on health was funded by OOP payments. User fees in Vietnamese health 
facilities witnessed an exponential increase in the 1990s. Between 1993 and 1998, public 
sector user fees rose by over 1000% in real terms. During the same time period , fees for 
private health professionals rose by almost 600%. As a result, according to the Vietnamese 
Living Standards Survey (VLSS) data of 1998, the incidence of financial catastrophe in 
Vietnam, defined at a threshold level of 10% of the pre-payment income, was observed to be 
14.2% (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). Most of this OOP payment was spent on 
purchasing medicines (88.0%). Thuan et al (2006) further noted that the catastrophic OOP 
payments in Vietnam were incurred mostly as a result of relatively minor communicable 
illnesses, including respiratory infections, diarrhoea and fever.  
OOP contributions were observed to be far more devastating when households had to seek 
hospital care. The VLSS (1998) data estimated that, for individuals in the bottom two 
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socioeconomic quintiles, the cost of a single contact with a public hospital was equal to 
approximately 22% of the annual non-food consumption expenditure; this proportion was 
only 5% for the richest quintile. Furthermore, a single inpatient admission, on average, 
amounted to almost 60% of the annual non-food expenditure for the poor and middle income 
quintiles (Sepehri et al 2006). 
One of the important objectives of the Vietnamese VHI programme was to reduce financial 
barriers and improve access to health care. Based on the VLSS data from 1993 and 1998, 
Sepehri et al (2006) found that, when insurance endogeneity was not accounted for, insurance 
membership (both compulsory and voluntary) appeared to increase the average cost of health 
care; however, when self-selection bias was taken into account, insurance appeared to reduce 
the cost of care by 16% and 18% in 1993 and 1998. Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005) found a 
similar impact of insurance on health financing, although in their study, the magnitude of the 
effect was estimated to be higher. Jowett et al (2003) analysed the impact of VHI on total 
health care expenditure, and found that insurance membership reduced the total cost by more 
than 200%.  
1.4 Methodological challenges in measuring the impact of VHI 
The impact of VHI on health financing is commonly evaluated using the observed health care 
costs that are actually incurred by individuals. It has been noted in the literature that the 
observed cost of care may be biased due to potential correlation between the unobserved 
determinants of cost of care and care-seeking/insurance-seeking self-selection decisions and 
possible non-random distribution of unmet need for health care. Therefore, an analysis of the 
impact of VHI based on the observed cost may produce biased estimates. 
Care-seeking bias may occur when individuals with certain characteristics are more or less 
likely to seek health care given their illness. For instance, when poor individuals are faced 
with high expected costs of health care, they may decide not to seek care because of their 
inability to afford health care costs. In such a case, their unobserved expected cost of care 
would be high, but the observed cost would be zero. If the care-seeking decision is not 
randomly distributed in the population, and is systematically associated with high or low 
expected costs of care, then an analysis based on the observed costs will produce biased 
estimates. 
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Similarly, when insurance-seeking decisions are systematically associated with high or low 
expected cost of care, then this correlation between the insurance self-selection decision and 
health care expenditure will produce biased estimates of the cost of care analysis. For 
instance, if individuals who expect to have high health care costs are also systematically more 
likely to seek VHI, then the impact of insurance membership on the cost of care will be 
underestimated. 
Finally, when evaluating the socioeconomic-related distribution of health care costs, if the 
unmet need for health care is not accounted for, and the level of unmet need for care is 
associated with the socioeconomic status, then a distributional analysis based on the observed 
health care costs will systematically underestimate costs for certain socioeconomic groups. 
This will, in turn, produce biased estimates of equity and progressivity of health financing. 
These concepts are discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
Sepehri et al (2006) found that when they did not take account of the potential endogeneity of 
insurance, the net effect of insurance appeared to increase the average level of health care 
expenditure; however, when the insurance-seeking bias was taken into account, the effect was 
found to be significantly negative. Ekman (2007a), in a study of VHI in Zambia, did not 
account for insurance-seeking and care-seeking biases, and found that insurance membership 
was associated with the increased probability of financial catastrophe. Similarly, in a 
household survey of China, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) controlled for the insurance self-
selection decision in their analysis and still found that insurance membership increased the 
likelihood of catastrophic expenditure. The authors suggest, among other possible 
explanations, that not accounting for the care-seeking decision could have potentially 
produced biased estimates (insurance membership can increase the likelihood of seeking care 
when ill and therefore increases the mean expenditure).  
Therefore, in the literature, self-selection biases are either not taken into account or are 
corrected partially (i.e., either the insurance-seeking bias or care-seeking bias is corrected) in 
the cost of care analysis. Similarly, the literature does not make any attempt to take account 
of the unmet need for health care when evaluating the distribution of health care costs across 
the socioeconomic gradient. This thesis will propose improved methods to correct for these 
potential biases. 
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1.5 Thesis research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to measure the impact of the Vietnamese VHI on individual level 
OOP cost of health care, and its distribution across the socioeconomic gradient, after 
correcting for care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection biases, and for the unmet 
need for health care.  
This thesis will aim to achieve the following research objectives: 
1. To measure the impact of VHI on average OOP cost of health care after correcting for 
self-selection biases (addressed in chapter 4). The specific objectives of the chapter 
are: 
a. To model the individual level cost of care, by controlling for need and non-
need variables, including insurance membership; 
b. To evaluate and correct for the presence of care-seeking and insurance-seeking 
self-selection biases in the cost of care model, to estimate an unbiased 
relationship between VHI insurance membership and the cost of care  
2. To measure the effect of VHI in reducing regressivity of health care financing 
(addressed in chapter 5). The specific objectives of the chapter are: 
a. To evaluate whether insurance membership, on average, has a pro-poor effect 
on the expected cost of health care; 
b. To compare the observed cost distributions of insured and uninsured groups to 
assess the level of pro-poorness and progressivity or regressivity of health care 
financing; 
c. To evaluate the effect of need standardisation processes on progressivity or 
regressivity of cost distributions for insured and uninsured groups; 
d. To assess the impact of correcting for care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-
selection biases on need-standardised cost distributions. 
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3. To measure the effect of VHI in reducing the incidence and intensity of financially 
catastrophic events (addressed in chapter 6). The specific objectives of the chapter 
are: 
a. To compare the crude incidence and intensity of catastrophic events in the 
insured and uninsured groups; 
b. To analyse the impact of VHI membership on the probability of catastrophic 
event using discrete regression models; 
c. To correct for the potential bias in catastrophic probability models due to 
unobserved correlation between self-selection decisions and cost of care; 
d. To analyse the catastrophic risk reduction attributable to insurance 
membership, and compute the number needed to treat in order to prevent one 
catastrophe event; and  
e. To evaluate the socioeconomic distribution of the protective effect of 
insurance on catastrophic event occurrence 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is organised in seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the context of 
Vietnam and the Vietnamese voluntary health insurance programme. Chapter 3 will present 
the literature review of the methodological issues addressed in the thesis and also discuss the 
potential biases in the standard analyses. Chapter 3 presents the literature review for this 
study. This chapter has been sub-divided into five sections. These sections address: 3.1) 
methods of health financing in the developing countries; 3.2) review of self-selection biases 
in cost of care models; 3.3) outline of the equity argument in this thesis; 3.4) review of equity 
and progressivity indices; 3.5) concept and measurement of catastrophic cost of health care. 
Chapter 3 sets the contextual scene by identifying the implications of uncorrected biases in 
the standard methodological practice. Chapters 4 – 6 present the empirical results of the cost 
of care analysis, equity and progressivity analysis and catastrophic incidence modelling. 
Finally, chapter 7 will conclude the thesis with a discussion of the empirical findings and 
direction of future research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the context of Vietnam, its health care 
system and the structure of the Vietnamese Voluntary Health Insurance programme at the 
time of the survey, i.e. the year 1999. The chapter is organised in the following manner. 
Section 2.2 provides an overview of the demographic, socioeconomic and health indicators of 
Vietnam, followed by section 2.3 which discusses Vietnamese poverty and inequality 
indicators. Section 2.4 discusses the administrative structure of the regions of Vietnam, while 
section 2.5 presents the recent history of health sector reforms in Vietnam in relation to the 
structure of its health care system in 1999. Section 2.6 discusses the structure of Vietnam’s 
public health care system in 1999. Section 2.7 outlines the role of the private sector in health 
care provision in Vietnam. Finally, sections 2.8 and 2.9 discuss the Vietnamese health 
financing system and the VHI programme. All the facts and figures, unless otherwise stated, 
relate to 1998-99. When relevant statistics were not available for these years, figures from the 
closest year were used. This background will provide a contextual understanding of the 
analysis to follow.  
2.2 Vietnam: background of the context 
Vietnam is the easternmost country in the Indochinese peninsula, bordering China to the 
North, Laos to the Northwest and Cambodia to the Southwest (see Appendix 1 for the map of 
Vietnam and its neighbouring countries). It was the thirteenth most populous country in the 
world in 1999, with a population of 76.6 million, of which 76.4% lived in rural villages. 
Children under the age of 16 made up 30.6% of the populace. The overall population growth 
rate in 1999 was recorded as 3.6%. As a result, the population of Vietnam in 2008 had 
increased to 83.1 million, of which 73.0% lived in rural villages (General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam, 1999). Population density is highest in the fertile Mekong Delta in the south, near 
Ho Chin Minh City, and the Red River Delta in the north, near the capital city Hanoi (Ensor 
1995; Barbieri et al 1996). Samples for our current study were drawn from the populous Hai 
Phong and Ninh Binh provinces (Red River Delta) and Dong Thap province (Mekong River 
Delta). 
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With an economic growth rate of 4.2%, Vietnam was one of the fastest growing Asian 
economies in the 1990s (World Bank 2000). Despite the economic boom, its gross national 
product (GNP) was close to just US$400 per capita per annum at the turn of the millennium, 
which placed it in 157th place of 207 countries in the world. In 1999, Vietnam’s GNP was 
comparable to neighbouring Laos, but was less than half that of China. The economy was 
dominated by agriculture, especially rice growing, which comprised 62.5% of the total 
economic activity in the year 1999-2000. Rice production saw an increase of 200% over the 
15 years period preceding 1999, compared to a population growth of 30% (Thang and Popkin 
2003). National census data for 1999 showed that 66.5% of the population over the age of 13 
were employed, 13.1% were students, 7.7% were household workers, and the remaining 
individuals were not in paid employment. Vietnam had maintained a remarkable adult 
literacy rate which was recorded close to 91% in 1999, with 74.2% of the under 17 still at 
school (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 1999). 
Despite its poor economy, some of Vietnam’s health indicators were far better than other 
developing countries with comparable GNPs. With life expectancy at birth of 67.4 years and 
12.8% probability of dying before the 40th birthday, Vietnam was trailing just behind the 
overall average for Asia. This has been attributed to relatively low infant mortality (27.5 per 
1,000 live births) and under-5 mortality (34.2 per 1,000 children). The corresponding rates 
for East Asia and the Pacific in the same year were 35.5 and 44.7 per 1,000 respectively. 
These relatively low mortality rates were partly due to highly successful vaccination 
campaigns which reached 97% coverage (Flessa and Dung 2004). During the same period, 
maternal mortality was recorded as 130 per 100,000 live births. In contrast with mortality 
rates, childhood nutritional improvements had lagged behind other health indicators. The 
Vietnamese national human development report 2001 showed that the percentage of 
underweight children below the age of five was 36.7% between the years 1995 and 2000 
(National Human Development Report 2001). This rate was estimated to be 1.3 times higher 
than what would be expected based on the macro-level relationship between income and 
health indicators. Thang and Popkin (2003) used logistic regression models on cross-sectional 
individual level survey data to establish that these statistics were far worse for rural and poor 
households, and those with ethnic minority backgrounds. This mixed picture of good survival 
rates and poor nutrition may reflect the dual effects of socioeconomic inequality and health 
system performance.  
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Regional differences in health indicators in Vietnam are obvious in table 2-1. The Northwest 
and Central Highlands have higher infant mortality rates, and lower percentages of those over 
65 years of age, compared to the national average. This pattern can partly be explained by the 
high prevalence of malaria in these regions. 
Table 2-1: Regional differences in the health indicators of Vietnam (1998-1999) 
Regions  
Infant 
mortality 
rate (%) 
1999 
People 
over 
65 
years 
(%) 
1999 
Crude 
birth 
rate 
(1998) 
Malaria 
cases 
(per 
100,000 
people) 
in 1998 
TB* 
cases 
(per 
100,000 
people) 
in 1998 
People 
not 
expected 
to survive 
to age 40 
(%) in 
1999 
Under-
weight 
children  
> 5 year 
(%) in 
1998 
Red River 
Delta 25.2 7.4 17.0 136 83 6.5 33.5 
North East 38.0 5.3 20.6 683 78 11.3 40.1 
North West 57.7 4.3 28.8 1239 47 14.9 41.7 
North Central 
Coast 36.7 6.9 22.9 570 90 10.5 42.9 
South Central 
Coast 39.0 6.6 21.3 700 125 12.3 39.2 
Central 
Highlands 65.0 3.5 32.9 2235 51 21.3 48.9 
South-eastern 17.2 4.7 19.1 325 147 6.7 30.0 
Mekong 
River Delta 35.3 5.1 20.4 304 146 9.7 32.2 
Sampled provinces 
Hai Phong 20.8 7.1 15.5 82 83 6.5 33.9 
Ninh Binh 26.3 7.5 16.8 324 69 10.7 36.5 
Dong Thap 45.7 5.2 21.2 38 189 8.9 31.8 
All Vietnam 33.1 5.8 20.6 502 109 9.7 36.7 
* TB = Tuberculosis   Source: National human development report (2001) 
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Table 2-1 also shows that in all regions of Vietnam at least 30% of children under the age of 
five were underweight. Indicators for the sampled provinces, Hai Phong and Ninh Binh, show 
a mixed picture of better mortality indicators and average malnutrition prevalence, whereas 
Dong Thap showed a relatively poor picture of mortality and life expectancy. One of the 
reasons for high infant mortality in Dong Thap is its poor access to safe water (13.2%) and 
sanitation (4.0%) in the region (National Human Development Report 2001).  
2.3 Poverty and inequality 
Vietnam’s national poverty survey (1999) reported that 28.2% of the population lived below 
the poverty line; the majority of these people lived in rural villages. Regional concentration 
of poverty is striking in the Northern uplands, North Central and Central Highlands regions, 
with an average poverty incidence of 50%, in contrast to the South East where the incidence 
was estimated to be 8% (see table 2-2). However, a longitudinal assessment of poverty in the 
1990s showed that, compared to the year 1993, the average incidence of absolute poverty had 
fallen sharply by the end of 1998 (Fritzen 2002).  
Table 2-2: Sub-national socioeconomic indicators of Vietnam 
Regions 
Population 
(1998 
million) 
Incidence of 
poverty (%) 
GDP growth 
rate (average 
1995-1999) 
GDP per 
capita   
(1999-$PPP) 
HDI 
score 
(1999) 
  
1993 1998 
   
Vietnam  75.8 58 37 7.6 1860 0.696 
Northern Upland  13.5 79 59 7.0 899 0.629 
Red River Delta  14.9 63 29 6.9 1616 0.723 
North Central  10.5 75 48 4.9 939 0.662 
Central Coast  8.1 50 35 6.6 1238 0.676 
Central Highlands  2.8 70 52 11.5 1102 0.604 
South East  9.7 33 8 9.9 3809 0.751 
Mekong Delta  16.3 47 37 5.5 1496 0.669 
Sources: Fritzen (2002), World Bank (1999) and NCSSH (2001) 
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Relative socioeconomic inequality was observed to have widened significantly during the 
period following economic transition that started in the 1980s. While the average monthly 
income per capita was 295,000 Vietnamese Dong (VND) [equal to US$23.17 in 1998], 
differences between and within regions were very prominent. Gini coefficient of income 
inequality for Vietnam increased at an alarming rate between 1995 and 2000 from 0.36 to 
0.41 (Fritzen 2002). The richest socioeconomic quintile in Vietnam earned an average of 
10,360 thousand VND per annum, which was almost nine times the average income of the 
poorest quintile (1,164 thousand VND). Figure 2-1 shows the distribution of the income gap 
between the richest and the poorest quintiles across all regions of Vietnam.  
 
Figure 2-1: Income of the richest and the poorest quintiles in 1995 and 1999 
 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
2.4 Administrative structure of the regions of Vietnam 
Vietnam is geographically divided into 8 regions, namely North West, North East, Red River 
Delta, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, South East and Mekong 
River Delta. Administratively, regions are further subdivided into 59 provinces, and 5 
centrally controlled municipalities that exist at the same level as provinces. Provinces are 
further divided into districts, provincial cities and towns. Each district is formed by 
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communes and townlets, whereas provincial cities and towns are formed by communes and 
wards. In total, there are 597 districts and 10,331 communes in Vietnam. Rural communes 
are subdivided into villages, which are headed by village leaders, who would also be 
members of the Commune People’s Committee. These committees are responsible for the 
welfare of the households living within the commune. Similarly, District and Provincial 
Peoples’ Committees are administratively responsible for their respective regions. Members 
of these committees are elected by local community members, and are responsible for 
coordinating and managing local activities with the government.  
2.5 History of the health sector reforms in Vietnam with relevance 
to the health care structure in 1999 
Vietnam’s health system has been shaped through decades of socio-political ideologies and 
economic reforms. Soon after its independence from the French in 1954, the country was 
separated into North and South Vietnam. The North followed a largely egalitarian philosophy 
and prioritised principles of equity in the delivery of health care. It was one of the first 
countries in the world to embrace a primary health care policy, focused on improving access 
to health services for both rural and urban households (Khe et al 2002). Evidence suggests 
that North Vietnam had achieved almost universal coverage of primary health care in the 
urban areas and around 75% coverage in rural areas, with patchy distribution in mountainous 
regions (Witter 1996). The Vietnamese primary health care model partly inspired the 
approach later adopted by the World Health Organisation at Alma Ata in 1978 (WHO 2002). 
Between 1954 and 1975, the public sector was the sole provider of health care in the North, 
while private providers and pharmacies were prohibited to practise or sell medicines. The 
health system was entirely financed through taxation, communal funds and foreign aid. 
Whereas district and provincial hospitals received their funding directly from the 
government, the network of local health stations, village nurses and health workers was 
supported by commune level agricultural cooperatives. Health care was provided free of 
charge and drugs were heavily subsidised by the government (Gerald 1997).  
After the victory of the communist North in the Vietnam War, the country reunified to form 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975. After reunification, the North attempted to 
replicate the same model of primary health care in South Vietnam, which at the time did not 
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have a well-established health infrastructure. Extension of a heavily subsidised health care 
system placed a huge strain on the available public sector budget. Limited resources were 
further aggravated when an official ban on private medical practice and private pharmacies 
was extended to the South. As a result, a large number of doctors emigrated from southern 
Vietnam (Sepehri, Chernomas and Lodhi 2003), and many health workers either completely 
abandoned their professions, or started unofficial practice to support their below subsistence 
level incomes from the public sector (Beresford 1988).  
During the same period, the country’s economy underwent socialist reforms and enforced 
collective ownership of agricultural assets, nationalisation of industries and commerce and a 
severe crackdown on private businesses (Riedel 1995). This resulted in a disastrous 
slowdown of economic progress across the country, only to be aggravated by failure to 
acquire promised foreign funding after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Public 
sector and state-owned enterprises suffered from large deficits, and by the mid-1980s 
inflation had reached its peak at 400 percent (Pham 1999). As a result of the economic crisis, 
by the late 1980s public health care spending had progressively decreased from 0.82% of 
GDP in 1984 to 0.38% in 1988. In 1989, government health care spending in Vietnam was 
US$0.83 per capita, which was the lowest of all the low-income countries in Asia (World 
Bank 1992). Health care workers were demoralised by years of hyperinflation, irregular 
payments and termination of state subsidies for housing and education. The situation was 
further exacerbated by the unavailability of drugs and medical equipment at health care 
facilities. This resulted in a sharp decline in utilisation rates of government health services 
during the 1980s. Sepehri et al (2003) report that, by 1989, the average consultations in 
Vietnam had reduced to 1.2 visits per person per year. This was a sharp decline from 2.3 
consultations per person in 1984. As the quality of government health services worsened, the 
illegal private health sector started to grow in the early 1980s. Private sale of drugs 
continued, and many health workers began to work informally from their homes to 
supplement their incomes (Dung 1996). 
In 1986, the government of Vietnam introduced market reforms called Doi Moi (literal 
meaning: renovation), that had a dramatic social and economic impact. Agricultural 
production was de-collectivised, subsidies were removed, price liberated and, most 
importantly, participation in the private sector was promoted. As part of these reforms, farm 
cooperatives were replaced by non-communal family farms, which deprived commune level 
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health stations and community nurses of their source of financing (Fforde and Vylder 1996; 
World Bank 2005). These reforms were further extended to the health sector in 1989, to 
introduce neoliberal health policy changes. These reforms included the following measures 
(Hong Ha et al 2002): 
a. User fees were introduced at district, provincial and national level health 
facilities to improve cost recovery. Exemptions were granted to the disabled, 
war veterans, very poor households and children under the age of six. User 
fees were not comprehensively applied to commune health stations, where 
drugs were usually not available. Prescriptions had to be purchased from local 
pharmacies. 
b. Private provision of health services was legalised. Also medical professionals 
in the public sector were allowed to establish private services during out of 
office hours. 
c. Permission to establish private pharmacies and sell drugs in an open market 
was granted. 
d. State control over the pharmaceutical companies was substantially reduced 
and the industry was liberalised. 
These reforms of 1989 had a pronounced impact on health service delivery, especially on 
primary health care in the rural villages of Vietnam. Below we discuss the structure of the 
health sector by 1999, which was formed as a result of the above changes. 
2.6 Structure of the public health care system of Vietnam 
The public sector health care system in Vietnam is organised into a four-tiered system (figure 
2-2). The Ministry of Health is at the top of the structural hierarchy, followed by Provincial, 
District and Commune level People’s Committees. The ministry is responsible for policy-
making, planning, training of professionals and setting prices for the public health care 
system. At the second level are the Provincial Health Bureaus that liaise with the Provincial 
People’s Committee and the Ministry of Health for programme planning and funding.  
Although the economy is centrally planned, provincial governments are given substantial 
authority and responsibility for much of the health care (Ensor 1995). Committees have the 
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key responsibility for overseeing the administration of services and ensuring appropriate 
delivery of care at each level. Administrative responsibilities are decentralised to health 
bureaus that manage the provincial facilities, and also oversee the delivery of care through 
district hospitals and communal health stations. 
Figure 2-2: Structure of the public sector health care system of Vietnam 
 
Each province has at least one general hospital, with a capacity of 200 – 1,000 beds with 
specialised departments including internal medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology, 
paediatrics, infectious diseases and traditional medicine. Each hospital, on average, serves a 
population of 1.2 million people. Although lower level health facilities are meant to be 
referral centres, the gate-keeping function does not always work well, and it is common for 
people to use hospitals as primary centres for consultation (Flessa and Dung 2004). 
Sometimes maternity care is directly referred to the next hospital level by health workers 
without consultation with a health station. In addition, households living close to district or 
provincial hospitals frequently bypass primary health care services, and seek care at the 
outpatient department of the nearest hospital, as hospital services are perceived to be of better 
quality (Whitehead 2001). 
Chapter 2  Vietnam: its demography and health care system 
 
27 | P a g e  
 
On the third level are the District People’s Committees that manage district hospitals. These 
hospitals serve a population of between 50,000 to 300,000 people, and have general medical 
and surgical departments alongside maternal and child health and family planning units. At 
the bottom of the health service structure are Inter-Communal Polyclinics and Communal 
Health Stations. These clinics mainly provide primary health care services to between 2,000 
and 10,000 people, and have limited resources for any inpatient admissions. More 
complicated cases are referred to the next level of service delivery.  
Vietnam’s network of primary health care services is remarkably strong, with around 1,006 
polyclinics and 9,806 health stations. These institutions rely on village health workers, who 
are local community members willing to act as a bridge between health clinics and the 
community. Local health workers provide preventive health care, basic curative care, and 
also refer cases to local health stations and polyclinics. Commune Health Centres work 
closely with Commune People’s Committee and District Health Bureau. There are nearly 
43,000 primary health care workers at the commune level and over 60,000 at district level. 
Table 2-3 summarises the ratio of doctors and nurses to the population in 1995 and 1998. 
Table 2-3: Doctor-population and nurse-population ratios in 1995 and 1998 
Regions/provinces 
Doctors  
(per 100,000 
people in 1995) 
Doctors  
(per 100,000 
people in 
1998) 
Nurses  
(per 100,000 
people in 
1995) 
Nurses  
(per 100,000 
people in 
1998) 
Red River Delta 37 42 56 50 
North East 35 38 46 50 
North West 27 32 74 75 
North Central Coast 26 29 44 44 
South Central Coast 34 37 48 48 
Central Highlands 34 39 54 55 
South-eastern 41 47 64 60 
Mekong River Delta 25 27 35 36 
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Sample provinces 
Hai Phong 
58 56 79 83 
Ninh Binh 40 43 44 40 
Dong Thap 26 29 27 33 
All Viet Nam 42 44 65 60 
 
Source: National human development report (2001) 
2.7 Role of the private health care sector 
Vietnam also has a parallel system of privately provided health care that is particularly active 
in outpatient care (Berman 2000). Though entities within the private health system function 
independently of each other, it can be informally understood as an unstructured, unconnected 
and usually unregulated three-tier system (Hong Ha, Berman and Larsen 2002). The first tier 
is formed by the three private hospitals which are based in large cities, and have the capacity 
to provide modern medical and surgical services. The second tier is constituted by partially 
equipped, privately operating, qualified primary care physicians, working either 
independently or in small groups. They are based in cities, towns and rural areas, and 
primarily cater to the needs of middle-income individuals. The final tier is made up of 
partially trained mobile health workers, who operate as physicians in rural villages, and 
provide services at flexible hours, visit patients at home and usually accept fees as cash or in 
other forms. Some provinces had reported having at least five of these ‘physicians’ operating 
in each commune (Hong Ha, Berman and Larsen 2002). These health workers play a vital 
role in providing health care to rural Vietnamese, who often do not have easy access to public 
health facilities. People commonly use private providers for illnesses like arthritis, asthma, 
coughs and fever.  
Using a small sample of 153 individuals, Tuan et al (2005) found that the mean scores of 
patient satisfaction with physicians were consistently higher for private providers, though the 
difference was not statistically significant owing to the small sample size. The same study 
found that practitioners at public sector health centres had better clinical knowledge and 
skills, at least for some illnesses, than private physicians. This suggests that patient 
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satisfaction may be influenced by the clinic environment, attitude of physicians and ease of 
access. Hong Ha et al (2002) used a multivariate logistic regression model, finding that the 
richest two quintiles were twice as likely to choose private care over public care for illnesses 
affecting children under the age of 15. For adults, the difference was far less obvious. The 
preference for private health care was obvious in all regions of Vietnam, especially in the 
north central and southeast regions and central highlands.  
Table 2.4 summarises the findings of VLSS 1997-98, which suggests that health service 
utilisation was consistently high in the richest socioeconomic quintile, except for the use of 
commune health stations, which are based mostly in rural villages. The socioeconomic 
difference in utilisation was observed to be highest in the use of hospital care.  
Table 2-4: Distribution of health services utilisation across socioeconomic quintiles, 1998 
Provider 
Poorest 
quintile 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
3 
Quintile 
4 
Richest 
quintile 
All public providers 13.5 16.2 20.9 21.2 28.2 
Public hospitals 7.9 11.2 16.0 23.0 41.9 
Commune health 
stations 20.0 23.0 25.5 19.1 12.4 
Private clinics and 
doctors 11.2 15.5 21.7 20.3 31.2 
Drug vendors 15.0 19.1 21.2 21.1 23.6 
Traditional healers 12.2 14.7 16.1 22.2 34.7 
 
Source: Sepehri et al (2005) 
Since Doi Moi, private pharmacies also exist in most parts of the country. There were around 
3,000 licensed pharmacies in Vietnam in the early 1990’s, with almost one-third of them in 
Hanoi. There were an additional 1,000 state-run retail pharmacies at the time. Sales at private 
pharmacies accounted for almost three quarters of the total pharmacy sales in the country 
(Valedin et al 1992).  
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2.8 Financing of the health care system 
The public sector health care system of Vietnam is financed primarily from general taxation. 
Both provincial and district governments retain much of the revenue raised through taxation, 
and use it to fund services in the region. Some of the vertical programmes run by the central 
government are funded directly by them. Communal funding also forms a small part of the 
resources generated at the local level, though much of it is undocumented (Ensor 1995). 
Sepehri, Chernomas and Lodhi (2005) report that, in the year 1998, approximately 47% of 
public hospital revenue was sourced from the state budget, while out-of-pocket user charges 
and health insurance contributions added another 30% and 15% respectively (table 2-5). It 
should be noted that the focus of this thesis is only on the out-of-pocket expenditure 
component of health care financing. 
Table 2-5: Sources of public health financing contributions in 1990s1 
Year  State budget Out of pocket 
user fee 
Health insurance 
contribution Other 
1994 76 9 8 7 
1995 54 19 10 17 
1996 55 23 13 9 
1997 52 27 17 4 
1998 47 30 15 8 
Sources: Sepehri, Chernomas and Lodhi (2005) and 
Vietnamese Living Standard Survey (1997-98) 
 
In 1997, the state budget for health was 4,328 billion VND (US$ 47 million), 62% of which 
was spent on curative care (Khe et al 2002). Although the public health expenditure per 
capita increased by 3.86 times between 1991 and 1998, it was only 0.6% of the GDP in 1998. 
The public health expenditure in Hai Phong province was highest among the sampled 
provinces in 1998, although the expenditure as a proportion of the provincial GDP was only 
0.5% (table 2-6).  
 
                                                           
1
 These figures only represent the contributions made towards financing public health facilities. Expenditure 
made to purchase health care at private facilities is not taken into account. 
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Table 2-6: Public health expenditure in regions of Vietnam in 1990s 
Region 
Public 
health 
expenditure 
1991 (VND 
per capita) 
Public 
health 
expenditure 
1993 (VND 
per capita) 
Public 
health 
expenditure 
1998 (VND 
per capita) 
Public 
health 
expenditure 
as % of 
GDP (1998) 
Public health 
expenditure as 
% of total 
local 
government 
expenditure 
(1998) 
Red River 
Delta 5810 13015 23055 0.6 6.1 
North East 6074 12862 26867 1.1 6.2 
North West 5439 9595 34335 1.8 7.1 
North Central 
Coast 3775 11276 22390 0.9 7.1 
South Central 
Coast 6554 13308 23850 0.8 6.1 
Central 
Highlands 5798 14625 33913 1.0 6.6 
South-eastern 13386 26302 31345 0.4 5.4 
Mekong River 
Delta 4542 11027 20942 0.6 6.0 
Sampled provinces 
Hai Phong 
12810 22835 25442 0.5 6.3 
Ninh Binh 4504 11362 22072 1.1 6.8 
Dong Thap 4711 9306 19928 0.7 6.0 
All Viet Nam 6495 14336 25132 0.6 6.1 
Source: National Human Development Report (2001) 
Out of pocket (OOP) payment for health care is an important mechanism of financing in 
Vietnam for both public and private health care systems. When the expected cost of care is 
high, households often decide not to seek care because of their poor ability to pay. In a small 
sample of 418 individuals, Khe et al (2002) reported that 20.2% of the sick individuals in the 
bottom quintile (compared to 8.2% in the richest quintile) were deterred from seeking formal 
Chapter 2  Vietnam: its demography and health care system 
 
32 | P a g e  
 
care because of lack of money. Table 2-7 shows the distribution of average out-of-pocket 
expenditure for hospital visits and the average length of hospital stay across the 
socioeconomic quintiles. These figures suggest that the richest quintile spends substantially 
more in absolute monetary terms and also has a longer length of hospital stay, compared to 
the poorest quintile. Table 2-8 presents the average OOP expenditure per contact as a 
percentage of annual non-food expenditure per capita. This table suggests that the 
proportionate socioeconomic sacrifice made by the richest quintile to achieve better access to 
health care is less than the proportion sacrificed by the poor.  
Table 2-7: Average out-of-pocket expenditure per contact and length of hospital stay 
(in ‘000 of Vietnamese Dongs - VND) 
 
Socioeconomic quintiles  
(based on per capita expenditure) 
 
Average Poorest Quintile (2) 
Quintile 
(3) 
Quintile 
(4) Richest 
OOP expenditure 
per hospital contact 169.0 82.0 143.0 169.0 186.0 193.0 
OOP expenditure 
per hospital 
admission 
862.0 217.0 405.0 600.0 1038.0 1907.0 
OOP expenditure 
per patient day 60.0 21.0 38.0 43.0 71.0 101.0 
Annual admission 
rate (per 1000) 50.4 33.9 43.5 49.3 61.9 63.3 
Length of hospital 
stay (days) 14.3 10.3 10.9 13.9 14.6 18.8 
Distribution of 
aggregate hospital 
days (%) 
20.0 9.7 13.2 19.0 25.1 33.0 
Sources: Sepehri, Chernomas and Lodhi (2003) and Vietnamese Living Standard Survey (1997-98) 
 
 
Chapter 2  Vietnam: its demography and health care system 
 
33 | P a g e  
 
Table 2-8: Affordability ratio (average OOP expenditure per contact as percentage of annual 
non-food expenditure per capita) 1998 
Affordability ratio 
Average Poorest quintile 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
3 
Quintile 
4 
Richest 
quintile 
Commune health stations 1.3 3.8 3.1 2.0 1.4 0.9 
Private clinics and 
physicians 2.1 5.5 5.3 4.4 1.6 1.0 
Hospitals 
      
All contacts 10.9 22 21.8 17.6 12.2 4.6 
Hospital admissions 55.7 57.9 61.6 62.4 67.9 45.3 
Source: Sepehri et al (2003) 
Informal payments for health care, often called ‘envelope payments’ in Vietnam, are common 
practice in the system. Without such payments, treatment is not thorough and often delayed. 
Sepehri et al (2005) also add that there is growing evidence that the number of laboratory 
investigations also depend on the method of financing and on envelope payments. In some 
studies, these payments have accounted for up to 36% of the hospital fee and 19.6% of the 
total hospital bill (Tran 2001). 
2.9 Background on health insurance in Vietnam 
The Health Insurance programme in Vietnam was formally launched in August 1992, 
following the issuing of the National Health Insurance Decree (Ministerial Decision No. 
299/HDBT), which called for Compulsory Health Insurance (CHI) for salaried workers in 
both public and private sectors (the latter for companies with over ten employees). The stated 
goals of the scheme included raising additional resources, assisting in poverty alleviation 
efforts (particularly for special merit groups), and increasing financial protection against 
uncertain future health care expenditures (Solon and Tien 1997). The health insurance 
programme was later expanded to include a Voluntary Health Insurance (VHI) component 
which provided coverage for those who were not covered by the CHI. The focus of this thesis 
is on this latter component of the insurance programme, i.e. VHI. 
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Figure 2-3 (below) summarises three distinct population groups based on their eligibility to 
enrol in the CHI or the VHI programme. Only group 2 (individuals eligible for VHI) is 
relevant to the current thesis.  
Group 1 (CHI eligible group) consists of individuals who are currently in formal employment 
(public or private sector), and those who have retired from public sector employment. This 
group is required to purchase membership in the compulsory health insurance programme. 
Members of the CHI programme contribute 1% of their salaried income, with employers 
contributing a further 2%. More than 80% of the approximately seven million people eligible 
for this scheme were enrolled in the CHI programme in the 1990s (Ensor 1995; Jowett and 
Thompson 1999). This thesis does not study the CHI programme; hence, group 1 is not a 
subject of this study. 
Group 2 (VHI eligible group) consists of the individuals who are: i) employed in the informal 
sector; ii) employed by small private enterprises that are not part of the CHI programme; iii) 
self-employed, including farmers and service workers; iv) dependents of those insured under 
the CHI programme; and iv) school children and other students. These individuals were 
encouraged to insure themselves under the VHI programme. In 1999, approximately 10% of 
those eligible for VHI membership had purchased insurance. Those who did not purchase the 
insurance cover paid full user charges. Several reasons have been suggested for the low 
uptake of voluntary insurance amongst adults. One is the lack of institutional capacity at 
provincial and district levels to develop mechanisms that facilitate VHI enrolment. For 
example, monthly contributions would allow those who cannot afford to pay the full annual 
premium in one go, to join. Similarly, no regulations exist concerning how premiums should 
be set under voluntary insurance, e.g. linking to local income levels, or limiting the frequency 
of premium increases. Since the focus of this study is on the VHI programme, this thesis is 
only concerned with Group 2.  
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individuals were therefore eligible for humanitarian health insurance assistance, paid for by 
the government or non-governmental organisations. In 1998, over 99% of those low-income 
individuals eligible for free health insurance, i.e. group 3, were not covered by health 
insurance; they were awaiting allocations from poverty alleviation funds or non-
governmental organisations such as the Red Cross. Enrolment in this group is only likely to 
increase substantially if sufficient funds are available and politicians make the issue a 
priority. This thesis does not focus on humanitarian health insurance. 
For the VHI programme, provincial funds proposed a contribution level to the Provincial 
People’s Committees, who gave the final approval. Premiums were fixed within provinces, 
but varied between them, and are typically in the region of US$ 2-10 for an annual policy 
(Jowett et al 2003). Fixed premiums are likely to lead to the problem of adverse selection, i.e. 
those at greater risk of falling ill or those who are already ill are more likely to subscribe to 
the VHI programme. Since the premiums are generally calculated on the basis of average risk 
of illness, if significantly greater number of high risk individuals bought insurance 
membership, the VHI programme would struggle to achieve solvency. Hence, when 
establishing an insurance premium, there is a trade-off between ensuring that the premiums 
are affordable to the large majority of the population, whilst also making sure that the risk 
pool is sufficiently balanced between high and low risk individuals to avoid insolvency. In 
the case of Vietnam, while the National Directorate of the Voluntary Health Insurance 
Agency (VHIA) undertook costing studies, premiums appeared to be based on informal 
estimates of willingness and ability to pay at the provincial level. 
One measure taken by central government was to establish a ceiling on a patient’s annual out-
of-pocket health expenditures, equivalent to half the minimum annual salary, approximately 
860,000 VND (Solon and Tien 1997). This applies to both individuals paying full user 
charges and to those making co-payments under health insurance. Co-payments were 
introduced as part of Article 7, Decree 58/1998, to limit excessive use of health services 
(Jowett et al 2003). Under this measure, insured patients are obliged to make a copayment of 
20% of the full user charges applicable, for the services they receive. 
At the time of the survey, membership was based around individuals, rather than families, 
under both compulsory and voluntary schemes.  
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2.9.1 Health care benefit of VHI 
Under the initial decree of 1992, benefits under compulsory insurance were defined as 
including medical examinations, diagnostic tests, drugs, and diagnostic and treatment 
operations. Two types of policy are offered under the voluntary scheme, one covering only 
inpatient services, and a second covering both inpatient and outpatient services, with the 
benefits covering consultation fees, diagnostic tests and medicines. At the time of purchasing 
an insurance policy, individuals must designate one public health facility at which benefits 
can be obtained which, in most cases, is a District Hospital. Members were thus unable, at the 
time of the survey, to use the insurance policy at private or non-designated public facilities.  
Health insurance essentially offers financial benefits (i.e. an 80% reduction in user charges), 
rather than coverage for additional health services, or service provision in a separate facility. 
During the survey, it became clear that in some provinces separate consultation rooms and 
wards are made available, with ceiling fans, as well as tea-making facilities. However, in 
many cases these benefits appear to be only for those with compulsory insurance, which 
highlights the lack of clarity on this issue. 
Health facilities are reimbursed by provincial health insurance funds for the services they 
provide to insured patients. Reimbursements are made on a fee-for-service basis, which 
generally includes a flat fee for accommodation, and a standard fee for medical tests and 
procedures. A Ministry of Health Circular in October 1995 revised the approach to 
reimbursing providers from a fixed in-patient day payment to a fee-for-service basis. 
This chapter provided an overview of the context of Vietnam, its socio-demographic context 
and health financing system. The next chapters will discuss the methods used to evaluate the 
impact of Vietnamese VHI on cost of health care and its socioeconomic distribution.  
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3.1 Health financing methods in the developing countries 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Improving health status of the poor is fundamental to socioeconomic development and 
poverty reduction in the developing countries (Strauss and Thomas 1998). When access to 
health care is determined primarily by ability to pay, the distribution of health and health 
service utilisation is likely to be distributed in an inequitable manner (Bloom and Canning 
2003; Rocio and Jairo 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). Hence, extending financial 
protection mechanisms to improve access to health care is a major policy objective in most 
low- and middle-income countries. 
The aim of section 3.1 is to discuss health financing strategies used in the developing 
countries. The remaining part of section 3.1 is organised as follows. Sub-section 3.1.2 will 
outline the issue of uncertainty in the nature of health care costs, followed by a discussion in 
sub-section 3.1.3 on risk management strategies used by households in the developing 
countries. Finally sub-section 3.1.4 will discuss the commonly practiced health financing 
methods in the developing countries. 
3.1.2 Uncertain nature of health care costs 
Health care costs, unlike some other household expenses, are intrinsically uncertain. This is 
because health care need is not only unpredictable in its magnitude but also in its frequency 
and timing in the life cycle of an individual (Brown and Churchill 1999). Economists have 
often attempted to model and predict future health care need and level of health service 
utilisation based on age, health status, genetic predispositions and socioeconomic status. Vliet 
(1992) noted that, despite these modelling attempts, no more than 20 percent of the total cost 
variation in utilisation can be explained in a typical model. 
Narayan et al (1999) added that uncertainty in health care costs is also well appreciated by 
poor households. In their analysis of interviews conducted with more than 20,000 low-
income individuals in 23 developing countries, Narayan et al found that low-income 
households considered illness (or injury) and death to be the most unpredictable events in 
their lives. In a similar vein, Brown and Churchill (1999) found that households associated 
different degrees of uncertainty to five groups of events; the least amount of uncertainty was 
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associated with regular life cycle events, followed by death or disability, and finally events 
requiring health care or those affecting massive population proportions (mass co-variants 
including epidemics and natural disasters). Figure 3-1-1 shows the relative position of these 
events in terms of uncertainty and expected cost. In Brown and Churchill’s study, health care 
costs were suggested to have moderate to high levels of uncertainty, and moderate level of 
cost impact. This makes insurance a relevant concept in this context to provide protection 
against financial risk.  
Figure 3-1-1: Uncertainty and relative costs of household events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brown and Churchill (1999) 
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Households use both formal and informal strategies of managing financial risk associated 
with the use of health care. This thesis will discuss the strategies under three main categories: 
• Risk reducing strategies; 
• Risk coping strategies; and 
• Risk pooling strategies. 
Risk reducing strategies include saving and investment mechanisms. These methods are 
planned ex ante, i.e. households plan and act in advance of the risk event to reduce the 
probability of financial catastrophe. Risk coping strategies, on the other hand, are ex post 
mechanisms used to cope with the damaging impact of a risk event. These include selling of 
assets and borrowing from lenders in formal or informal sector. Finally, risk pooling 
strategies, including insurance mechanisms, are also planned ex ante to protect against the 
undesired financial consequences of risk events. Households often use more than one risk 
strategy to manage risk.  
Risk management strategies exist both in formal and informal varieties. Here, the formality of 
a strategy is defined in terms of the organisational structure of the institutions involved in risk 
management, and their ability to legally enforce contractual agreements. This thesis will 
briefly discuss formal strategies of risk management. The examples discussed do not provide 
an exclusive list of methods, but are useful for the purpose of illustrating the strengths and 
weaknesses of each group of strategies. 
 
3.1.3.1 Formal risk reducing mechanisms 
To reduce the risk of financial catastrophe from health care costs, households may use 
strategies including, but not limited to, medical savings accounts, micro-savings, investment 
in businesses and diversification of income. Here, medical savings accounts and micro-
savings in community banks will be briefly discussed.  
Medical Savings Accounts (MSA) 
MSAs currently operate mainly in China (Hindle 2000), South Africa (Matisonn 2000), the 
United States (Decker 2000) and Singapore (Phua 1997). They are inter-temporal self-
insurance schemes where individuals or households deposit voluntary or compulsory 
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contributions into personalised savings accounts that are designed to spread the financial risk 
of health care over time (Dixon 2002). Funds are operated either by the state, an insurance 
company or a bank. Individuals manage their own accounts, and, at least theoretically, there 
is no incentive for moral hazard. MSAs are usually set up in conjunction with a private health 
insurance plan to protect individuals from catastrophic health care expenditure. Since there is 
no risk sharing or pooling involved, some would argue that MSAs do not reduce inequity in 
financing or improve access to health care. Dixon (2002) notes that MSAs had in fact 
aggravated inequalities between rural and urban populations. Further research is required to 
establish the usefulness of MSAs in the context of developing countries.  
Community Banks 
The concept of community banking has been operationalised in several forms in developing 
countries; these vary from the less formal village banks to the well-regulated micro-finance 
institutions. Two of the largest community banks targeting the poor are Grameen Bank 
(Bangladesh) and SEWA (India). These are community-based savings and credit associations 
that do not require collateral or group guarantees, and operate on no joint liability principles. 
With a total deposit standing at US$973.02 million in April 2009, Grameen is probably the 
largest community bank in the world. Both Grameen and SEWA mainly target rural women, 
and through them have facilitated a culture of savings and self-sufficiency. These banks have 
established a network of community workers who collect small savings from the poor, which 
can then be used to protect against financial catastrophe at a later date. 
Critics argue that formal community banking systems may be less efficient than Self-Help 
Groups (SHG) that operate on the same principle but are more flexible and less structured 
than community banks (Harper 2002). Large community banks may have a high staff per 
client ratio compared to SHGs. Another limitation that affects formal savings institutions is 
due to the fact that community banks only deal with cash contributions, the rural poor often 
have limited access to cash and rely on in-kind transactions that are not accepted at 
community banks.  
It should be mentioned here that many of these community banks also offer micro-insurance 
plans to support the health care of its members. Grameen, BRAC and SEWA are important 
examples of this dual-purpose community banking system.  
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3.1.3.2 Formal risk coping mechanisms 
Risk coping strategies mainly involve borrowing money or selling resources to pay for health 
care. Commercial banks, community banks, credit unions and micro-credit banks offer formal 
risk coping mechanism in the developing countries. Most of these institutions, except for the 
community banks discussed above, require collateral before any loan is disbursed. Bouman 
and Houtman (1988) note that credit programmes of the formal banking system may be 
beyond the reach of the rural poor who do not have any collateral. Consequently, the low 
income households either end up selling their assets or using the exploitative services of 
pawnbrokers. Where community banks exist, affordable borrowing mechanisms may provide 
a promising mechanism of risk coping.  
 
3.1.3.3 Formal risk pooling mechanisms 
The WHO (2000 p.115) defines risk pooling as ‘the practice of bringing several risks together 
for insurance purposes in order to balance the consequences of the realization of each 
individual risk’. An ILO (1996 p.35) study adds that risk pooling mechanisms facilitate 
‘reduction or elimination of uncertain risk of loss for the individual or household by 
combining a larger number of similarly exposed individuals or households who are included 
in a common fund that makes good the loss caused to any one member’.  
Formal risk pooling mechanisms include, among others, social health insurance, private 
health insurance, and voluntary or community-based health insurance programmes. While 
each of these mechanisms is practiced in the developing countries to various extents, the next 
sub-section will discuss only the most common methods of health financing in this context. 
3.1.4 Health financing methods in developing countries 
Figure 3-1-2 identifies health financing methods practiced in the developing countries, 
highlighting the ones that are more common than others. The following health financing 
methods account for the greatest share of the total health care spending and will be discussed 
in more detail below:  
• out of pocket (OOP) user-fees;  
• income taxation and general revenue-based financing;  
• voluntary and community-based health insurance (not for profit). 
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Figure 3-1-2: Health financing methods in the developing countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Normand and Busse (2002) – modified for the case of developing 
countries 
The other formal methods of health financing in developing countries include Social Health 
Insurance (SHI), private for-profit health insurance and medical savings accounts. These are 
not discussed here as they account for a relatively small share of health care spending in 
developing countries. 
3.1.4.1 Out of pocket user fees 
This is the most common method of health financing in developing countries. Using this 
method, health care is bought directly in return for the payment made. Hence, the cost 
incurred by an individual is a direct function of the quantity and quality of care received. 
Jowett et al (2003) noted that since the wider introduction of user fees in government 
Providers 
Risk-pooling entity 
Tax 
collector 
Social Health 
Insurance 
Population 
Private Health 
Insurance 
Voluntary health 
insurance or 
community-based 
health insurance 
Out-of-pocket 
payments 
General 
taxation and 
revenue 
Social 
insurance 
contributions 
Health 
insurance 
contributions 
Health 
insurance 
contributions 
Chapter 3.1                                              Health financing methods in the developing countries 
 
45 | P a g e  
 
facilities in the developing countries, access to health facilities is largely determined by a 
household’s income level. Waddington and Enyimayew (1989) adds that, owing to the 
financial implications of health care costs, households often delay seeking care until the 
disease severity has progressed and more expensive treatment is required. Furthermore, when 
treatment is expensive, poor households often rely on informal medical care that is more 
affordable but less effective and potentially damaging to health (Fabricant et al 1999). 
Hardeman et al (2004) noted that, due to poor targeting of fee exemptions policies in 
Cambodia, OOP payments have often failed to protect the poor from financial catastrophe. 
Both inclusion and exclusion errors have accounted for this failure. Inclusion error occurs 
when resources leak to those who are better off, and exclusion occurs when those who need 
exemption are unable to receive it. Inclusion errors commonly occur when there is lack of 
accountability and absence of clear guidelines. Exclusion error occurs when user fees serve to 
top up health care providers’ income and each exemption is seen as a loss of revenue; or in 
another case when health workers do not have the expertise, resources, time and incentive to 
objectively assess patients’ ability to pay (Huber 1993).  
Literature shows that introduction of user fees has usually done more harm than good. User 
fees tend to reduce the demand for health care, increase the likelihood of financial 
catastrophe and poverty, and promote inequities in health care use (Gilson and Mills 1995; 
Mbugua, Bloom and Segall 1995; Meessen et al 2006). Xu et al (2003 p.111) add that poor 
households ‘can be protected from catastrophic health expenditures by reducing a health 
system’s reliance on out-of-pocket payments and providing more financial risk protection’. 
Some of the African countries, including Uganda and South Africa, have recently abolished 
user fees for primary health care. Similarly, Zambia has eliminated user fees at rural health 
facilities. These changes have generally resulted in an increase in utilisation, at least in the 
short-term. In the case of Uganda, health service attendance increased by almost 50-100% 
(Xu et al 2006). However, the increase in use was observed mainly in relation to curative 
care, which in some cases crowded out the preventive care (Wilkinson et al 2001). However, 
these findings should be interpreted with caution, since early evaluation of user fee 
elimination may overestimate the impact of the policy. Furthermore, studies have also found 
that, although the volume of care increased after fees elimination, the quality of care rapidly 
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3.1.4.2 General taxation and general revenue-based financing 
General taxation and revenue-based financing are the main sources of public health financing 
in 106 of the 190 countries evaluated by the WHO (Savedoff 2004). In high income 
countries, almost two-thirds of public sector expenditure is funded through tax revenues, 
while in low-income countries virtually all of the public health expenditure is generated 
through this source (WHO 2001). However, public health expenditure accounts for a 
significantly smaller proportion of total health care expenditure in the developing countries; 
most of the financing of public and private health care occurs through OOP payments.  
Some of the strengths of the general taxation and revenue-based health financing system are 
as follows:  
• Since the tax-based system relies on a broad revenue base, the financial burden can be 
spread over a larger proportion of the population. Value added taxes, sales taxes and 
import taxes account for a large proportion of the total revenue generated in 
developing countries. 
• Income tax structure can be designed to be progressive so that the amount of 
contribution reflects the socioeconomic status of an individual. 
• General taxation can be designed in an equitable manner by selectively taxing the 
services and commodities that are more likely to be consumed by the higher 
socioeconomic groups. 
However, in the case of developing countries, general taxation or a revenue-based system of 
financing has several weaknesses and limitations. Some of these limitations are outlined 
below: 
• Tax collection requires well-developed administrative and economic capacity, which 
is generally low in the developing countries.  
• Administratively, income tax collection can be highly challenging when a major part 
of the economy is employed in the informal sector. The ILO (1996) estimates that 
approximately 61% of the urban employment sector in Africa is informal. In Vietnam 
in 1998, the informal economy managed by non-farm households alone employed 
24% of adult workers. Furthermore, a sizeable proportion of the farm-based economy 
was classed as informal. As a result, income taxation only generates 7% of the total 
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revenue in the developing countries in contrast to 22% of the total GDP in developed 
countries (Auriol and Warlters 2004). 
• General taxation can be highly regressive. This is particularly the case when 
governments add heavy taxes on items of regular household consumption. 
With these limitations of the OOP payments and general taxation/revenue-based financing, 
voluntary health insurance has seen a substantial increase in developing countries. Below I 
will discuss the general concept of VHI along with its strengths and weaknesses. 
3.1.4.3 Voluntary health insurance or community-based health insurance 
While some studies define voluntary health insurance (VHI) under the umbrella term of 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) (Ekman 2004), this thesis distinguishes between 
them. CBHI is a generic term used in the literature to refer to risk pooling mechanisms where 
premiums are community rated, i.e. all members make a flat rate contribution, irrespective of 
their risk status. Whereas CBHIs are usually managed by non-governmental entities 
(including, but not limited to, communities themselves and non-governmental organisations), 
VHI programmes are generally managed by public sector organisations. CBHI programmes 
may be organised at the level of small communities or larger regions, while VHI programmes 
are generally managed at regional, provincial or national level. The underlying principle of 
the two mechanisms is broadly the same, i.e. to provide accessible and affordable health care 
to the population. Both CBHI and VHI are managed on a non-profit basis.  
Under VHI and CBHI programmes, members contribute insurance premiums at the time of 
registration, which may be supplemented further by co-payments for the services at the time 
of seeking access to care. Insurance premiums are usually collected by the programme 
organiser directly or through intermediate bodies; these may include community members or 
designated public sector individuals/bodies. When seeking care, depending on the design of 
the programme, an insured member may need to pay the user fees for the care sought, or may 
get a discount from the provider on the care sought. If the members are required to pay user 
fees, the payment claims are then sent to an insurance programme operator who would 
subsequently reimburse the payment after thorough assessment. If instead the patients get a 
direct discount at the health facility, the service provider would submit the reimbursement 
requests to the insurance operator. In the case of CBHI, the operating NGOs may re-insure 
the risk with a private insurance company. Figure 3-1-3 summarises the general models of 
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two CBHI schemes in India. In the SEWA scheme, the insured members make the full 
payment at the health facility and then send the reimbursement claims to the CBHI operator. 
In the ACCORD programme, the insurer provides a direct discount at the time of seeking 
care. Figure 3-1-4 presents a simplified structural organisation of the Vietnamese VHI 
programme. It is interesting to observe that the organisational structure is very similar to the 
ACCORD scheme in India which is implemented at a much smaller scale. 
Figure 3-1-3: Insurance benefit and reimbursement structure of two Indian CBHI schemes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Devadasan et al (2007) 
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Figure 3-1-4: Insurance benefit and reimbursement structure of the Vietnamese VHI 
programme 
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the study points out that most schemes fail to provide protection to the poorest households. 
Jowett et al (2003) suggests that highly cohesive communities, and those endowed with dense 
horizontal networks, are more prone to collective action, and thus more likely to purchase 
health insurance, which is also suggested in previous studies.   
The key strengths of VHI and CBHI programmes are summarised below: 
• Jakab and Krishnan (2001) reviewed 45 published and unpublished reports on the 
experience of CBHI and VHI to conclude that these  programmes improved the level 
of access to health care in low-income settings, especially for the poor, by reducing 
the price of health care. 
• Voluntary insurance also tends to protect individuals from the catastrophic impact of 
health care costs. This in turn protects households from compromising their financial 
capacity to afford basic subsistence goods.  
• Health insurance programmes tend to improve resource mobilisation, although the 
resources mobilised may not be sufficient to make the programmes financially self-
sustainable.  
• VHI and CBHI programmes are especially appropriate for countries where the 
majority of the adult population is employed in the informal sector. For instance, in 
Tanzania, where the social health insurance programme covers the workers in the 
formal sector, the CBHI was found to be more appropriate for those employed in the 
informal sector (Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004).  
• VHI and CBHI can pave the way towards an employment based social health 
insurance programme.  
In the literature, the following have been highlighted as potential weaknesses of the VHI and 
CBHI programmes: 
• While the VHI and CBHI programmes have shown evidence of reducing barriers to 
financial access, membership does not provide complete protection against financial 
catastrophe. Devadasan et al (2007), in their study of two community health insurance 
programmes in India, found that voluntary insurance halved the incidence of 
catastrophic expenditure. Furthermore, Ekman (2004) and Preker and Carrin  (2004) 
noted that, since the poorest households had limited access to insurance due to their 
inability to pay for insurance premiums, the level of protection for the poorest 
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households was, in some cases, was less than that for the relatively better-off 
(Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004).  
• Since the premiums charged by VHI and CBHI programmes tend to be low, in most 
cases the resources generated may not be great and the programme needs to be 
supplemented by other sources of revenue including user fees, government subsidies, 
and donor assistance. This is further aggravated by the small size of the insurance 
pool, especially in case of CBHIs. The ILO STEP study found that, out of 85 
programmes evaluated, 70% had less than 200 members (ILO and STEP 2002). 
Consequently, the sustainability of these programmes may sometimes be 
questionable. Some of the CBHI schemes reinsure the risk pool with larger private 
insurance programmes that have greater ability to cope with financial shocks.  
• VHI and CBHI programmes tend to attract individuals with high expected costs of 
care. As a result of this moral hazard, insurance pools often tend to deplete very 
quickly (Hsiao 2001).  
• Evidence suggests that the insurance operators very rarely negotiate the quality of 
care provided for the insured members. Hence, insurance programmes have not been 
observed to improve care when the quality is poor. This finding is further confirmed 
by the ILO and STEP study, which illustrate that only a minority of schemes (16 
percent of the 62 cases for which information is available) negotiate the quality and 
costs of services with providers. Most simply purchase services at market prices (ILO 
and STEP 2002). Ekman (2004) found that there is weak or no evidence that schemes 
have an effect on the quality of care, or the efficiency with which care is produced.  
With their strengths and limitations, voluntary insurance schemes have now been a highlight 
in health sector development for more than a decade. This study will explore the impact of 
the Vietnamese VHI programme on the average cost of care and its socioeconomic 
distribution after correcting for self-selection biases.  
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3.2 Self-selection biases in cost of care models 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Self-selection biases are recognised as important methodological concerns when modelling 
individual-level health care costs. These costs are only observed when an individual decides 
to seek health care, given his/her illness. If the care-seeking decision is correlated with the 
expected cost of care through unobserved factors, the endogeneity of care-seeking decision 
can introduce bias in the cost of care models. This kind of self-selection is termed ‘care-
seeking self-selection’. The other kind of self-selection that this thesis addresses relates to an 
individual’s decision to seek insurance membership. Since the insurance decision can also be 
correlated with the expected cost of care through unobserved factors, the potential for bias 
cannot be ignored. This kind of self-selection is termed ‘insurance-seeking self-selection’ in 
this thesis. 
The aim of this section of the literature review is to discuss how these two kinds of self-
selection decisions can potentially bias regression estimates. This discussion will then turn to 
the models presented in chapter 4, which aim to correct for the two types of self-selection. 
3.2.2 Care-seeking self-selection  
Care-seeking self-selection bias is a form of sample selection bias that occurs when the 
outcome of interest is only observed for a sub-sample of the population that meets some 
criterion defined with respect to certain exogenous variable, and this selection criterion is 
related to the outcome of interest (Breen 1996; Bhat and Jain 2006). In the context of health 
care expenditure analysis, the cost of care (the outcome of interest) is only observed for 
individuals who decided to seek health care (the selection criterion). Therefore, while a larger 
proportion of the sample may be in need of health care, only a sub-sample is observed having 
incurred non-zero costs, leaving non-care-seekers with zero observed cost. If this decision to 
seek health care, i.e. the selection criterion, is randomly distributed in the population or if the 
decision to seek health care was unrelated to costs when health care was sought, then there 
would be no cause for concern. However, if the care-seeking decision is distributed such that 
it is associated with the expected cost of care, through factors not known to the analyst, then 
the parameter estimates from the cost model, based only on the observed cost, will be biased. 
In other words, if the unobserved factors affecting the care-seeking decision are correlated 
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with the unobserved factors determining the level of health care costs when care is sought, 
then the model estimates cannot be generalised to the entire population of sick individuals.  
For example, risk averse behaviour may be an unobserved factor associated with the care-
seeking decision and also with the expenditure incurred when care is sought. Risk averse 
individuals may be more likely to seek health care, but when care is sought their expenditure 
would be lower than the population expectation. Hence, estimating a model for expected 
expenditure based on only the observed sample of individuals who utilise health care may 
underestimate expected expenditure in the population. In another example, if there is a 
systematic tendency in the sample, such that the sicker individuals living in poverty tend to 
avoid seeking care  because of the high levels of expected cost, then the parameter estimates 
from cost models will be biased downwards. They will not reflect the true relationship 
between the expected cost and the socioeconomic variable in the population. In summary, if 
there are systematic differences between those who self-selected, and those who did not, and 
such differences are systematically associated with unobserved factors that determine the 
outcome variable, then the expected value and population regression function cannot be 
directly estimated (Jones 2007).  
To put this mathematically, let the cost of care model be expressed as: 
 =   + 	           [3.2.1] 
Here   is the cost of seeking health care and  is a vector of exogenous variables.  is only 
observed if an individual seeks care, i.e.  depends on an exogenous variable  such that: 
  > 0    = 1= 0    = 0               [3.2.2] 
 represents the care-seeking decision which can be estimated as a probit model that uses the 
cumulative standardised normal distribution to model binary choice variable. A probit model 
for care-seeking decision can be expressed as [3.2.3]: 
Pr[ = 1] =   +  	         [3.2.3] 
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Here  is a vector of exogenous determinants of care-seeking decision and Φ is the 
cumulative normal density function. Equation [3.2.3] can be manipulated to show that an 
individual would seek care when 
	 ≥ −           [3.2.4] 
If the expected value of the unobserved factors, represented by 	, is equal to zero, i.e. the 
unobserved factors are distributed randomly, then equation [3.2.1] is a good estimator of the 
population regression function. However, if the unobserved variables of the two processes in 
equations [3.2.1] and [3.2.3] are not independent of each other, then the expectation of 	 in 
equation [3.2.1], conditional on care-seeking, will not be equal to zero. This is because the 
expectation of 	 will also depend on the care-seeking process, as shown in equation [3.2.5]: 
!"	| ,  = 1% =  !"	| , 	 ≥  −%        [3.2.5] 
This endogenous dependence of the error term violates one of the fundamental assumptions of 
least squares regression, which assumes that the error term in the model is randomly 
distributed, with an expectation of zero. As a result, the sample regression function will not be 
a good estimator of the population regression function. This is represented in figure 3.2.1, 
which shows that when the observed cost for non-care-seekers is zero, the OLS regression 
function is less steep than the population regression function. Hence, the care-seeking bias 
would result in an under-estimation of the regression coefficients. 
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Figure 3-2-1: The effect of care-seeking self-selection on regression estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sigelman and Zeng (1999) 
Heckman (1976, 1979) explains that self-selection bias stems from the common problem of 
omitted variable bias. This is obvious from equation [3.2.6] below, which shows that the 
expected value of cost of care for the sample data now also on , which was omitted in 
equation [3.2.1].  
! | ,  = 1 =   + !"	'	 ≥  −  %        [3.2.6] 
Self-selection bias was first studied by labour economists, who were interested in estimating a 
model for the potential wage function for a population. Data on wages is only observed for the 
individuals who self-selected to participate in the labour market, while those who did not 
participate had zero observed wages. Labour economists have explained that individuals only 
decide to participate in the labour market if their unobserved threshold of wage demand is 
met. In cases where the market offers lower wages than the reserved threshold, individuals 
stay unemployed, and in turn have zero observed wages (Gronau 1974; Heckman 1974; 
Winship and Mare 1992; Kyriazidou 1997). Heckman (1974) argued that, if one is aiming to 
model the wage function of the population, then the self-selection decision cannot be ignored. 
He showed that when modelling female labour supply or their market wages, the presence of 
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unaccounted self-selection bias will produce biased and inconsistent coefficients on OLS 
regression.  
3.2.3 Insurance-seeking self-selection 
Classical linear regression assumes that all the independent variables in the model are 
exogenous, i.e. they are determined outside of the model. In other words, correlation among 
the independent variables in the model, and also between the independent variables and the 
unobserved factors in the error term of the model should be zero. If this condition is violated, 
then the model suffers from endogeneity bias, and therefore the parameter estimates based on 
such a model will be biased. 
Insurance status influences both the care-seeking decision and the cost for health care function 
of an individual. If part of this influence occurs through unobserved determinants of 
insurance-seeking decisions that also have a bearing on care-seeking and cost of care models, 
then insurance status is not an exogenous variable, because part of it is determined within the 
model (Gruber 2000).  
Like the care-seeking self-selection decision [equation 3.2.3], the insurance-seeking decision 
can also be represented as a probit model with binary dependent variable: 
Pr[) = 1|*+ ] =  Φ *++ + 	+         [3.2.7] 
Here ) is the insurance status of an individual and *+′  represents a vector of exogenous 
variables. Endogeneity bias can arise in care-seeking models if there is a non-zero correlation 
between 	+ for the insurance equation, and 	 for the care-seeking model. Similarly, it can 
arise in the cost of care equation if there is a correlation between 	+ and 	-. In other words, 
as sample size increases, regression coefficient β. does not converge in probability to the true 
value of population parameter β. The bias will be equal to ρ σε σ/0 , where ρ  is the correlation 
between the error terms of care-seeking and insurance-seeking models, or care-seeking and 
cost of care models, σε is the variance of the error term of the outcome model, and σ/ is the 
variance of endogenous variables. 
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This bias is more likely to occur in the case of VHI programmes, that tend to attract sicker 
individuals, or individuals who expect to have high cost of health care. Regression models can 
control for the observed differences in health care needs, but many inherent risk-related 
characteristics of an individual are not observed, and therefore cannot be controlled for in the 
analysis. 
Besides individual intrinsic factors, there may be environmental factors affecting self-
selection decisions and the cost of health care. Consider an example where the probability of 
an individual purchasing health insurance is reduced, due to the large distance between his/her 
village and the nearest health facility where the insurance card is accepted. This distance may 
also reduce the probability of the individual seeking care when sick, and in turn the observed 
cost of health care, with or without insurance. If the distance variable is an unobserved factor 
in the study, then part of the calculated association between health insurance status and the 
cost of health care may not actually be due to insurance, but underlying unobserved factors. 
Similar consideration can be given to other unobserved characteristics related to an 
individual’s personal preferences, which may affect the tendency to purchase insurance as 
well as health spending behaviour. However, the direction of this bias cannot be predicted 
without an empirical analysis of the insurance programme (Meer and Rosen 2003). 
Anticipation of a relatively high level of utilisation in the future may incline an individual to 
seek health insurance, which will lead to an upward bias in the estimated association between 
insurance and health care utilisation. On the other hand, insurers may introduce procedures 
that would cream off only the most profitable low-risk clients, and decline insurance to 
individuals with high expected utilisation (Sekhri and Savedoff 2005; Osei-Akoto 2003). In 
such scenarios, due to low levels of utilisation and expenditure among the insured compared 
to the wider population, the estimated impact of health insurance on the cost of health care 
may be biased downwards. In another example, Dor et al (2006) point out that if insurance is 
correlated with an unobserved trait, say ‘awareness’, then it may lead individuals to purchase 
insurance and also to seek health care, then the error terms would be positively correlated and 
the bias would be downwards. Similarly, if insurance is associated with an unobserved trait, 
say ‘negligence’, then the correlation would be negative and the bias upwards.  
Hadley (2003) reviews the literature on the role of health insurance in improving access and 
utilisation of health care, and notes the scarcity of research that adjusts for insurance 
endogeneity bias. In recent years, however, there are more studies considering endogeneity 
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bias. Ekman (2007b) uses the national household survey data from Jordan to analyse the 
impact of health insurance on health care utilisation and expenditure. The author used a two-
part model, with the first part modelling the probability of non-zero utilisation, and the second 
part modelling health care utilisation or expenditure conditional on positive utilisation. Ekman 
(2007b) found that the effect of health insurance on improving access to health care, and 
reducing health care expenditure, became more pronounced after correcting for endogeneity 
bias. Dor et al (2006) used data from a US national health and retirement study, and found a 
six-fold increase in insurance effect on health scores after adjusting for insurance 
endogeneity. Similarly, van Dalen (2006) uses Chinese health and nutrition to study the effect 
of health insurance membership on demand for health care. After correcting for endogeneity 
bias, using the instrumental variable method, they find that insurance does not seem to have a 
significant effect on health care utilisation and expenditure. This is partly attributed to high 
levels of out-of-pocket payments made by both the insured and uninsured. Finally, Waters 
(1999) uses data from the Ecuador Living Standards Measurement Survey 1995 to evaluate 
the impact of health insurance on health care utilisation. After correcting for insurance 
endogeneity bias, Waters found that the General Health Insurance programme in Ecuador has 
a strongly positive association with curative health care, but has no significant effect on the 
use of preventive care.  
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3.3 Outline of equity argument 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Health care payments in most developing countries are directly linked to the quantity of care 
received, regardless of the household’s socioeconomic status. As a result, millions of poor 
households are left without much access to affordable health care (Lewis 2007, Falkingham 
2004; Xu et al 2003; Whitehead 2001). Such disparities in the socioeconomic distribution of 
health care costs have been of serious concern among policy makers and researchers in recent 
years (Gwatkin et al 2004). Studies have found that the richer quintiles of population 
systematically contribute less as a percentage of their total disposable income or consumption 
expenditure towards health care (Glinskaya 2005; Fabricant et al 1999; Wagstaff et al 1999). 
Despite this, their contribution is high enough, in absolute monetary terms, to facilitate 
privileged access over the poor (Makinen et al 2000). These concerns over inequity have 
been addressed widely in the literature on both developed countries (Rubio, Smith and 
Doorslaer 2008; Rice and Smith 2001; van Doorslaer et al 1999; Wagstaff et al 1999; Larison 
et al 1995) and the developing countries (O’Donnell et al 2005; Schneider and Hanson 2006; 
Yu, Whynes and Sach 2008; Cisse´ et al 2007; Abu-Zaineh et al 2008; Gilson et al 2001; 
Markova 2007; Castano et al 2002; Hajizadeh and Connelly 2009).  
The equity concerns raised in this thesis stem from two observations about health care 
financing:  
a) A disproportionately high cost burden on poor households in relation to their ability to 
pay deters them from seeking health care, and in turn aggravates the unequal 
distribution of health across the socioeconomic gradient. 
b) This cost burden can also have a disproportionately high impoverishing effect on poor 
households in terms of their consumption of essential goods and services.  
These arguments form the basis of the case for developing health financing policies which 
decouple the relationship between the level of payment and the level of service use (to 
promote horizontal equity in delivery), and also to link health care payments to ability-to-pay 
(to promote vertical equity in financing) (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993; Wagstaff 2002b).  
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The primary objective of this section of the chapter is to briefly discuss the concept of equity 
from a pragmatic perspective for the current thesis. The remaining section is organised in the 
following manner, and will discuss as follows: sub-sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 will discuss 
practical definitions and principles of equity for the current study, sub-section 3.3.4 will 
discuss the choice of reference distribution for the current study; sub-section 3.3.5 will 
discuss the concepts of vertical and horizontal equity, and their relevance to health care 
financing. 
3.3.2 A pragmatic approach to equity 
Equity is an ethical concept grounded in the theory of distributive justice (Rawls 1985). It is 
different from individual preference, since ‘the source of value for making judgments about 
equity lies outside, or is extrinsic to, preferences’ (Culyer 1980, p.60). Hence, the principles 
of equity are derived from social value judgments about the claims that individuals ought to 
have (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000), without having to rely on the discretionary 
benevolence of other members of the society or the state.  
A theoretical debate around the conceptual foundations of equity is not the subject matter of 
the current review. Instead, discussion is built on a working definition of equity. Braveman 
and Gruskin (2003) define equity in health as ‘the absence of systematic disparities in health 
(or in the major social determinants of health) between social groups who have different 
levels of underlying social advantage/disadvantage — that is, different positions in a social 
hierarchy’. Here ‘health’ can be interpreted broadly to encompass related concepts including 
access to and financing of health care.  
Whitehead (1992) adds that any differences in health and health-related distributions should 
be considered inequitable if they are unnecessary, avoidable, unfair and unjust. Hence, a 
distribution of health care costs may be inequitable if it systematically disadvantages those 
already marginalised as a result of existing disparities (McIntyre et al 2006). These equity 
concerns may be reinforced by efficiency concerns about potential productivity losses among 
the poor, which may limit economic growth for the whole of society (Chima, Goodman and 
Mills 2003). The pursuit of equity also finds support in the constitution of the WHO (WHO 
1946) and international human rights treaties. 
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3.3.3 A focus on distributive justice 
Normative research is commonly concerned with the distributive and procedural justice of a 
health care system. In the current study, the interest lies with the former with respect to health 
care costs. One classic idea of egalitarianism is based on the principle of distribution in 
relation to merit or need. The Aristotelian principle of justice argues that individuals should 
be treated the same if they are the same in morally relevant respects, and that when 
individuals are different in morally relevant respects they should be treated differently 
(Meurer 1999). This argument has laid the foundation of the concepts of vertical and 
horizontal equity. When applied to the financing of health care, for instance, vertical equity 
might imply that rich individuals ought to pay more than poor individuals – usually argued to 
be in proportion to the ability to pay (Wagstaff, Doorslaer and Paci 1989).  
3.3.4 Reference distribution for equity analysis 
Health economists generally tend to evaluate the distribution of health-related variables 
against the socioeconomic gradient in the society. For the purpose of analysis, certain 
baseline inequalities are, for justifiable reasons, taken as given. For instance, when studying 
equity in health care utilisation, the existing differences in need for care, caused by 
underlying inequalities in health, are usually not the primary subject of analysis. Rather it is 
the inequity in the distribution of use in relation to the need for care, which is of concern. 
Similarly, when measuring inequity in the financing of health care, the baseline distribution 
of income, consumption expenditure or wealth is taken as given, and the subject of study is 
inequity in the relationship between socioeconomic distribution and health care costs.  
Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) argue that an exclusive focus on socioeconomic inequality 
can potentially overlook the inequalities associated with other, perhaps equally important 
factors, such as regional variations, that may limit access to health care. While this argument 
may carry weight in the context of health and health care utilisation, the context of 
socioeconomic distribution remains the most relevant baseline comparator when analysing 
health care financing. This is mainly because socioeconomic status forms the most important 
barrier to seeking health care (van Doorslaer and O’Donnell 2008).  
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3.3.5 Horizontal and vertical equity 
In the context of health care, fairness and justice are usually measured based on two 
important concepts: horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity refers to ‘equal 
treatment of equals’, while vertical equity refers to ‘appropriately unequal treatment of 
unequals’ (O’Donnell et al 2007a). Horizontal equity has primarily been studied in the 
context of health care utilisation, where the focus is on equal utilisation for equal need, 
irrespective of other characteristics such as socio-economic status (van Doorslaer et al 2000; 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, and Paci 1991). In a survey of 
health care decision makers, Mooney et al (1995) found that the majority of respondents 
supported this principle of equal access for equal need, and were not prepared to deviate from 
this principle by, for example, weighting health gains for the poor more highly than health 
gains for the rich, or vice versa. Vertical equity, on the other hand, has mainly been of 
concern in health care financing, where the usual argument is that payments should be in 
proportion to the ability to pay. Hence, individuals with unequal ability to pay should face 
appropriately unequal costs of health care (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Paci 1989; McIntyre 
and Gilson 2002).  
Vertical equity is of special interest when health care is financed through out of pocket 
payments, and the care received is a direct function of the payment made. The principle of 
vertical equity would argue that, if individuals X and Y have different abilities to pay, such 
that X earns twice as much as Y, then X should pay twice as much as Y for health care, 
irrespective of the level of need and service use. Hence, based on this principle, a financing 
system would be regarded as unequal, on grounds of vertical equity, if payments are not in 
proportion to income (or wealth or consumption or other socio-economic variable measured 
in money terms).  
This thesis proposes a new approach to defining vertical equity in financing that also 
incorporates the concept of vertical equity in utilisation. It argues that health care utilisation 
should be in proportion to the level of need while health care payments should be in 
proportion to the ability to pay. In other words, this thesis argues for differential use for 
differential need and differential payment for differential ability to pay. Hence, it is proposed 
that those in greater need should be able to receive greater health care, whilst being able to 
pay based on the ability to pay and not the quantity and quality of care received. This 
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approach controls for the unmet need for health care use, which is ignored in the traditional 
approach to vertical equity. 
This thesis analyses vertical equity in health care financing in Vietnam, and evaluates the 
impact of the Vietnamese voluntary health insurance programme on equity. The next section 
will discuss the equity indices and the potential biases associated with standard methods of 
equity measurement.   
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3.4 Review of equity and progressivity indices 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a significant increase in the number of health insurance programmes 
in developing countries. These programmes include both for-profit and not-for-profit 
schemes providing different levels of cover (Drechsler and Jütting 2005). When insurance 
programmes use price discrimination based on individual risk of ill-health, equity concerns 
are severely exacerbated (Jack 2002). Hence, not-for-profit health insurance programmes 
with premiums based on “community rating” – i.e. everyone in the community pays the 
same, irrespective of their health risk – have been seen as more equitable alternatives.  
The aim of this section is to discuss the common methods employed to measure vertical 
equity in the distribution of health care financing, and to highlight their limitations. The 
concept of vertical equity in financing has been elaborated in sub-section 3.3.5. The 
remaining section is organised in two parts. Sub-section 3.4.2 will discuss the standard 
approaches used to measure equity and progressivity in financing. Then sub-section 3.4.3 will 
evaluate the methodological challenges that arise when these approaches are used in the case 
of out-of-pocket costs. In chapter 5, the thesis will propose improved methods that could be 
used to overcome the methodological limitations of the standard approach. 
3.4.2 Standard approaches of measuring equity 
Health financing policies are frequently evaluated against their equity goals (van Doorslaer 
and Koolman 2004; Yip and Eggleston 2004; Bundorf and Pauly et al 2006). This sub-section 
of the review will focus on two approaches commonly used to quantitatively measure vertical 
equity in financing: 
i) Evaluation of the magnitude and direction of the interaction term between 
individual socioeconomic status and health insurance status while modelling health 
care costs. 
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ii) Evaluation of the distribution of health care costs against the socioeconomic 
variable, and measurement of the degree of departure from proportionality using 
concentration and Kakwani indices.  
Both of these approaches are discussed separately below. 
3.4.2.1 The first approach: evaluation of the interaction term in the cost of care 
regression model 
An interaction term between insurance and socioeconomic status of an individual is 
commonly employed in regression models to analyse the equity impact of insurance 
membership on health care costs (Ekman 2007b; Sepehri, Sarma and Simpson 2006; Jowett, 
Contoyannis and Vinh 2003) and health service utilisation (Yip and Berman 2001; Waters 
2000). Interaction terms are useful when the effect of an independent variable (x1) on the 
dependent variable (y) is moderated through another independent variable (x2), whose 
magnitude dictates the level of effect of x1 on y (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). In the case of 
health insurance, we test the hypothesis that the relationship between socioeconomic status 
and the cost of care depends on the insurance status of the individual. The coefficient on the 
interaction term suggests the direction and magnitude of the influence of insurance 
membership, if any, on this relationship. 
Statistically speaking, the coefficient on the interaction term represents the difference 
between the insured and the uninsured, in the slope of the regression line representing the 
relationship between the cost of care and socioeconomic status. In other words, the 
coefficient is equal to the amount by which the slope of the average relationship between cost 
of care and socioeconomic status is expected to change when insurance status changes from 
insured to uninsured. The coefficient is calculated by taking the second order  partial 
derivative of the expected value of cost of care (y) with respect to the socioeconomic variable 
(x1), and then dividing it by the change in insurance status (x2) (see equation 3.4.1). 
12 =  ∆
4![5|1]46∆7              [3.4.1] 
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The coefficient on this interaction term provides an estimate of the equity impact of the 
health insurance programme on the predicted cost of care. Suppose that the insurance variable 
is coded 1 if an individual purchased health insurance and 0 otherwise. Here, a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term in the cost of care model would suggest that the average 
change in the expected cost of care for a unit increase in the socioeconomic variable, keeping 
all else constant, is greater for the uninsured group compared to the insured. This would 
manifest itself graphically as a steeper cost of care curve for the uninsured. The equity 
interpretation of a negative coefficient is that insurance reduces the cost of care significantly 
for the lower socioeconomic groups than for the higher socioeconomic group (Jowett, 
Contoyannis and Vinh 2003). In other words, insurance has a greater protective effect on the 
poor. On the other hand, if the coefficient was positive, the average relationship between the 
cost of care variable and socioeconomic status would favour the richer quintiles.  
When cost of care and socioeconomic variables are both log-transformed in the model due to 
their skewed distributions, the coefficient on the interaction term represents the difference in 
elasticities (Wooldridge 2003). In other words, the coefficient estimates the difference 
between insured and uninsured groups, in the percentage change in the expected cost of care 
associated with a one percentage point change in the socioeconomic variable.  
The advantage of using a regression-based interaction analysis is that it controls for the 
differences in observed need and non-need variables, whilst estimating the relationship 
between insurance and cost of care. This can be crucial when there is reason to suspect that 
the insurance purchase decision was not random, and that observed differences in individual 
characteristics may have made some individuals more likely to enrol in the programme. 
However, as discussed earlier, an ordinary least squares model will not correct for the 
differences in the unobserved determinants of self-selection, leading to biased estimates of 
the interaction coefficient. Nevertheless, corrective models can be employed which will be 
discussed in chapter 5.  
The other challenge in using the interaction term approach is that it only estimates the 
average effect of the interaction between insurance membership and socioeconomic status, 
and tells us nothing about the distribution of health care costs across socioeconomic groups. 
It is in this context that the equity and progressivity indices become valuable. 
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3.4.2.2 Second approach: measuring equity and progressivity of financing 
While the first approach to equity analysis evaluates the impact of insurance membership on 
the expected cost of care, the second and more common approach focuses on the distribution 
of health care costs in relation to a socioeconomic variable. This approach measures equity in 
financing based on concentration and Kakwani indices. These indices and the approach are 
discussed below. 
3.4.2.2.1 Measuring inequality in cost of care distribution using concentration index 
A concentration curve is the generalised form of the well known Lorenz curve. Technically 
speaking, the concentration curve is a monotonically increasing cumulative density function 
showing distribution of the variable of interest sorted by socioeconomic status (Roy, 
Chakravarty and Laha 1959, Mahalanobis 1960, Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Paci 1991, 
Kakwani, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1997, Cowell 1995). This distribution is subsequently 
compared with a uniform distribution that represents equality. In the current study, we 
evaluate the cumulative proportion of cost of health care plotted against the cumulative 
proportion of population ranked by consumption expenditure. A concentration index (CI), in 
turn, measures the departure of the concentration curve from an egalitarian distribution, and 
is therefore used as a summary measure of socioeconomic inequality in the distribution of 
health care costs. 
Following the notation from O’Donnell et al (2007a), a concentration index (CI) can be 
represented as twice the area between the concentration curve and the line of equality: 
89 = 1 − 2 : ;<=>=6?           [3.4.2] 
where Lh(p) is the cumulative function of cost of health care sorted by socioeconomic status. 
The concentration index is best applied to cardinal variables with non-negative values; hence 
cost of health care is an appropriate candidate. Since CI is invariant to multiplication or 
division by a constant scalar (Kakwani 1980), choice of the type of currency or its 
denomination, or a uniform change in the time period of cost incurrence that does not alter 
the proportional relationship between individuals in terms of relative cost incurrence, the 
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value of concentration index will not change. Also, if the choice of the socioeconomic 
variable changes from consumption expenditure to total income or wealth, and such change 
does not alter the rank order of individuals, then the concentration index will remain 
unchanged. 
The value of any CI varies between -1 and +1, with a negative sign suggesting a higher 
concentration of the cost of health care among the poor [pro-rich], and a positive sign 
suggests a higher concentration among the rich [pro-poor]. A negative [positive] index can 
occur in two instances:  
1. If the concentration curve always lies above [below] the 45 degrees line, or 
2. If the concentration curve crosses the 45 degree line and the area above 
[below] the 45 degree line is greater than the area below [above].  
Similarly, the index would take a value of zero if it lies everywhere on top of the egalitarian 
line, or if it crosses the line of equality, and the areas above and below the line are equal 
(Wagstaff 2002a). This can be potentially misleading, and therefore the index should always 
be studied in conjunction with the concentration curve.  
In summary, the sign of index suggests direction of the relationship between cost of health 
care and the socioeconomic variable, and the magnitude of the index suggests the strength of 
this relationship (O’Donnell et al 2007a). 
3.4.2.2.2 Progressivity in financing and the Kakwani index 
Although the concentration index is a useful indicator to measure the degree of 
socioeconomic inequality in the cost of health care, it does not enable one to say much about 
progressivity or regressivity of a financing system, defined in relation to the baseline 
distribution of socioeconomic status. Castano et al (2002) add that a pro-poor pattern of 
concentration curve may be a delightful finding for an analyst. However if the Lorenz curve 
for the socioeconomic variable exhibits a pro-rich distribution that outdoes the pro-poor 
pattern of cost of care, then the true regressive nature of the system will only be revealed 
when the two distributions are graphically compared.  
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The standard approach used to measure progressivity in health financing involves calculating 
the Kakwani Index of progressivity (KI). KI compares the concentration index for the cost of 
care variable with the Gini index, which represents inequality in socioeconomic variables 
(Kakwani 1977). The Gini index is defined as the area between cumulative distribution of the 
socioeconomic variable, represented by the Lorenz curve, and the line of equality. Podder 
(1995) explains that, conceptually, the KI is a measure of elasticity that quantifies 
proportional change in the cost of care variable in relation to change in socioeconomic status.  
Mathematically, the Kakwani index is twice the area between the concentration curve for the 
cost of care and the Lorenz curve for the socioeconomic variable (equation 3.4.3).  
@A = 2 : B;= −  ;<=C>=6?        [3.4.3] 
Here @A is the Kakwani index, Ly(p) represents the Gini index (G) based on the Lorenz curve, 
and Lh(p) is the concentration index (CI) based on the concentration curve. Equation 3.4.3 
can be simplified as: 
@A =  89< − D           [3.4.4] 
If the cost of care is progressive [regressive], the concentration curve will lie below [above] 
the Lorenz curve, and KI will be positive [negative] (Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2000). The 
value of the KI ranges from +1 to -2, where +1 represents a scenario when the pre-payment 
socioeconomic variable is distributed equally among all members of society, but cost of care 
is borne only by one individual. -2 signifies the other extreme, whereby all of the pre-
payment socioeconomic variable is concentrated in the hands of the richest individual, but the 
entire cost of care is borne by the poorest individual.  
In reality, the value of the KI lies between these two extremes. The Kakwani index will be 
zero if cost of care is perfectly correlated with socioeconomic status, and the two curves lie 
on top of each other, representing proportionality of financing, or in another case when the 
concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, and the areas above and below the point of 
crossing cancel out. This makes it important for the KI to be evaluated alongside the 
graphical representations of the concentration and Lorenz curves (Wagstaff et al 1989).  
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3.4.3 Methodological challenges in the use of standard approaches 
When standard approaches of measuring equity in financing are applied to the case of out of 
pocket cost of care, the analysis can produce misleading and biased estimates. This is 
primarily because the standard approaches ignore the benefit side of health care financing, 
and also do not control for potential care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection biases. 
Below we discuss these methodological issues in terms of how they can potentially bias the 
equity analysis.  
3.4.3.1 Potential bias in equity analysis due to unmet need 
In a predominantly out-of-pocket (OOP) system of health financing, health care is bought 
directly in return for the payment made. Therefore, when an individual cannot afford to pay 
much and the amount of care received is therefore small, the level of unmet need for health 
care may be high. Need is generally defined using the Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) definition 
as the amount of resources (expenditure) required to exhaust capacity to benefit. In case of 
the current study, since care is received directly in return for OOP payment, need is defined 
as the OOP payment required to exhaust capacity to benefit.  
The traditional concentration index approach to equity in financing focuses on the 
distribution of observed health care costs, and does not take account of the level of care 
received in return for the payment. This approach may be reasonable in high income 
countries with universal health care systems, where the receipt of care is, to a large extent, 
decoupled from the ability and willingness to pay. However, when the amount of care 
received is closely tied to the actual payment for health care and often grossly out of 
proportion to the level of need, as in most developing countries with predominantly OOP 
health care financing, the standard approach will produce only a biased assessment of equity. 
In a similar vein, O’Donnell et al (2007a) point out that an analysis of the welfare-reducing 
effect of observed health care costs that ignores the welfare-increasing effect of health care 
consumption (tied with health care costs), can potentially lead to misleading results. This 
argument applies to most of the developing countries where financing is not independent of 
utilisation, and the quantity of care received is a direct function of the ability to pay.  
To demonstrate the above-mentioned bias in distributional analysis, consider an example of 
two individuals, X and Y, who have the same level of need for health care which requires 
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them to spend £100 each to exhaust their respective capacities to benefit. They both desire 
access to full treatment but have different abilities to pay: the disposable income of X is 
£1000 and the disposable income of Y is only £500. Consequently, rich individual X 
purchases the entire treatment that costs him £100 – i.e. 10% of his income - whereas poor 
individual Y can only afford partial treatment that costs £20 – i.e. 4% of his income. 
Individual Y will effectively have an unmet need for health care consumption equal to £80. 
Here we assume that cost of care reflects the use value of care, and that £20 buys only one-
fifth of the care bought by £100 in terms of value. 
When the above example is analysed using the traditional distributional analysis based on 
concentration and Kakwani indices, the results would suggest a pro-poor distribution of the 
cost of care, since poor individual Y contributes a smaller proportion of the income compared 
to the rich. In turn, he is implicitly assumed to make a smaller welfare sacrifice than X. The 
analysis, however, fails to account for the unmet need of individual Y, which results in a 
smaller treatment-related welfare gain compared to individual X. The traditional approach 
becomes even more questionable when Y has a higher need for health care than the rich 
individual, which is typically the case, resulting in an even greater unmet need for the poor.  
The equity approach proposed in this thesis standardises for individual differences in the 
level of need, in turn controlling for the unmet need for health care. The need standardised 
variable represents the cost of seeking health care when all individuals had the average level 
of need. The socioeconomic distribution of health care costs (i.e. the concentration curve) is 
thus determined by the differences in non-need variables and their influence on the predicted 
cost of care.  
The equity principle argued in this thesis is that individuals should pay for health care 
according to their ability to pay, whilst being able to exhaust their capacity to benefit from 
health care (which has been standardised in this thesis).  
3.4.3.2 Potential bias due to care-seeking self-selection 
As discussed earlier, the traditional equity analysis is based on evaluating the socioeconomic-
related distribution of the observed health care costs for the insured and uninsured groups. 
However, cost of care is only observed (and used in the traditional equity analysis) if an 
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individual seeks health care. If the unobserved determinants of the care-seeking decision are 
correlated with the socioeconomic status and/or the insurance status of an individual, then the 
actual cost of care will be systematically more likely to be observed for certain 
socioeconomic and/or insurance groups. As a result, an equity analysis of the socioeconomic-
related distribution of the observed cost of care and the effect of insurance on this distribution 
cannot be generalised to the whole population. 
To illustrate the case, consider an example of a small community of one hundred individuals, 
one half of whom sought insurance membership while the other half did not. It is likely that 
the poorer individuals in the community may be systematically less likely to seek care when 
ill because of their poor ability to pay (and/or low expectations and poor information). Hence, 
the cost of care may be systematically more likely to be observed for those in richer 
socioeconomic groups. However, for those with insurance membership, the price of health 
care at the point of delivery will be reduced; this in turn will influence the likelihood of care-
seeking. Therefore, it is likely that a higher proportion of the insured poor may decide to seek 
care compared to the uninsured poor, and in turn have non-zero costs. This potential 
correlation between insurance/socioeconomic status and the care-seeking decision can 
influence the cost distribution across the socioeconomic gradient.  
The care-seeking self-selection bias is, in principle, similar to the bias attributable to the 
unmet need for health care (identified in sub-section 3.4.3.1). For the current analysis, the 
primary difference between the two potential biases lies in the methodological treatment 
proposed to correct for the biases. To account for the bias attributable to unmet need for care, 
the proposed need standardisation is applied to the data for which the cost of care is observed. 
However, to account for the care-seeking self-selection bias, we first account for the potential 
correlation between the care-seeking decision and the cost of care model, and only after that 
apply the corrective measures of need standardisation. 
If care-seeking bias is not taken into account, as is the case with the traditional approach to 
equity analysis, the equity results will not be generalisable to the whole sample of sick 
individuals, but will be limited to those who sought health care. The corrective models will 
be discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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3.4.3.3 Potential bias due to endogeneity of insurance decision 
Earlier in the literature review, it was argued that the insurance decision can have a potential 
endogeneity effect on the expected cost of care. Here we add that, since the insurance 
decision is likely to be associated with the ability to pay, the endogeneity effect may not be 
equally distributed across all socioeconomic quintiles.  
Consider an example of a community to whom health insurance is offered. Further suppose 
that the insurance programme is designed in a way that the cost reduction benefit of insurance 
is greater for the services available at tertiary care facilities, which tend to be more accessible 
to those with higher socioeconomic status. In such case, there will be a differential effect of 
insurance membership across the socioeconomic gradient and the insurance benefit will be 
more pronounced for those with higher income. This, in turn, will influence the equity 
analysis that evaluates socioeconomic-related distribution of health care expenditures. The 
underlying cause of this endogeneity bias is attributable to the correlation between the 
unobserved determinants of insurance decision and socioeconomic status. 
In chapter 5, we propose methods to standardise need differences, and also simultaneously 
control for care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection biases. These methods will be 
applied to the case of the voluntary insurance programme of Vietnam. 
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3.5 Review of catastrophic cost of care analysis 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Protection from catastrophic health care costs is widely considered to be a policy objective 
for health financing systems (WHO 2000; Filmer, Hammer and Pritchet 2002). Since most 
developing countries rely heavily on out of pocket financing, a pay as you go principle leads 
to payments rising in proportion to service use. Consequently, households without any form 
of prepayment risk-cover often end up depleting their resource pools when the need for health 
care is high. This leaves very little for subsistence. If the incurred cost of health care is 
considered high in proportion to ability to pay, the resulting financial shock is termed 
‘catastrophic’. One common ethical position on catastrophic cost of care is that no one should 
have to spend more than a pre-specified fraction of their income, wealth, consumption or 
other monetary socioeconomic variable (Wagtsaff and van Doorslaer 2003). Xu et al (2003) 
found that catastrophic consequences are more common among households whose heads are 
elderly, disabled or unemployed.  
Catastrophic health care payments should not be treated the same as large health care costs 
defined in absolute monetary terms. A large surgery bill, for instance, may not be financially 
catastrophic for households with large pool of resources, whereas a regular episode of malaria 
can be financially devastating if a household does not have any reserves (Xu et al 2003). 
Catastrophic costs are therefore characterised in relation to the socioeconomic status of the 
household.  
3.5.2 Perspectives on the definition of a catastrophic event 
Wyszewianski (1986) defined catastrophic costs in terms of their effect on long-term 
spending and living standards. He argued that health care costs should be considered 
catastrophic if they lead to a reduction in basic subsistence spending, an increase in 
borrowing, a depletion of essential savings or the sale of essential assets over a period of 
time. Such a long-term impact has often been estimated in the literature when the researchers 
have access to panel data across several years (Lindelow and Wagstaff 2005; Wagstaff 2007; 
DeWeerdt and Dercon 2006; Gertler and Gruber 2002). When only cross-sectional data is 
available, it is not possible to model the degree of consumption smoothing over financial 
shocks. Hence the common approach is to estimate the welfare impact of health care costs on 
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the current level of consumption (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003, O’Donnell et al 2007b, 
Russell 1996).  
The catastrophic cost fraction can be represented as: 
8 = EF            [3.5.1] 
Here 8 is the catastrophic cost fraction, E represents the health care costs and F is the 
socioeconomic status variable. The underlying principle argues that the higher the fraction of 
health care costs, the greater will be the compromise made on the non-health care expenditure 
to cope with the shock. This will result in a cut back on essential spending, and subsequently 
on basic survival necessities. 
The level of reference threshold is based on what the researchers think is the appropriate cut-
off fraction, beyond which health care costs will seriously disrupt the consumption of other 
goods. Some authors have used a threshold of 10% of the budget share beyond which costs 
are labelled catastrophic (Devadasan 2007; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Russell 1996), 
while others have used a range of values between 5% and 30% (Somkotra and Lagrada 2008; 
van Doorslaer and O’Donnell 2007; Wyszewianski 1986; Berki 1986; Ranson 2002; Waters 
et al 2004). Some WHO studies suggest a higher threshold of 40% of the socioeconomic 
variable (Murray and Evans 2003; Xu et al 2003); this has been supported by few other 
studies (Sun et al 2009). To avoid making any subjective value judgment about the threshold 
value, researchers usually report the catastrophic incidence at multiple threshold levels, and 
leave it to the reader to reach his/her own conclusions. We have followed this strategy in the 
current study, and have used values between 10% and 40% with intervals of 10%.  
3.5.3 The choice of denominator for catastrophic analysis 
The incidence of financial catastrophe depends on both the incurred health care costs (the 
numerator) and the choice of socioeconomic variable (the denominator). Researchers have 
commonly used either total consumption expenditure or income as the relevant denominator. 
The life cycle income hypothesis suggests that individuals tend to smooth their consumption 
over their life cycle, in order to ensure a desirable level of consumption across all life periods 
(Ando and Modigliani 1957). Hence, the current level of consumption is a good indicator of 
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the long-term socioeconomic status of an individual. Xu et al (2003) suggest that 
consumption smoothing can be reflected by the following equation: 
8G = HG + IG +  ∑ 2K2L6 M2N21 + ∑ M2N2K2L6 O             [3.5.2] 
Here 8G is consumption at time t = 0, G and 2 are incomes at time t = 0 and t > 0 
respectively,  IG is the annualised value of savings and debts at time t = 0, N is [1/(1+r)] (r 
being the market interest rate), and M2 is the probability of being alive in the subsequent 
future year. This equation suggests that, when a household has access to savings and 
borrowings, the current level of consumption is a function of current income, current holding 
of assets, the probability of living and earning in future successive years, and the market 
discount rate. Hence the current consumption level captures the interactive dynamics of the 
socioeconomic context of an individual.  
One argument against the use of consumption expenditure as the appropriate denominator is 
due to its direct relationship with health care costs, i.e. the numerator (health care cost) is also 
part of the denominator (total consumption expenditure). However, the other alternative, i.e. 
the cost-income ratio, is regarded to be insensitive to the source of health financing 
(O’Donnell et al 2005). Households may use means other than income (savings, borrowings 
or assets) to finance health care, but this will not be reflected in the denominator. More 
importantly, it will not be obvious whether health care costs have displaced non-health care 
consumption, because consumption is not captured in the equation.  
When using consumption expenditure as the relevant denominator, it is common practice to 
evaluate catastrophic incidence with reference to total and non-subsistence consumption 
expenditure separately. Subsistence is usually defined in terms of the absolute minimum 
considered essential for survival. Since food is generally agreed to be the basic survival 
necessity, researchers commonly use non-food consumption expenditure as a proxy indicator 
of the non-subsistence socioeconomic variable (van Doorslaer and O’Donnell 2007).  
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3.5.4 Incidence of catastrophic costs in developing countries and the 
potential role of insurance 
Financial catastrophe is a common consequence of health care use in developing countries. 
Naga and Lamiraud (2008) proposed that the performance of an insurance programme should 
be measured against the catastrophic incidence rate among the insured. When insurance cover 
is insufficient, either because the proportion of the population insured is low, or because of  
the lack of generosity of insurance benefits, the overall level of protection would be highly 
compromised (Scheil-Adlung et al 2006).  
Most of the studies in the past decade have found a positive role for insurance in offering 
protection against financial catastrophe. A comparative analysis of health care payments in 
11 Asian countries found that health systems relying heavily on out-of-pocket payments, and 
not offering a widely accessible insurance programme, are most likely to have a high rate of 
financial catastrophe (van Doorslaer and O’Donnell 2007). Among the Asian countries, 
Vietnam, India and Nepal were notable for out of pocket financing of at least three-quarters 
of total health care costs.  
Devadasan et al (2007) investigated the impact of voluntary health insurance on catastrophic 
incidence among hospitalised patients. Based on their analysis of two voluntary health 
insurance programmes in India, ACCORD and SEWA, they found that insurance 
membership halved the incidence of financial catastrophe. In a similar study, Sun et al (2009) 
evaluated the impact of China’s New Cooperative Medical Scheme on the probability of 
catastrophic events before and after insurance reimbursement, and found that programme 
membership reduced the catastrophic intensity by 18.7%. Similarly, Knaul et al (2006) found 
that the catastrophic incidence was significantly reduced in parts of Mexico when insurance 
cover was extended. 
In a study of the impact of user fee elimination in Uganda, Xu et al (2006) found that the 
catastrophic incidence rate was closely related to the cost of therapeutic drugs. They found 
that the catastrophic incidence did not fall after fee abolition, primarily because of the 
unavailability of essential drugs at public facilities. This led to financial catastrophe, because 
the cost of private medication was high. Similar phenomena can be seen when the insurance 
benefits fall short of protecting against drug costs.  
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3.5.5 Potential biases in catastrophic event analysis and relevance of the 
current thesis 
Analysis of catastrophic incidence may suffer from the self-selection biases discussed in 
earlier sections. These potential biases may under or over-estimate the impact of insurance on 
catastrophic event rate. In a recent paper, Galárraga et al (2008) evaluated the impact of 
insurance membership on catastrophic health care costs in Mexico and found that insurance 
endogeneity had resulted in an under-estimation of the protective effect of the Seguro Popular 
insurance scheme. In another study, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) found that, after 
correcting for potential insurance endogeneity using instrumental variables, insurance 
membership increased the likelihood of catastrophic events in China. They proposed that the 
increased risk could be attributed to the higher probability of care-seeking associated with 
insurance membership; their analysis did not correct for care-seeking self-selection bias. 
Hence, in the literature on catastrophic incidence analysis, only a handful of studies have 
endeavoured to account for insurance-seeking self-selection bias, and, to the best of my 
knowledge, none of these studies have accounted for care-seeking self-selection. Also, the 
evaluation and simultaneous correction of the two biases has not been attempted. In this 
regard, the current thesis will make a significant contribution to the literature.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to measure the direct impact of the Vietnamese Voluntary Health 
Insurance (VHI) programme on the cost of health care of sick individuals, after correcting for 
care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection biases. The specific research objectives are 
to:  
i) Model the cost of care after controlling for individual level need and non-need 
variables inclusive of insurance membership; 
Test and correct for the presence of care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection biases 
in the cost of care model, in order to estimate the unbiased relationship between VHI 
insurance membership and the cost of care. The cost of care models proposed in the current 
study aim to estimate the direct effect of health insurance on health care costs. However, the 
relationship between insurance and health care costs is complex. While insurance membership 
has a direct effect on the price of care at the point of delivery, it can also have elastic demand 
and supply effect which can actually increase the overall expenditure on health care by 
potentially increasing the frequency of treatment episodes, extent of diagnosis and 
investigations, quality and quantity of care received and the intensity of treatment. 
Furthermore, insurance membership can also impact on the likelihood of hospital inpatient 
admission and drug prescription patterns. Hence, insurance can have both direct and indirect 
effect on cost of care. However, in case of Vietnam, the precise magnitude of insurance 
coverage is uncertain, given the varying implementation of the VHI programmes. Hence, the 
models proposed in this thesis estimate only the direct effect of insurance on health care costs. 
It should be mentioned at the outset that this study is based on a secondary analysis of cross-
sectional data collected in Vietnam during 1999 and initially analysed by Jowett et al (2003). 
The current study aims to correct for the potential biases present in the earlier analysis.  
The remaining chapter is organised in the following sections. Section 4.2 will discuss the 
survey methodology used for data collection in the current study. This will be followed by 
section 4.3 discussing the econometric models used for correcting self-selection bias. The 
following two sections, 4.4 and 4.5, will discuss the results of descriptive data analysis, and 
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will be followed by results from the econometric analysis. Finally, section 4.5 will conclude 
the chapter with a discussion on the findings of this analysis.  
4.2 Survey methodology and data 
Data was collected through one-to-one questionnaire-based interviews, conducted by a team 
of trained interviewers. All the provinces with an active voluntary health insurance 
programme were eligible for sampling; however, the survey was conducted across three 
provinces with reasonably high membership rates, whilst taking account of the geographical 
variation between provinces. Samples were drawn from Hai Phong (population: 1.7 million; 
one third of which is urban) and Ninh Binh (population: 1 million; one quarter of which is 
urban) in the north-east and Dong Thap (population: 1 million; one-quarter of which is urban) 
in the south-west. Hai Phong was the primary centre for the insurance pilot in 1989, and 
hence had the most developed insurance programme in the country at the time of the survey. 
Within each province, one urban and two rural districts were randomly selected, followed by 
random selection of three communes (referred to as wards in urban areas) within each district. 
As a result, interviews took place in 27 communes, in nine districts of three provinces. Within 
each commune, members of voluntary health insurance programmes were randomly selected 
from lists supplied by Provincial Health Insurance offices. Uninsured individuals were 
randomly selected from lists of residents provided by the local People’s Commune Committee 
of each commune (Jowett et al 2003). Since the focus of the survey was on the voluntary 
health insurance programme, members of compulsory or humanitarian-based health insurance 
programmes were excluded from the study. A total of 1,650 adults and 1,101 children were 
interviewed, of which 19% were residents of Ninh Binh, 40% of Hai Phong and 41% of Dong 
Thap.  
Figure 4-1 presents a summary of the sample based on sickness, care-seeking decision and 
insurance status. It also identifies the potential self-selection biases at different levels.
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number of illnesses in the last three months). The socioeconomic status of the respondent was 
recorded using annual household consumption expenditure in the 12 months preceding the 
survey. Using ‘Permanent Income Theory’, attributed to Friedman (1957), it is argued that 
households smooth their consumption by accumulating or de-cumulating physical buffer 
stocks that may include farm animals, grains or jewellery. Hence, consumption expenditure is 
a better estimate of socioeconomic status than income (Conning and Udry 2005). 
Consumption expenditure data was adjusted for heterogeneity in household size by using the 
following equivalence scale proposed by Aronson et al (1994): 
P< = I< + ∅R<S           [4.1] 
where P< is the equivalence factor for household h, I< is the number of adults and R< is the 
number of children in the household h. Based on Wagstaff et al (1999), the two unknown 
parameters ∅ and T were set equal to 0.5. 
Data on illness, health care utilisation and costs were collected at an individual level for the 
three months prior to interview. From a total sample of 2,751 interviewees, less than half had 
fallen ill in the three months prior to this (figure 4-1). This sub-sample is the group of interest 
for the current analysis. Of these 1,192 individuals who reported illness, 985 individuals 
sought health care, and provided details of the total cost incurred during the last three months.  
Respondents were asked to recall direct health care costs (i.e. user fees for consultations, 
diagnostic tests and medicines), indirect costs (food and hospital stay, travel and other costs) 
and any unofficial payments (i.e. gifts to health care providers). Insured individuals were also 
asked about the payment they made in the form of the insurance premium. However, there 
were substantial non-responses to this question, possibly because many individuals purchased 
their policy several months before the survey. Given the difficulty in accurately establishing 
the premium paid, the amount was not included in estimations of health costs for the insured. 
Whilst a downward bias in estimates may be expected, the underestimation is unlikely to be 
substantial, given the low level of premiums relative to average health costs amongst insured 
patients (Jowett et al 2003). 
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4.3 Methodology 
This thesis models cost of care for the individuals who reported being ill in the three months 
prior to the survey.  The decision to focus on the sick population was made for the following 
reasons: a) health care expenditure data for the non-sick sub-sample had large number of 
missing values: 976/1558 (62.6%); b) in order to model health care costs for both sick and 
non-sick, we would require a complicated three-part model that can simultaneously model 
probability of illness, probability of self-selection decisions (care-seeking and insurance-
seeking) and the cost of health care. Because of the complexity of a three-part model, a 
methodological choice was made to focus on the sick sub-sample; and finally, c) since the 
insured often tend to be sicker, the impact of insurance, as measured in the sick population, is 
likely to be a conservative estimate.  
In order for the results of insurance to be generalisable to the population, the analysis makes 
the following assumptions: (i) insurance status does not alter the threshold for reporting 
sickness, i.e. insured and uninsured would report sickness at the same level, given the level of 
other attributes; (ii) had the non-sick become sick, the care seeking decision of the insured 
non-sick and the uninsured non-sick would be the same as the insured sick and uninsured 
sick, respectively; and finally, (iii) the effects of insurance on health care costs would be the 
same for the non-sick, had the non-sick become sick. Later, Table 4-1 shows that only a 
slightly higher proportion of the sick were insured compared to the non-sick (20.25% 
compared to 19.35%; t-statistic of difference: -0.58) which supports the assumption that 
insurance does not alter the probability of reporting sickness, although this is not a formal test. 
This study uses five different econometric models to estimate the impact of the Vietnamese 
VHI on the cost of care, with or without correcting for care-seeking and insurance-seeking 
self-selection biases. The first model is based on ordinary least squares estimation that does 
not allow for self-selection biases. The second model is a two-part model that separately 
estimates the probability of incurring any health care costs and the amount of health costs 
incurred when care is sought. This model assumes independence of the two processes, and 
hence does not allow for self-selection bias. Models 3 to 5 evaluate and correct for either care-
seeking or insurance-seeking, self-selection or both. Parameter estimates from these models 
are subsequently compared, and the effect of bias correction is evaluated. Since ‘cost of care’ 
and ‘household consumption expenditure’ variables have skewed distributions, these variables 
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have been log-transformed before being used in the models. Each of the five models is 
discussed in detail below. 
4.3.1 Model 1: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model for cost of care 
All models take as their dependent variable the log of the observed cost of health care for 
those individuals who reported any illness during the three months prior to the survey. 
Individuals who did not seek health care, despite their illness, were observed to have zero 
cost. Since the log of zero is undefined, a positive constant (+1) was added to the observed 
cost of all observations to ensure that the logged cost variable is a non-negative number. The 
independent variables used in cost models were selected based on: a) theoretical relevance of 
variables to cost of care; b) explained variance in the model; and c) the variables used in 
previous models reported in the literature, including the previous analysis of the thesis dataset 
[Jowett et al (2003)]. 
The naïve OLS Model 1 for cost of care can be represented as: 
![5] =  GG              [4.2] 
Here 5 is the log of health care cost, and G represents the association between independent 
variables and health care cost. The marginal effect is equal to [4!5|G/4G ] for continuous 
variables and ∆!5|G for binary variables (Cameron and Trivedi 2009 p. 102). 
The OLS model assumes that the observed health care expenditures (both zero and non-zero) 
are actual health care costs. Hence, the OLS approach does not (and need not) model the care-
seeking decision hurdle separately before health care costs are observed.  
4.3.2 Model 2: Two part model (TPM) for cost of care  
The two part model allows the predictors of health care costs to have a differential effect on 
the probability of incurring any costs and the amount of health care costs when care is sought. 
The model takes advantage of the rule of conditional probability, and splits the cost of care 
into two parts: the probability of incurring non-zero cost [Pr5 > 0]; and the level of 
observed costs conditional on incurring non-zero costs [!5|5 > 0]. In this study, positive 
costs are incurred only when health care is sought. Hence the probability expressions for non-
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zero cost [Pr5 > 0] and the care-seeking decision [Pr = 1] are equivalent (here  
represents the care-seeking decision). Hence, the two-part model can be expressed as: 
!5| =  Pr5 > 0  .  !5|5 > 0               [4.3]  
or equivalently as !5| =  Pr = 1  .  !5| = 1             [4.4] 
Here the first part of the model [Pr(z = 1)] is estimated for the care-seeking decision using a 
probit function, while the second part [E(y| = 1] uses an OLS equation for the observations 
with positive costs, conditional on care seeking. The probit model constrains the variance to 
be equal to 1 and can be represented by equation [4.5] below: 
Pr[ = 1|] =  Φ         [4.5] 
where Φ is a monotonic transformation representing an inverse cumulative function based on 
the normal distribution.  
The second part of the TPM models health care costs conditional on care-seeking; this can be 
represented by equation [4.6] below: 
![5| = 1, ] =  22        [4.6] 
The two part model assumes no care-seeking self-selection bias; hence, it independently 
models the processes of incurring non-zero expenditure and incurring positive health care 
expenditure.  Calculation of the marginal effects in the TPM takes account of probabilities 
and expectations from both parts of the model, and can be obtained using the equations below.  
For continuous independent variables: 
4!5 4⁄ 2[ =  \Pr = 1 x 4!5| = 142[ ^ + \!5| = 1 x 4 Pr = 1 42[ ^      [4.7] 
For binary independent variable: 
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!5|2_ = 1 − !5|2_ = 0= [`Pr = 1|2_ = 1 – Pr = 1|2_ = 0b  x  !5| = 1|2_ = 1]+  [`Pr = 1|2_ = 0b x  `!5| = 1|2_ = 1 −  !5| = 1|2_ = 0b]  
[4.8] 
To measure uncertainty in estimates of the marginal effects of the two-part model, standard 
errors are obtained by bootstrapping the estimates for marginal effects. 
4.3.3 Model 3: Heckman’s sample selection model for care-seeking self-
selection bias 
The assumption of independence of care-seeking decision and cost of care equation is a 
potential limitation of TPM, since the two processes may be correlated through unobserved 
factors. Heckman’s sample selection model allows for potential correlation between the cost 
of care and care-seeking equations, in turn accounting for potential care-seeking self-selection 
bias. Like the TPM, Heckman’s model also estimates two equations, namely care-seeking 
equation and health expenditure equation. However, instead of sequential estimation of the 
two processes, Heckman’s model jointly estimates the two equations for greater efficiency 
using maximum likelihood estimation method. Joint estimation assumes bivariate normality 
of error terms of the two equations, and allows for error correlation, which is expressed 
below: 
d		<e ~ g d00e , h1 ii 1jk          [4.9] 
Here 	 and 	< represent error terms in selection (care-seeking) and outcome (cost of care) 
equations respectively, and i represents the correlation between error terms.  
Following the notation used for TPM, the selection probit for Heckman’s model is 
represented as: 
Pr[ = 1|] =  Φ         [4.10] 
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Similarly, the equation for non-selection into care-seeking can be represented by equation 
[4.11] below: 
Pr[ = 0|] = [1 −  Φ ]       [4.11] 
The outcome equation of Heckman’s sample selection model is the same as the second part of 
TPM (equation 4.12). 
![5| = 1, ] =  <<        [4.12] 
The difference between the two part model and the Heckman model is that the former 
assumes no care-seeking self-selection bias, hence the two parts are modelled independently; 
however, the Heckman model simultaneously estimates the two processes to allow for 
potential care-seeking self-selection bias. Heckman’s model should be preferred over the 
TPM if the null hypothesis of no correlation between the selection and outcome processes i = 0 can be rejected; this would suggest that the two equations are not independent of 
each other and should be modelled simultaneously to allow for error correlation. If i is not 
statistically significantly different from zero, then TPM is more appropriate. If i is observed 
to be positive, the estimated effect of care-seeking will be biased away from zero, and vice 
versa.  
4.3.4 Model 4: Treatment effects model for insurance self-selection 
 
As discussed earlier, insurance-seeking self-selection bias can occur due to correlation 
between unobserved determinants of the insurance-seeking decision and the cost of care 
equation, thus resulting in biased regression estimates of the impact of insurance membership 
on health care costs. This is likely to occur, for example, when sick and risk-averse 
individuals are more likely to seek insurance, resulting in a higher expected cost of care in the 
insured group. Insurance endogeneity can occur independently of care-seeking self-selection, 
and therefore needs to be accounted for separately. Unlike the case of care-seeking self-
selection, insurance endogeneity does not directly result in the systematic censoring of cost 
data.  
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Here Heckman’s treatment effects model is used (different from Heckman’s sample selection 
model). This model jointly estimates the insurance-seeking probit model and the cost of care 
model using maximum likelihood estimation method. This allows for potential correlation 
between the unobserved determinants of the insurance decision and the cost of care equation . 
Mathematically speaking, the insurance-seeking probit model for selection and non-selection 
can be represented by: 
Pr[) = 1|*+ ] =  Φ *++         [4.13] 
Pr[) = 0|*+ ] = [1 −  Φ *++]         [4.14] 
 
Identification of the treatment effects model: Identification relies on finding explanatory 
variables that uniquely determine the insurance-seeking probit equation, but not the outcome 
model. This would impose an exclusion restriction assumption, which argues that certain 
variables in vector * of the probit model have +s that are equal to zero in the cost model. 
This would generate nontrivial variations in the selection equation, which should be enough to 
identify the process uniquely from the outcome equation.  
In the current study, the following binary variables were used to identify the insurance-
seeking decision: ‘respondent has medium to high level of worry about personal future 
health’; ‘respondent knows where to buy VHI card’; ‘respondent knows that VHI subsidises 
drugs costs’; ‘respondent is a member of other mass/community organisation’. Theoretically, 
it makes sense that individuals who are more worried about their future health are more likely 
to purchase insurance. Similarly, individuals who are members of other community 
organisations, and those who have knowledge of the insurance programme, are more likely to 
become members. Also, it makes theoretical sense to argue that these variables are not likely 
to directly influence the incurred cost of care. This study further tests the appropriateness of 
these variables for the current study using the statistical methods discussed below. 
Due to the temporal nature of event occurrence, two variables are naturally unique to the cost 
of care (outcome) equation. These variables are: ‘hospital inpatient stay in the last three 
months’ (binary) and ‘the number of illnesses in the last three months’ (count). Since the 
insurance membership was sought more than three months before the survey, and the cost of 
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care was incurred during the past three months, these variables could not have directly 
influenced the insurance selection probit.  
It should be noted however that, while the inpatient stay in the past three months could not 
have directly influenced the probability of insurance decision, the insurance status could have 
indirectly increased the probability of hospital inpatient stay. However, the coefficient on the 
insurance variable in the cost of care model is likely to capture only the direct effect of 
insurance, i.e. the effect of cost subsidisation, and not the effect of behavioural or supply-side 
changes resulting from insurance membership. 
 
4.3.5 Model 5: Two part Heckman sample selection model 
The previous two models proposed methods to separately correct for either care-seeking or 
insurance-seeking self-selection bias. Since the cost of care model can potentially suffer from 
both kinds of biases, a two-part model (model 5) is proposed here to simultaneously account 
for the two self-selection biases. 
The first part of model 5 is a probit model for the insurance-seeking decision and is 
represented by equation [4.15] below: 
Pr[) = 1|*+ ] =  Φ *+         [4.15] 
This equation is used to generate the so-called ‘Inverse Mills Ratio’ (IMR) for the insurance 
decision. IMR (m+) is a monotonically decreasing function, represented by a ratio of the 
probability density function to the cumulative density function of insurance-seeking decision.  
m+ =  
nop
oq ϕ *+ Φ *+s                for ) = 1ϕ *+ [1 − Φ *+]s      for ) = 0
      [4.16] 
m+ represents the unobserved propensity of insurance-seeking self-selection. It estimates the 
probability of seeking insurance, given that insurance was offered; i.e. the individual was ‘at 
risk’ of insurance self-selection. If, based on the known characteristics, the predicted 
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probability of insurance-seeking is high and the individual is observed to have sought 
insurance, then the influence of unobservable variables, and hence the selection bias, would 
be small. On the other hand, if the patients who self-selected into insurance-seeking were 
predicted not to have self-selected based on the observable characteristics, the potential for 
bias is high. This would suggest that there are unobservable variables not included in the 
model that are responsible for self-selection (Crown et al 1995). Self-selection bias is 
effectively an omitted variable bias. Hence, inclusion of the unobserved insurance-seeking 
propensity, m+, as an additional covariate in the cost model is a way of attempting to correct 
for the bias. 
As the probability of insurance-seeking self-selection approaches 1, the cumulative density 
function also approaches 1, and the probability density function approaches zero. As a result, 
the λ/ approaches zero, and the expected value of the error term in cost regression also 
approaches zero. Similarly, as the probability of self-selection decreases, the cumulative 
density function approaches zero at a faster rate than the probability density function, and the 
inverse Mills ratio approaches infinity (Renders and Gaeremynck 2006).  
The second part of model 5 is the Heckman’s sample selection model (same as model 3); 
however, it is now augmented by the IMR from the insurance probit (from part 1) in both cost 
of care and care-seeking equations. Hence the final cost equation (in part 2) accounts for the 
potential insurance-seeking self selection bias through the inclusion of IMR from part 1 
(insurance probit) of the model, and for the care-seeking self-selection bias, by allowing for 
error correlation between cost equation and the care-seeking equation in part 2. The final cost 
equation can be represented as: 
![| = 1,  < ] =  << +  i+w+m+*+       [4.17] 
Here i is the correlation between the error terms of the two equations, and sigma represents 
the standard error of the residual of the outcome equation. By simultaneously correcting for 
the two self-selection biases, the unbiased parameters on the cost of care model are estimated. 
Identification of Heckman’s sample selection model: Instruments to identify sample 
selection are often unavailable or hard to defend, particularly in cost of care models where 
variables determining access to care are the same as those determining cost of care (Dow and 
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Norton 2003). In such situations, identification relies on the functional form of the IMR. If the 
IMR is non-linear, and does not suffer from multi-collinearity with other covariates in the cost 
model, the Heckman model can be sufficiently identified (Leung and Yu 1996; Jones 2000). 
4.3.6 Testing for self-selection bias 
Following Waters (2000), three methods are employed to ascertain the presence of care-
seeking and insurance-seeking sample selection biases:  
1. The significance of ρ (rho) in Heckman’s sample selection and treatment effects 
models (model 3 and model 4): If rho is significant in the two models, the null 
hypothesis of no self-selection bias can be rejected, and a corrective model is 
warranted. 
2. The significance of predicted values or residuals from the self-selection equations 
when inserted in the cost of care model: This test involves obtaining the predicted 
probability or the residual (actual binary outcome minus the predicted probability) for 
care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions based on separate univariate probit 
models. The predicted probability or the residual is then used as a regressor in the cost 
of care model. A statistically significant non-zero coefficient on the predicted value or 
residual indicates that self-selection bias exists and should be corrected to obtain 
unbiased estimates. This test is similar to the omitted variable version of the Hausman 
test (Waters 2000).  
3. Comparison of the coefficient on insurance variable: A significant difference in the 
magnitude or direction of the coefficient on insurance would indicate the presence of 
self-selection.  
Each of these tests was applied to establish the presence of potential care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking self-selection biases. 
4.3.7 Testing the appropriateness of the identifying variables 
The identifying variables used in the Heckman treatment effects model, and the first part of 
the two-part Heckman model, should be uniquely associated with the insurance-seeking 
decision, although not associated with care-seeking or the cost of health care.  
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Following Waters (1999), the appropriateness of identifying variables was tested using the 
following two methods:  
1. Association of the identifying variables with the insurance-seeking decision: The 
identifying variables were included on the right hand side of a reduced form probit 
equation for making the insurance-seeking decision. If the coefficient on an 
identifying variable is statistically significant in the self-selection model, it is retained 
as an appropriate candidate. 
2. Non-significance of the identifying variables in the cost of care model: This test is 
conducted by including all the identifying variables on the right hand side of the cost 
of care model. In order to appropriately identify the self-selection process, these 
identifying variables should not be statistically different from zero in the cost of care 
model. 
4.4 Results 
This section presents the results of the cost of care analysis. Before presenting the regression 
results in section 4.4.2, the descriptive results are presented in subsection 4.4.1. 
4.4.1. Descriptive results 
 
Table 4-1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
analysis.   
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Table 4-1: Results from the descriptive analysis of variables of interest 
  
Respondents 
who 
reported 
illness in the 
last 3 
months 
(N=1,192) 
Ill 
respondent
s who 
sought 
health care 
(N=982) 
Insured 
who 
were 
also sick  
(N=242) 
Uninsured
   who 
were also 
sick 
(N=950) 
t-statistic of 
difference 
between 
insured and 
uninsured 
([Pr (T > t)] 
in brackets) 
Variable Name Mean Mean Mean Mean t-statistic 
Member of Voluntary Health 
Insurance 
(percentage of respondents) 
20.25 17.09 - - - 
 
Age (years) 
 
 
35.86 
 
 
35.95 
 
 
34.80 
 
 
32.42 
 
 
-1.60 
(0.10) 
Female 
(percentage of respondents) 55.75 56.70 38.59 56.38 
4.98 
(0.00) 
 
Rural resident 
(percentage of respondents) 
81.81 82.22 72.20 71.65 -0.16 (0.86) 
 
Resident of Hai Phong 
(percentage of respondents) 
8.32 6.43 31.95 7.17 -11.01 (0.00) 
 
Resident of Ninh Binh 
(percentage of respondents) 
28.33 27.67 4.98 48.89 13.31 (0.00) 
 
Resident of Dong Thap 
(percentage of respondents) 
63.35 65.90 63.07 43.94 -5.36 (0.00) 
 
Occupation – 
service/business 
(percentage of respondents) 
11.55 11.28 8.71 10.33 0.74 (0.46) 
 
Occupation – farmer 
(percentage of respondents) 
41.28 41.12 25.31 29.82 1.37 (0.17) 
 
Occupation - hired 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
6.80 7.38 8.30 5.48 3.10 (0.01) 
Occupation – student 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
22.32 21.18 22.82 35.83 3.84 (0.00) 
Occupation – retired 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
7.68 7.36 2.90 6.74 2.25 (0.02) 
Occupation - other 
(percentage of respondents) 10.37 11.68 3.32 12.96 
4.30 
(0.00) 
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Variable Name 
 
Mean Mean Mean Mean t-statistic 
 
Number of years of schooling 
 
5.32 5.18 8.19 6.03 -8.33 (0.00) 
Health status - good 
(percentage of respondents) 20.27 18.64 37.76 21.29 
-5.36 
(0.00) 
 
Health status - fairly good 
(percentage of respondents) 
51.54 52.66 37.34 52.90 4.34 (0.00) 
      
Health status - fairly bad 
(percentage of respondents) 16.21 16.33 14.11 11.70 
-1.02 
(0.31) 
 
Health status - long-term 
illness 
(percentage of respondents) 
11.99 12.37 10.79 14.12 1.35 (0.18) 
 
Chronic illness 
(percentage of respondents) 
14.78 15.16 12.45 13.28 0.34 (0.73) 
 
Number of illnesses in the 
last 3 months 
2.01 2.02 2.08 1.88 -2.08 (0.04) 
 
Inpatient care (yes) 
(percentage of respondents) 
10.19 9.82 13.25 9.20 -1.83 (0.07) 
Know where to buy VHI card 
(yes) 
(percentage of respondents) 
- - 91.70 43.73 
-14.44 
(0.00) 
Know that VHI subsidises 
drug costs (yes) 
(percentage of respondents) 
- - 92.53 61.74 -9.47 (0.00) 
Member of other 
mass/community 
organisation (yes) 
(percentage of respondents) 
- - 66.39 48.89 -4.90 (0.00) 
Medium to high level of 
worry about future health 
(yes) 
(percentage of respondents) 
- - 92.11 82.50 -3.69 (0.00) 
 
Distributions of the cost of health care and total consumption expenditure were observed to be 
highly skewed. This is because most of the individuals incurred relatively low health care 
costs; furthermore, 207 individuals did not seek health care at all, resulting in a spike at zero 
in the observed cost distribution. For the purpose of regression analysis, both cost of care and 
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consumption expenditure variables were log
health care costs based on insurance s
Figure 4-2: Distribution of total health care costs during 
Further descriptive analysis was carried out, in order to compare the average cost of health 
care over the last three months across socioeconomic quintiles. Table 4
the insured group, out-of-pocket costs increased consistently with tot
expenditure. The pattern was less clear for the uninsured group, for which the poorest quintile 
had a higher cost burden than the second richest quintile. Also, it is obvious from the table 
that all the socioeconomic quintiles in the insured
care, compared to the respective uninsured quintiles. Finally, the average cost of care for the 
insured group was less than one
using sampling weights to reflect the distribution of sampling frequency. 
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the last three months
-2 shows that, within 
 group incurred substantially lower costs of 
-third that of the uninsured. These statistics were summarised 
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Table 4-2: Average per capita health care costs in the last three months (by consumption 
quintiles) 
 
Poorest 
quintile 
(‘000 VND) 
(N = 239) 
Quintile 2 
(‘000 
VND) 
(N = 238) 
Quintile 3 
(‘000 
VND) 
(N = 238) 
Quintile 4 
(‘000 
VND) 
(N = 240) 
Richest 
quintile 
(‘000 VND) 
(N = 236) 
Total 
(‘000 VND) 
(N = 1,192) 
 
Insured 29.85 29.86 45.87 52.95 98.99 66.69 
Uninsured 176.40 101.29 356.28 159.15 283.30 212.76 
Average 174.758 98.418 322.697 170.794 268.020 206.091 
Figure 4-3 summarises the proportionate share of health care costs in the total household 
consumption expenditure. As one would expect, although richer quintiles incur a higher cost 
of care in absolute monetary terms, the proportion of income sacrificed is substantially lower 
than in the poorest quintile. Figure 4-3 shows that proportionate shares were consistently 
lower for the insured group. 
Figure 4-3: OOP health expenditure as percentage of total consumption expenditure 
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Jowett et al (2003) conducted a similar descriptive analysis using the same dataset, and found 
slightly different results, although the general pattern of the above findings were similar. This 
can be attributed as follows: a) Jowett et al (2003) ignored the non-care-seeking sample (207 
observations with zero observed cost), which would have resulted in an overestimation of the 
sample mean, b) When generating quintiles based on equivalent per capita annual 
consumption expenditure, Jowett et al (2003) used equal consumption weights for children 
and adults in the household, whereas our analysis used lower weights for children, using the 
formula suggested in both Aronson et al (1994) and Wagstaff et al (1999) [equation 4.1].  
4.4.2. Regression results 
The regression models used in this study estimate the impact of insurance membership on cost 
of health care, after controlling for the effect of observed characteristics on OOP costs. This 
section presents results from the econometric models of cost of care discussed earlier. 
Analysis was carried out using Stata software, version 9.2. The unit of analysis was an 
individual for whom the questionnaire was completed. Table 4-5 presents the results of 
econometric analysis for cost models. 
The OLS analysis was carried out on all the individuals who reported illness over the last 
three months. Observed cost for those who did not seek care was zero. These observations 
were also included in the analysis. The OLS model assumes that both zero and non-zero 
values are actual expenditures; hence, it does not model the care-seeking decision.  There 
were 1,192 eligible observations available for the model, however three dropped out of the 
analysis due to missing values on explanatory variables. The OLS model passed the Ramsey 
RESET test with test score F (3, 1,164) = 0.32 and p > F = 0.81, and had an R-squared value 
of 0.25. OLS results show a statistically significant negative effect of insurance membership 
on the log of health care expenditure. This implies that, after controlling for differences in 
need, use of care and other observed characteristics, insurance significantly reduces the cost 
of care. Regression results also show that the socioeconomic status of an individual is 
positively related to their observed cost of care. Given that it would be expected for health 
care to have positive income elasticity, this result makes intuitive sense. Cost of health care 
was also observed to have a strong positive relationship with inpatient admissions and long-
term health care status. Patients who self-assessed their health as fairly bad or those who were 
suffering from long-term illness incurred substantially higher cost than those in good health.  
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The TPM model allows differential effect of the independent variables on the probability of 
care-seeking decision and amount of health expenditure when care is sought. The TPM 
coefficients in table 4-6 show that individuals with relatively worse health status were more 
likely to seek health care than those in good health. Also, individuals living in Hai Phong and 
Ninh Binh provinces were less likely to seek care when ill, compared to the residents of Dong 
Thap. Part two of the TPM was estimated using only those observations with positive 
observed cost. Out of 985 eligible observations, three participants dropped out due to missing 
values on covariates, and the analysis was thus carried out on 982 observations. The R-
squared value of part two of the model was 0.36.  
Rules of conditional probability were used to estimate the impact of insurance conditional on 
care-seeking, followed by boot-strapping of coefficients to obtain measures of uncertainty. 
Table 4-5 shows that the coefficient on insurance was -0.97 while the coefficient on 
socioeconomic status was 0.439. Both coefficients were statistically significant at 1% level. 
Since the cost of care equation is semi-logarithmic, the coefficient on insurance variable was 
transformed using equation [4.19] (Kennedy 1981) to estimate the percentage impact of 
insurance on cost of care. 
x∗ = exp \{ −  12 |{^ −  1              [4.19] 
Here x∗ is the transformed coefficient, { is the untransformed coefficient on the insurance 
variable and V(c) is the variance of the untransformed coefficient. 
The above two models, i.e. OLS and TPM, do not allow for potential care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking self-selection bias. The presence of these biases was tested using the 
methods discussed in the previous section. Table 4-3 shows the outcome for one of these 
tests, which indicates the presence of both care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection. 
The other two tests, i.e. significance of rho and change in insurance coefficient, are discussed 
with the regression results for respective models.  
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Table 4-3: Tests to establish presence of care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection 
bias 
Testing for the presence of care-seeking selection bias 
TEST: Statistical significance of predicted values or residuals from care-seeking self-
selection model when inserted in the cost of care model 
Variable Coefficient t P>t 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Predicted probability 7.192 2.520 0.018 1.319 13.065 
 Residual (actual outcome – 
predicted probability)  3.860 23.60  0.000  3.523  4.196  
 
Testing for the presence of insurance-seeking selection bias 
TEST: Statistical significance of predicted values or residuals from insurance self-
selection model when inserted in the cost of care model 
Variable Coefficient t P>t 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Predicted probability -1.546 -3.670 0.001 -2.413 -0.679 
 Residual (actual outcome – 
predicted probability)  -0.263 -0.86  0.395  -0.888  -0.362  
 
 The result for Heckman’s sample selection (model 3) shows that the estimated correlation 
between the residuals of care-seeking probit and cost of care model is statistically significant 
[Wald statistics for independence of equations: rho = 0 rejected (p>z = 0.06)]. Significance of 
rho supports the presence of care-seeking self-selection, which is corrected by model 3. After 
correcting for sample selection bias, the coefficient on insurance was still statistically 
significant, and shows an increase of 40% in magnitude compared to the OLS estimate. The 
coefficient on log of consumption expenditure also showed a marginal increase after 
correction for care-seeking bias. Similar changes were observed for other covariates, whilst 
there was no change in direction of effect. The difference between the two part model and the 
Heckman model is that the two part model independently models the two parts, whereas the 
Heckman model allows for correlation between the two processes. 
Model 4 estimates treatment effects, and corrects for potential endogeneity of the insurance 
decision. This model uses all available observations with zero and non-zero observed cost, 
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and aims to correct for insurance self-selection bias by independently identifying insurance-
seeking decision whilst simultaneously estimating the cost of care model. Appropriateness of 
variables used for the identification of insurance decisions was tested using methods 
discussed earlier. Outcomes for each identifying variable are presented below. Tests 1 and 2 
are largely consistent for most of the identifying variables, and confirm their appropriateness 
as instruments. 
Table 4-4: Tests for appropriateness of instruments for insurance-seeking self-selection 
model 
Testing for the appropriateness of instruments for endogeneity model 
TEST 1: Association of identifying variables with the insurance-seeking decision 
Variable Coefficient SE z P>z 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Worry level: medium to high 1.853 0.433 4.280 0.000 1.004 2.702 
Member of mass organisation 0.880 0.267 3.290 0.001 0.356 1.404 
Knows where to get VHI card 2.362 0.321 7.350 0.000 1.732 2.992 
Knows about discount on 
drug cost 0.558 0.216 2.580 0.010 0.134 0.982 
              
TEST 2: Significance of identifying variables within the cost of care model 
Variable Coefficient SE z P>z 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Worry level: medium to high -0.132 0.173 -0.770 0.451 -0.488 0.223 
Member of mass organisation 0.166 0.151 1.110 0.279 -0.143 0.476 
Knows where to get VHI card -0.675 0.176 -3.830 0.001 -1.038 -0.313 
Knows about discount on 
drug cost -0.050 0.123 -0.410 0.685 -0.303 0.202 
              
The estimated correlation between the residuals of the insurance-seeking probit and cost of 
care models is statistically significant [Wald statistics for independence of equations: rho = 0 
rejected (p>z = 0.01)]. The significance of rho supports the presence of insurance-seeking 
self-selection, which is corrected by model 4. The coefficient on insurance was statistically 
significantly negative, and shows an increase in magnitude by 60.6% compared to the 
estimate of OLS model. This clearly suggests that the naive OLS model had significantly 
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underestimated the impact of insurance membership on cost of care. The effect of 
consumption expenditure was only marginally higher than that estimated by the OLS model.  
From the results, it was also revealing to note that insurance membership does not seem to 
influence the decision to seek care given illness, although it significantly reduces the cost of 
care once treatment is sought. It was also observed that socioeconomic status was not 
significantly associated with the decision to purchase insurance, whereas rural residence only 
showed positive association with insurance seeking in model 3. Our analysis also shows that 
years of schooling is an important predictor of insurance-seeking behaviour. 
Heckman’s sample selection and treatment effects models (3 and 4) correct either for care-
seeking or insurance-seeking self-selection, but not both. Model 5 aims to simultaneously 
correct for the two types of biases by introducing the IMR term (λ/) for the insurance-
seeking decision, both in the cost of care and in care-seeking equations. λ/ and its quadratic 
and cube roots from the insurance-seeking part of the model (part one), show different 
degrees of significance in the sample selection part of the model (second part). Large values 
of the t-ratio associated with IMR suggest the presence of sample selection bias (Jones 2007). 
Wald statistics for independence of care-seeking and cost of care equations rejected the null-
hypothesis [rho = 0 rejected (p>z = 0.01)], which confirms the presence of care-seeking bias, 
even after correcting for insurance-seeking bias in both equations by including flexible IMR 
functions. 
The coefficient on λ/ in the cost of care equation represents the correlation between the 
unobserved factors associated with insurance-seeking and cost of care equations, as estimated 
by the maximum likelihood procedure. λ/ is a non-linear function, and its effect on the cost 
of care model is found to be positive and concave. This suggests that the unobservable factors 
associated with the insurance decision are associated with higher costs of care but at a 
diminishing rate. In the care-seeking model, λ/ seems to have a negative effect on the 
probability of seeking care. Also, after controlling for insurance selection bias the effect of 
insurance status on care-seeking decision changes from negative to positive. This suggests 
that the unobserved determinants of the insurance-seeking decision were negatively correlated 
with the care-seeking decision, and once this negative correlation was accounted for, the 
positive impact of insurance on care-seeking became obvious. 
Chapter 4                                Modelling cost of health care 
 
103 | P a g e  
 
The coefficient on insurance was statistically significant in model 5, and was 1.831 times 
higher than the OLS model, suggesting that the naive model had significantly underestimated 
the impact of insurance by ignoring self-selection biases. The coefficient on consumption 
expenditure remained stable and significant. Figure 4-4 (below) compares the insurance 
coefficients and their transformation to percentage units from all five models. The figure 
shows that the estimated impact of insurance in model 5 was 72.3%, which was 
underestimated by approximately 21 percentage points by the OLS model. This clearly 
emphasises the need to correct for statistical bias in model estimation. 
Figure 4-4: Insurance coefficients in regression models and actual impact measured in 
percentage reduction in cost of care 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This chapter has analysed the impact of the voluntary health insurance programme on 
individual level health care costs in Vietnam. It was argued that the naive OLS model for cost 
of care may suffer from self-selection biases due to care-seeking and insurance-seeking 
decisions. This would be attributable to a potential correlation between the unobserved 
determinants of the care-seeking/insurance-seeking decisions and the cost of care model. The 
current thesis uses five different methods to model cost of health care; the models varying in 
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terms of the statistical approach taken to account for potential care-seeking and insurance-
seeking self-selection bias.  
After applying corrective measures based on Heckman’s selection model, the study revealed 
that health insurance has a significantly negative relationship with cost of health care. The 
study also showed that the impact of insurance membership on cost of care was significantly 
underestimated by the uncorrected OLS model (51.29% in OLS model; 72.34% after 
correcting self-selection biases).  When compared with the previous analysis of this data, our 
analysis suggests that Jowett et al (2003) had overestimated the impact of insurance. 
Furthermore, the insurance coefficient in the previous study was wrongly interpreted as 208% 
cost reduction. Such interpretation would imply a pay-out for care seeking, which was not the 
case in Vietnam. 
Our analysis suggested that the socioeconomic status of an individual has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with health care costs. This finding makes intuitive sense 
since out-of-pocket payments are more affordable for the rich, who also tend to have better 
access to more expensive tertiary care. The study also finds that ‘fairly bad’ and ‘long-term 
ill’ health statuses are associated with a higher cost of care. Also, inpatient hospital admission 
is positively associated with cost of care in all models. Using the transformation proposed in 
equation [4.19], inpatient admission appeared to increase the average cost of care more than 
10 fold. 
The study also found that that insurance membership did not have a statistically significant 
impact on the probability of care-seeking. This is an interesting finding, as it suggests that 
there are other factors, possibly related to geographical access to health services, which play a 
more important role in the care-seeking decision. The care-seeking analysis indicates that the 
province of residence plays an important role in the care-seeking decision. A separate 
frequency analysis complimented the regression findings suggesting that 94.05% of the sick 
residents of Dong Thap sought care, compared to 66.02% and 86.01% of residents from Hai 
Phong and Ninh Binh provinces, respectively. This study also found that the coefficient on 
insurance-seeking IMR was negative and non-linear in the care-seeking model. This suggests 
that the unobserved factors that increase the likelihood of insurance membership may reduce 
the likelihood of care-seeking at a decreasing rate. Further investigation into this relationship 
may offer insight into patient behaviour and preferences. 
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This study also modelled the probability of health insurance uptake, which was found to be 
positively associated with the socioeconomic status of an individual; hence, the richer 
individuals were found to be more likely to purchase insurance membership, and in turn 
benefit from cost reduction. This is likely to have equity implications, especially if the 
insurance fund is subsidised through government funds. Further research is required into 
potential ways of extending health insurance coverage to the poor. 
Finally, this study has highlighted the significance of employing unbiased econometric 
models for estimating the impact of health insurance on cost of care. The study found that, in 
the context of developing countries, where insurance premiums may be community-rated, 
correction of potential self-selection bias is important in order to estimate the impact of health 
insurance. Furthermore, the study also found that unobserved health care costs may introduce 
potential bias in cost of care modelling.  
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Table 4-5: Models for cost of care for sick individuals 
Variables Econometric models 
Dependent variable: 
Log of individual level 
cost of healthcare 
Model 1: 
OLS 
model 
with zero 
cost 
Model 2: 
Two-part 
model 
Model 3: 
Heckman's 
model for 
care-seeking 
self-selection 
bias 
Model 4 - 
Treatment 
effects 
model for 
insurance-
seeking 
self-
selection 
Model 5: 
Heckman's 
model for care-
seeking self-
selection with 
correction for 
insurance-
selection 
Member of VHI 
programme 
-0.676** -0.970*** -0.949*** -1.086*** -1.238*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Log of equivalent annual 
household expenditure 
0.419** 0.439*** 0.459*** 0.437** 0.488*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.002 
(0.65) (0.76) (0.71) (0.75) (0.90) 
Age-squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.76) (0.71) (0.66) (0.87) (0.82) 
Female 0.041 -0.251 -0.184 0.033 -0.193 
(0.91) (0.35) (0.51) (0.93) (0.51) 
Interaction between age 
and sex 
0.004 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.010 
(0.59) (0.16) (0.14) (0.56) (0.13) 
No. of illnesses in last 3 
months 
-0.028 0.022 0.010 -0.029 0.010 
(0.65) (0.60) (0.84) (0.63) (0.83) 
Inpatient admission in last 
3 months 
2.332*** 2.465*** 2.488*** 2.320*** 2.467*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Health status: fairly good 0.061 -0.390 -0.201 0.031 -0.243 
 (0.82) (0.15) (0.46) (0.91) (0.39) 
Health status: fairly bad 0.800** 0.606** 0.721*** 0.796*** 0.700** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Health status: long-term  0.909** 0.412 0.698* 0.906** 0.675* 
Illness (0.03) (0.14) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) 
Chronic illness 0.099 0.121 0.103 0.077 0.076 
 (0.76) (0.65) (0.72) (0.80) (0.78) 
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Rural residence 0.304 0.281 0.317 0.316* 0.332* 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
Province: Hai Phong -0.524 0.405 -0.008 -0.549 -0.004 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.99) (0.20) (0.99) 
Province: Ninh Binh 0.011 0.279 0.144 -0.017 0.115 
 (0.96) (0.33) (0.62) (0.93) (0.68) 
Occupation: service 0.270 0.400* 0.385** 0.250 0.350* 
(0.28) (0.07) (0.03) (0.31) (0.05) 
Occupation: farmer 0.021 -0.053 -0.040 -0.004 -0.077 
(0.90) (0.84) (0.85) (0.98) (0.72) 
Occupation: wage 
employment 
-0.166 -0.401 -0.252 -0.185 -0.284 
(0.31) (0.11) (0.18) (0.24) (0.14) 
Years of schooling -0.022 0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.002 
(0.53) (0.78) (0.75) (0.67) (0.96) 
Interaction between 
schooling and gender  
0.001 -0.009 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 
(0.96) (0.67) (0.71) (0.95) (0.74) 
Interaction between 
schooling and age 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.50) (0.44) (0.30) (0.55) (0.34) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - - - - 0.471* 
- - - - (0.08) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio – 
squared 
- - - - -0.236*** 
- - - - (0.00) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - 
cube-root 
- - - - 0.018 
- - - - (0.48) 
Constant -0.635 -0.350 -0.791 -0.701 -0.892 
(0.66) (0.73) (0.51) (0.62) (0.45) 
Rho - - 1.269* 0.224** 1.197* 
 - - (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) 
Sigma - - 0.406*** 0.479*** 0.398*** 
 - - (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189 
R-squared 0.26 0.36 - - - 
Robust p values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4-6: Models for care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions 
Variables Econometric models 
 
Model 2: 
Two-part 
model 
Model 3: 
Heckman's 
model for 
care-seeking 
self-selection 
bias 
Model 5: 
Heckman's model 
for care-seeking 
self-selection with 
correction for 
insurance-
selection 
Model 4 - 
Treatment 
effects model 
for insurance-
seeking self-
selection 
Dependent variable: Care-seeking decision 
Insurance-
seeking 
decision 
Member of VHI 
programme 
-0.040 -0.254 0.317 - 
(0.78) (0.33) (0.50) - 
Log of equivalent annual 
household expenditure 
0.109 0.185 0.190 0.355* 
(0.48) (0.31) (0.33) (0.10) 
Age -0.004 -0.015 -0.013 -0.265*** 
(0.91) (0.64) (0.68) (0.00) 
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
(0.86) (0.60) (0.64) (0.00) 
Female 0.338 0.259 0.302 -1.333*** 
(0.64) (0.70) (0.67) (0.00) 
Interaction between age and 
sex 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.048** 
(0.88) (0.94) (0.92) (0.03) 
No. of illnesses in last 3 
months 
-0.066 -0.092 -0.088* - 
(0.25) (0.10) (0.09) - 
Health status: fairly good 0.551** 0.416 0.464* -0.525** 
 (0.04) (0.15) (0.08) (0.02) 
Health status: fairly bad 0.323 0.334 0.351 0.679* 
 (0.23) (0.29) (0.23) (0.07) 
Health status: long-term  0.900** 0.682 0.716 0.590 
Illness (0.04) (0.29) (0.23) (0.44) 
Chronic illness -0.061 -0.003 -0.009 -1.720*** 
 (0.80) (0.99) (0.98) (0.00) 
Rural residence 0.130 0.078 0.074 0.988* 
 (0.52) (0.75) (0.75) (0.08) 
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Province: Hai Phong -1.128*** -1.196*** -1.171*** -2.117*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Province: Ninh Binh -0.519** -0.551* -0.531** -2.080*** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) 
Occupation: service 0.006 0.039 0.035 -0.838* 
(0.99) (0.92) (0.93) (0.07) 
Occupation: farmer 0.093 0.224 0.241 -0.345 
(0.77) (0.45) (0.42) (0.58) 
Occupation: wage 
employment 
2.009*** 1.463 1.539* -1.213** 
(0.00) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
Years of schooling -0.048 -0.033 -0.037 0.166*** 
(0.33) (0.59) (0.58) (0.00) 
Interaction between 
schooling and gender  
-0.004 0.012 0.010 0.029 
(0.93) (0.83) (0.85) (0.74) 
Interaction between 
schooling and age 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007*** 
(0.72) (0.78) (0.77) (0.01) 
Respondent has medium to 
high level of worry about 
future health 
- - - 1.888*** 
- - - (0.00) 
Member of a mass 
organisation 
- - - 0.909*** 
- - - (0.00) 
Do you know where to go 
get hi card? 
- - - 2.432*** 
- - - (0.00) 
Do you think or know of 
any benefit of VHI when 
getting medicines? 
- - - 0.597*** 
- - - (0.01) 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - - -0.221 - 
- - (0.57) - 
Inverse Mills' Ratio – 
squared 
- - -0.244** - 
- - (0.02) - 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - cube-
root 
- - 0.047* - 
- - (0.09) - 
Constant 0.591 0.270 0.142 -4.885*** 
(0.66) (0.86) (0.93) (0.00) 
Observations 1189 1189 1189 1189 
Robust p values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the impact of the Vietnamese voluntary health insurance (VHI) 
programme on the expected level of OOP health care costs was measured. The aim of this 
chapter is to evaluate the impact of VHI on equity and progressivity of OOP costs. The 
specific objectives are to:  
a) evaluate whether insurance membership, on average, has a pro-poor effect 
on the expected cost of health care; 
b) compare the observed cost distributions of the insured and uninsured 
groups, in order to assess the level of pro-poorness and progressivity or 
regressivity;  
c) evaluate the effect of need standardisation processes on progressivity or 
regressivity of cost distributions for insured and uninsured groups; 
d) assess the impact of correcting care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-
selection biases on need-standardised cost distributions. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the computational methods used to 
implement the two approaches to equity analysis examined in chapter 3. Section 5.3 presents 
the empirical results using both approaches. The final section, 5.4, discusses the implications 
of the findings. 
5.2 Study methodology 
The equity in financing analysis will be carried out using two distinct approaches. In the first 
approach, evaluate equity will be evaluated by introducing an interaction term between 
insurance and socioeconomic status in the cost of care models. In the second approach, equity 
and progressivity of financing is estimated by evaluating the distribution of health care costs 
using concentration curves. The methodology is discussed in detail below. 
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5.2.1 Evaluating the interaction effect between insurance and 
socioeconomic status 
Firstly, an interaction term for insurance status and log of consumption expenditure was 
introduced in a naive ordinary least squared (OLS) model for cost of care, and then 
successively introduced it in more complex models that control for the care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking self-selection biases. The models used in this chapter are the same as those 
used in chapter 4; the difference being the inclusion of an interaction term, which allows for 
equity interpretation. The following cost of care models are used in this chapter:  
• Ordinary Least Squares model (Model 1: self-selection biases not corrected);  
• Two-part model and Heckman’s sample selection model (Models 2 and 3: care-
seeking bias corrected); 
• Treatment effects model (Model 4: insurance-seeking bias corrected);  
• Two-part Heckman model, with the first part modelling insurance decision and the 
second part correcting the care-seeking and insurance-seeking biases simultaneously 
(Model 5: care-seeking and insurance-seeking corrected). 
Since the interaction term is a cross product with combined information on both the main and 
the interaction effect, we include the constituent components of the interaction term as 
separate variables in the model so that the main effects are partialled out of the interaction 
effect (Bedeian and Mossholder 1994). Cohen and Cohen (2002) suggest mean-centring the 
constituent continuous variable, before computing the interaction term, so that the new mean 
lies at zero. Therefore, we mean-centre consumption expenditure by subtracting the sample 
mean from individual consumption expenditure. This mean-centred variable is then included 
in the model, both as a constituent variable and as part of the interaction term. Mean-centring 
reduces covariance between the interaction term and the constituent variables, and may also 
reduce collinearity, although this final point is an ongoing debate in the literature (Aiken and 
West 1991; Kromrey and Foster-Johnson 1998; Echambadi and Hess 2007). The intercept 
term in mean-centred regression will be interpreted as the expected cost of care, when 
consumption expenditure is at mean value, and insurance membership is not taken. 
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5.2.2 Evaluating the distribution of health care costs for equity and 
progressivity analyses 
The second approach is based on evaluating concentration curves of the cost of care variable, 
in order to estimate equity and progressivity indices. Recognising the potential for bias 
associated with unmet need for care and self-selection decisions of care- and insurance-
seeking, the equity analysis is conducted in multiple stages using the cost variable with 
different levels of bias correction. Hence the analysis will be carried out separately on:  
a) the unstandardised observed cost of care;  
b) the predicted cost of care that standardises for differences in the level of need 
variables; 
c) the predicted cost of care as in (b) but additionally controlling for care-seeking self-
selection bias; 
d) the predicted cost of care as in (b) and additionally controlling for insurance-seeking 
self-selection bias; and  
e) the predicted cost of care as in (b) and simultaneously correcting for care-seeking and 
insurance-seeking self-selection biases.  
Below, the thesis will first discuss how these variables are generated; subsequently, 
computational methods for concentration and Kakwani indices will be discussed. 
5.2.2.1 Standardisation of the cost of care variable 
It was argued in chapter 3 that the unstandardised concentration and Kakwani indices do not 
account for the differences in the need for health care, and overlook the horizontal inequity in 
exhausting capacity to benefit from health care. Here, the thesis proposes that a standardised 
cost of care variable offers a solution, by controlling the differences in need for care. The 
purpose of standardisation is not to propose a causal model for cost of care, but to establish a 
refined understanding of the relationship between consumption expenditure, cost of care and 
insurance status. Similar standardisation methods have only been used in the context of health 
care utilisation (Gravelle 2003) and not in the case of health care financing; hence this would 
be the first attempt to need standardise the cost of care.  
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The need standardisation procedure generates the predicted cost of care that would be 
observed if all individuals had the same level of need. This level is defined by the sample 
mean for each of the need variables. The process is implemented using regression analysis 
that uses both standardising (need) and non-standardising (non-need) variables to estimate 
partial correlations of standardising variables conditional on non-standardising covariates. If 
non-confounding variables were not included in the regression model, the coefficients on 
standardising variables would reflect joint correlation of confounding and non-confounding 
variables, which will produce biased regression parameters (O’Donnell et al, 2007a).  
The process of need standardisation begins with the naive OLS model: 
5 =  } +  ~  +  ~ AAA +  @+ + 	             [5.1] 
Here 5 is the cost of care variable,  is a vector of need variables on which we want to 
standardise, and A represents non-need variables. Insurance status is also a non-need variable 
in the equation and has been identified separately as . The slope and intercept parameters 
from equation [5.1] are used, and the need variables are set to their respective sample mean, 
so the need-standardised cost of care can be predicted. This process is represented as: 
5 =  } +  ~  + ~ AAA +  @+           [5.2] 
Here 5 is the need standardised, predicted cost of care.  
In summary, the standardisation method used here involves freezing the need variables to 
their mean value, and then predicting the cost of care based on the actual value of the non-
need variables and the actual insurance status. Through this process, we aim to control the 
differences in need (by assigning mean need value to everyone), so that the equity analysis 
reflects the inequality attributable to non-need variables. This proposed method of 
standardisation is new and different from the conventional method of standardisation, which 
subtracts the need-predicted health variable from the observed variable (O’Donnell et al, 
2007a). The decision not to use this method was based on the finding that the need-predicted 
cost was higher than the observed cost for many individuals in the sample; this is because the 
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unstandardised cost of care variable does not account for unmet need for care. Therefore, 
subtracting the need predicted from the observed cost would produce negative values of the 
standardised cost variable, which could not be used for equity analysis because, by design, 
concentration curves plot non-negative variables. However, the method proposed in this 
thesis always produces non-negative, need-standardised predictions. 
In the current analysis, the following need variables were standardised: age, sex, number of 
self-reported illnesses in the last three months, individual health status in the last 12 months, 
and the presence of chronic illness. The analysis did not standardise for utilisation, because 
there was only limited data available on health care use. Instead, we assume that actual 
expenditure ought to be the same as need-predicted expenditure.  This assumption is 
reasonable, as a principle of horizontal equity in the utilisation of care, as long as poor 
households do not receive systematic price discounts, such that their actual expenditure could 
be lower than need-predicted expenditure, and yet they still receive the need-predicted 
utilisation of care.  Furthermore, it is not possible to use the utilisation variables as a proxy 
for need.  The literature on developing countries suggests that health service utilisation in 
poor economies does not necessarily reflect the level of health care need, but also a host of 
non-need demand and supply variables (Ensor and Cooper 2004; Makinen et al 2000). This 
was further confirmed for the current data, when a separate probit analysis for hospital 
inpatient admissions found that the probability of admission was negatively associated with 
some of the need variables (for example, ‘health status: fairly bad or long-term illness’), and 
positively related with non-need covariates (‘urban residence’, ‘years of education’ and 
‘socioeconomic status’).  
The concentration curve of 5 should therefore be interpreted as the distribution of predicted 
costs, when no difference exists between individuals in terms of their observed need. If 
insurance decisions can be assumed to be randomly distributed in the population, the 
observed difference between the cost distributions of insured and uninsured groups represents 
the effect of insurance on equity distribution.  
5.2.2.2 Correcting for self-selection biases 
The need standardisation procedure discussed above uses the OLS model (equation 5.1) to 
predict the cost of care. As discussed in chapter 3, this model may be biased due to 
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unaccounted correlation between the unobserved determinants of cost of care and care-
seeking/insurance-seeking decisions. Therefore, we follow the systematic modelling 
approach used in chapter 4 to correct for potential self-selection biases. These models replace 
the OLS model in equation [5.1], while keeping the need standardisation procedure in 
equation [5.2] the same. Predictions based on these models produce cost variables mentioned 
in section 5.1.2, i.e. the need standardised and self-selection, bias corrected cost of care. 
These predicted cost variables are subsequently used to compute concentration and Kakwani 
indices. 
5.2.2.3 Retransforming the predicted costs: Duan’s smearing factor 
The regression models discussed above use log-transformed cost of care as the dependent 
variable; hence the model predictions are also in the log form, which can be difficult to 
interpret for equity analysis. Manning (1998) famously stated that ‘Congress does not 
appropriate log dollars’. Hence the log form predictions should be transformed back to the 
natural scale before further analysis is carried out on the predicted values (Manning and 
Mullahy 2001; Buntin and Zaslavsky 2004). For re-transformation, we use the smearing 
factor proposed by Duan (1983). This factor is defined as the mean of exponentiated residuals 
from the regression model, and is represented as: 
F =  1g ~ P−.

 L 6
             [5.3] 
Here, S represents the smearing factor and P. represents the exponentiated form of the 
residual term for each individual. Both  and .  are in log form.  
It is common practice to employ a single smearing factor for the whole sample; however this 
method may produce biased estimates if heteroscedasticity of the error term is not accounted 
for (Manning 1998). To minimise heterscedasticity, we follow the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment approach (Newhouse 1993), and use separate smearing factors for the insured 
and uninsured groups. These smearing factors are then multiplied by exponentiated 
predictions from the regression models to convert them to natural scale:  
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.+-_ = P  . 1g ~ P 
g
 = 1         [5.4] 
5.2.2.4 Computation of Concentration and Kakwani indices 
To compute concentration indices (CI) in the current study, the following equation suggested 
by Kakwani et al (1997) is used: 
89 =  "2  .  0 % ~ ℎ1L6  −  1           [5.5] 
where ℎ is the individual cost of care;  is the mean cost of health care for the sample;  is 
the relative socioeconomic rank of the ith individual; and n is the sample size. Hence, the 
concentration index is a function of socioeconomic rank, which dictates the distribution of the 
cost of care. For computational convenience, equation [5.5] is estimated using the so-called 
‘convenient regression’ method [equation 5.6], which directly calculates the index: 
2w-7 ℎ 0  =  }[ + [ +  	[            [5.6] 
where w-7 represents variance of the fractional rank of individuals sorted by their 
socioeconomic status. The coefficient  on the ranking variable is the estimate of CI, and the 
standard error of  in the convenient regression, is the standard error of CI (O’Donnell et al, 
2007a). 
After computing the CI, the Kakwani index of progressivity (KI) is also computed using the 
convenient regression approach in equation [5.7]: 
2w-7 ℎ ̂<0 − 5 ̂0  =  }A +  A +  	A            [5.7] 
Here 5 is an individual’s socioeconomic variable and ̂< and ̂ are the mean values of cost 
of care and socioeconomic status respectively. The coefficient  on the ranking variable 
represents the KI, and its standard error is that of the index (O’Donnell et al, 2007a). 
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5.3 Results 
Empirical results are presented in two parts; the first part focuses on results from the 
interaction models, while the second part presents results from the concentration and 
Kakwani analyses.  
5.3.1 Results from the interaction models 
Table 5-1 presents results from cost of care regression models that use an interaction term 
between insurance and socioeconomic status. The interaction term coefficients are 
consistently negative and statistically significant in all models, suggesting that insurance is 
more protective for poorer households. The rho parameter is also statistically significant for 
the Heckman sample selection, treatment effects and Heckman two-part models, suggesting 
that the corrected models are to be preferred, because the error terms of the self-selection 
decisions and the cost of care equation are correlated.  
  
Chapter 5                                    Impact of VHI on equity of health financing 
 
119 | P a g e  
 
Table 5-1: Results for the cost of care regression models with interaction term for insurance 
status and log of consumption expenditure 
      
Variables Econometric models 
Dependent variable: 
Log of individual level 
cost of healthcare 
Model 1:  
OLS 
model 
Model 2:  
Two-part 
model 
Model 3: 
Heckman's 
model for 
care-
seeking 
self-
selection 
Model 4: 
Treatment 
effects model 
for 
insurance-
seeking self-
selection 
Model 5:  
Insurance 
probit 
followed by 
Heckman's 
model for 
care-seeking 
self-selection 
Interaction between 
VHI status and log of 
consumption 
expenditure 
-0.65** -0.73** -0.72** -0.57** -0.75* 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) 
Member of VHI 
programme 
-0.38 -0.77** -0.62** -0.74* -0.66 
(0.16) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.11) 
Log of equivalent 
annual household 
expenditure (mean-
centred) 
0.46** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.47** 0.53*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
 
Age 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
(0.66) (0.75) (0.72) (0.73) (0.87) 
 
Age-squared 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
(0.78) (0.72) (0.69) (0.87) (0.80) 
 
Female 
 
0.10 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.13 
 
0.09 
 
-0.13 
(0.79) (0.45) (0.66) (0.81) (0.67) 
 
Interaction between age 
and sex 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
(0.67) (0.20) (0.20) (0.64) (0.19) 
 
No. of illnesses in last 3 
months 
 
-0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
(0.62) (0.62) (0.87) (0.60) (0.85) 
 
Inpatient admission in 
last 3 months 
 
2.34*** 
 
2.47*** 
 
2.50*** 
 
2.34*** 
 
2.48*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Health status: fairly 
good 
 
0.06 
 
-0.39 
 
-0.21 
 
0.04 
 
-0.27 
(0.83) (0.14) (0.46) (0.89) (0.41) 
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Health status: fairly bad 
 
0.81** 
 
0.62*** 
 
0.74*** 
 
0.81*** 
 
0.71*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Health status: long-term 
illness 
 
0.92** 
 
0.42 
 
0.71* 
 
0.92** 
 
0.68* 
(0.03) (0.13) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) 
 
 
Chronic illness 
 
0.09 
 
0.11 
 
0.09 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 (0.79) (0.68) (0.75) (0.82) (0.80) 
 
 
Rural residence 
 
0.30 
 
0.28 
 
0.31 
 
0.31 
 
0.32 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
Province: Hai Phong 
 
-0.52 
 
0.42 
 
0.01 
 
-0.53 
 
0.02 
 
 
 
(0.24) (0.27) (0.98) (0.21) (0.96) 
Province: Ninh Binh 0.01 0.28 0.15 -0.01 0.14 
 (0.94) (0.32) (0.60) (0.97) (0.63) 
 
Occupation: service 
 
0.27 
 
0.40* 
 
0.38** 
 
0.25 
 
0.35** 
(0.29) (0.07) (0.04) (0.31) (0.05) 
 
Occupation: farmer 
 
0.02 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.04 
 
0.00 
 
-0.07 
(0.91) (0.84) (0.85) (1.00) (0.75) 
 
Occupation: wage 
employment 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.39 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.26 
(0.37) (0.13) (0.22) (0.30) (0.19) 
 
Years of schooling 
 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
(0.48) (0.84) (0.65) (0.58) (0.79) 
 
Interaction between 
years of schooling and 
gender (female) 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 
(0.99) (0.67) (0.68) (0.98) (0.68) 
 
Interaction between 
years of schooling and 
age 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
(0.46) (0.42) (0.28) (0.50) (0.28) 
 
Inverse Mills' Ratio 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.29 
- - - - (0.35) 
 
Inverse Mills' Ratio - 
squared 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.30*** 
- - - - (0.01) 
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Inverse Mills' Ratio - 
cube-root 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.03 
- - - - (0.31) 
 
Constant 
 
2.43*** 
 
2.83*** 
 
2.58*** 
 
2.49*** 
 
2.66*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Rho 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1.26* 
 
0.18** 
 
1.18* 
 
- - (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) 
 
Sigma 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.40*** 
 
0.48*** 
 
0.40*** 
 
- - (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189 
 
Robust p values in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Figure 5-1 plots the interaction coefficients for all five models. The figure shows that the 
interaction term coefficient was underestimated by 10% when care-seeking and insurance-
seeking self-selection biases were not taken into account, leading to a biased estimate.  
The magnitude of this interaction term can be interpreted as the difference in income 
elasticities between the insured and uninsured. The coefficient on log of consumption 
expenditure represents the income elasticity for the uninsured group (note: the interaction 
term equals 0 for the uninsured; hence, the coefficient on log of consumption expenditure 
represents elasticity for the uninsured). This income elasticity coefficient for the uninsured is 
positive and inelastic (0.53). For the insured group, the elasticity is obtained by adding the 
coefficients on the interaction term and the log of consumption expenditure. The income 
elasticity coefficient for the insured group is negative and inelastic (-0.22). The sign of the 
interaction term is consistently negative.  This suggests that those in higher socioeconomic 
groups experience a less dramatic effect of insurance membership on the cost of care than 
those in poorer quintiles. In other words, insurance has a greater protective effect on the poor 
than the rich. This finding is in line with the results presented in Jowett, Contoyannis and 
Vinh (2003), who used the same data for regression analysis (although they only used 
observations with positive OOP costs, N = 980); however the magnitude of the interaction 
effect was underestimated [coefficient = -0.433] in that study. 
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Figure 5-1: The coefficients on interaction term between insurance and socioeconomic status 
 
It should be noted that the interaction term estimates the marginal effect of consumption 
expenditure on the cost of care for the insured and the uninsured. However, in order to 
evaluate the entire distribution of expenditure and consumption expenditure, an analysis 
based on concentration and Lorenz curves is required. This analysis is presented in the 
following section.  
5.3.2 Results from concentration and Kakwani index analysis 
Figure 5-2 presents the concentration and Lorenz curves for the observed and predicted cost 
distributions. Figure 5-3 provides further insight into the cost distribution, by plotting the 
proportion of total sample health care cost shared by each socioeconomic quintile. Figure 5-4 
presents the progressivity gap between concentration and Lorenz curves (this is effectively 
the difference between the concentration and Lorenz curve at each point along the 
socioeconomic gradient) and shows the socioeconomic distribution of progressivity; table 5-2 
summarises CIs and KIs for each analysis.  
The concentration indices based on the observed cost of care (the unstandardised analysis) 
suggest that the average level of inequality in health care costs was more pro-poor in the 
insured group [CI = 0.145, p <0.01] than the uninsured group [CI = 0.120, p = 0.15] [table 5-
-0.65
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-0.75-0.80
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-0.60
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Figure 5-1: Difference in the average predicted cost of care 
between the insured and the uninsured groups when the 
consumption expenditure increases by 1%
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
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2]. A graphical examination of the concentration curves [figure 5-2 (a)] revealed that the cost 
distribution for the lowest three socioeconomic quintiles in the insured group was more pro-
poor than the respective quintiles of the uninsured group. This is because the lowest three 
insured quintiles contribute 42.4% to the total insured cost of care, while the respective 
uninsured quintiles contribute 58.2% to the total uninsured cost of care [figure 5-3]. A 
progressivity analysis of unstandardised costs suggests that the cost distributions are on 
average regressive or pro-rich for both groups: insured [KI = -0.244, p<0.01], uninsured [KI 
= -0.242, p = 0.01] [table 5-2] 2. Figure 5-4 shows that the level of regressivity in financing 
was less pronounced in the poorest quintiles of the insured group, compared to the uninsured. 
Since observed cost is a function of need and non-need variables, once the need 
standardisation process was implemented, the concentration indices for both groups become 
more positive, i.e. more pro-poor; insured [CI = 0.31, p<0.01], uninsured [CI = 0.16, p<0.01] 
[table 5-2]. Figure [5-2] shows that the need standardisation procedure shifts the 
concentration curves down for both the groups. This finding is not surprising, since need 
variables have a higher concentration among the poorer quintiles. When these need 
differences are averaged out, the standardised distribution becomes a function of the non-
need determinants, which are concentrated among the richer quintiles. As a result, the need 
standardised costs are relatively more pro-poor than the observed costs used in the 
unstandardised analysis [figure 5-3]. 
It is important to note that, for first half of the cost distribution, the unstandardised 
concentration curve for the insured group lies below the concentration curve for the 
uninsured group. Once the need variables were standardised and the self-selection biases 
were corrected, almost entire cost distribution of the insured lies below the distribution of the 
uninsured. This suggests that insurance is associated with relatively pro-poor distribution of 
health care costs. Furthermore, the poor half of the insured cost distribution lies below the 
Lorenz curve for income distribution; whereas the uninsured cost distribution always lie 
                                                           
2
 It should be noted that the analysis was carried out in Stata, and that the command for concentration 
curves, -glcurve-, randomly sorts individuals when the level of socioeconomic status is the same. This 
sort order remains stable within a particular Stata session but not between sessions. Hence the 
magnitude of the index may change marginally when the analysis is re-run. This issue was raised with 
the authors of the –glurve- package. Communication available on Statalist at 
http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2008-06/msg00726.html. This communication resulted in an 
update of –glcurve- on Stata and the contribution was acknowledged. The current results are based on 
the updated version of –glcurve-, which remains stable within a session but not between sessions. 
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above the respective Lorenz curve. This clearly indicates that insurance membership is 
associated with progressive financing for the poor. This is an important finding, as it implies 
that the cost reduction associated with insurance (as established in chapter 4) benefits the 
poor more than the rich. 
It was also interesting to note that the insured concentration curve has sharp dips in the richer 
half of the distribution (figure 5-4) which become less pronounced when the self-selection 
biases are corrected. This could potentially occur due to correlation between the unobserved 
determinants of socioeconomic status and the care-seeking/insurance-seeking decision. Once 
this correlation was taken into account in the cost of care model, the dips becomes less 
pronounced. 
The progressivity analysis of need adjusted distributions revealed that the Kakwani indices, 
for both the insured and uninsured groups, became less regressive after standardisation: 
insured [KI = -0.080, p<0.001], uninsured [KI = -0.203, p<0.01] [table 5-2]. In fact, the need 
standardised progressivity gap shows progressivity in financing for the poorest 45% of the 
insured sample, while the remaining distribution remained regressive [figure 5-4].  
In the next step, we use the two-part and Heckman’s sample selection models to correct care-
seeking self-selection bias along with need standardisation. Both models result in a marginal 
decrease in the CI for the insured, and an increase for the uninsured; insured [TPM: CI = 
0.278, p<0.01; Heckman: CI = 0.303, p<0.01], uninsured [TPM: CI = 0.180, p<0.01; 
Heckman: CI = 0.186, p<0.01] [table 5-2]. A separate analysis showed that, after care-
seeking correction, the predicted cost of care increased in absolute monetary terms for all the 
quintiles of insured and uninsured groups. However, the relative increase in the predicted cost 
was proportionately higher for the richer quintiles [figure 5-3]. This finding is not surprising, 
since the bias-corrected cost distribution is dictated solely by non-need variables, such as 
income and education (need variables have been standardised), which have higher values 
among the richer quintiles, thus predicting higher costs among the rich. The analysis of 
progressivity shows corresponding changes in Kakwani indices, reflecting these same 
movements in concentration curves. The insured distribution is still observed to be less 
regressive than the uninsured distribution. 
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In the next step, insurance-seeking self-selection bias was corrected, using a treatment effects 
model. The results suggest a marginal increase in the concentration indices, compared to OLS 
predictions, for both insured and uninsured groups; insured [CI = 0.316, p<0.01], uninsured 
[CI = 0.170, p<0.01] [table 5-2]. The corresponding concentration curves [figure 5-2] and 
predicted cost share graphs [figure 5-3] suggest that the impact of insurance endogeneity 
correction is more or less uniform across the socioeconomic quintiles. This suggests that the 
unobserved characteristics associated with the insurance decision do not have a significant 
distributional impact on cost predictions. The corresponding Kakwani indices also follow a 
similar pattern, producing only a marginal decrease for both groups. 
Finally, the two-part Heckman model (insurance probit followed by Heckman sample 
selection model) corrects for both types of self-selection bias, whilst standardising for need. 
The predicted cost distributions are significantly more pro-poor for the insured [CI = 0.324, 
p<0.01] compared to the uninsured [CI = 0.189, p<0.01]. The corresponding Kakwani indices 
also show that the insured cost distributions are significantly less regressive [KI = -0.065, 
p<0.01] than the uninsured [KI = -0.173].  
An analysis of distributional graphs suggests that, in the insured group, the pro-poorness and 
progressivity of cost distribution is concentrated mainly in the poorest three quintiles. In 
contrast, for the uninsured group, pro-poorness of the cost distribution is uniformly 
distributed, and the distribution of progressivity gap is always regressive [figures 5-2 and 5-
4].  
5.4 Discussion 
This study has identified potential biases in the standard practice of measuring equity and 
progressivity of financing, and has proposed an improved methodology that was applied to 
the case of Vietnamese VHI. The proposed method standardised the differences in the level 
of observed need variables and aimed to correct for potential self-selection biases associated 
with care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions.  
Based on the proposed methodology, this study has shown that the VHI membership reduces 
the level of regressivity of financing. The study also found that the need standardisation 
procedure increased the level of pro-poorness of cost distribution and reduced the level of 
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regressivity for insured and uninsured groups. However, correcting for self-selection biases 
only produced minimal changes in the overall distribution. This study also found that, after 
standardisation and bias correction, the OOP payments were progressive for the poorest half 
of the insured sample, although the overall Kakwani index remained regressive.  
The process of need standardisation has enabled the study to highlight the inequalities 
attributable to non-need determinants of health care costs. The findings of this study have 
important relevance to policy making in the developing countries. Since formal mechanisms 
of progressive taxation are limited in the context of informal economies, insurance can be a 
useful tool to reduce the cost burden on the poor and improve progressivity of financing. 
Furthermore, a progressive method of financing can potentially redistribute societal resources 
to the advantage of the poor. Hence, the study proposes that the Vietnamese VHI programme 
should be extended further with targeted measures to facilitate membership uptake, especially 
among the poor whose proportionate share of OOP payments can be reduced substantially by 
insurance membership. However, policy-makers need to be cautious about the concerns on 
financial sustainability of such programmes where relatively small cost recovery may leave 
significant funding gaps. 
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Figure 5-2 (a): Concentration and Lorenz curves for unstandardised and need standardised cost of care (based on OLS model) 
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Figure 5-2 (b): Concentration and Lorenz curves for need standardised and care-seeking self-selection bias corrected cost of care  
(based on TPM and Heckman models) 
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Figure 5-2 (c): Concentration and Lorenz curves for need standardised and insurance-seeking bias corrected cost of care (left) 
and both care- and insurance-seeking, bias corrected cost of care (right) 
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Figure 5-3: Percentage share of total cost of care by socioeconomic quintiles (by insurance status) 
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Figure 5-4: Distribution of the difference between concentration and Lorenz curves (the progressivity gap) along the socioeconomic gradient  
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Table 5-2: Concentration and Kakwani indices for insured and uninsured groups based on unstandardised and standardised analysis 
 
 
Unstandardised 
analysis OLS model TPM model Heckman model 
Treatment effects 
model 
Two-part Heckman 
model 
  
Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured 
 
Concentration 
Index 
0.145*** 0.120 0.309*** 0.160*** 0.278*** 0.180*** 0.303*** 0.186*** 0.316*** 0.170*** 0.324*** 0.189*** 
(0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Kakwani 
Index 
  
 
-0.244*** 
 
-0.242*** 
 
-0.080*** 
 
-0.203*** 
 
-0.111***
 
-0.182** 
 
-0.086*** 
 
-0.176** 
 
-0.073*** 
 
-0.192*** 
 
-0.065*** 
 
-0.173** 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Robust p values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to measure the impact of the Vietnamese Voluntary Health 
Insurance (VHI) programme on the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health care costs. 
The specific research objectives are to:  
i) compare the observed incidence and intensity of catastrophic events in the insured 
and uninsured groups; 
ii) analyse the impact of membership of the VHI programme on the probability of 
catastrophic event using discrete regression models; 
iii) correct for any potential bias in catastrophic probability models attributable to 
non-random distribution of self-selection decisions; 
iv) analyse the catastrophic risk reduction attributable to insurance membership, and 
compute the number needed to treat (NNT) to prevent one catastrophic event; and  
v) evaluate the socioeconomic distribution of the protective effect of insurance on 
the occurrence of catastrophic events. 
The above analysis is carried out using: a) the observed health care costs, and b) the predicted 
probabilities of financial catastrophe, calculated before and after correcting for potential care-
seeking and insurance-seeking self-selection bias.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Sections 6.2 to 6.4 will discuss the study 
methodology. More specifically, section 6.2 will discuss the two standard methodological 
approaches traditionally used for catastrophic cost analysis, i.e. the headcount and positive 
overshoot method, and regression-based catastrophic event modelling. Section 6.3 will 
discuss the potential biases in the regression models due to self-selection decisions, and the 
corrective models employed in this thesis. Sections 6.4 will discuss the computational method 
used to calculate risk reduction and NNTs. Section 6.5 will present the descriptive and 
analytical results from the catastrophic analysis. Finally, section 6.6 will discuss the 
implications of the study’s findings for social policy. 
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6.2 Methodology 
The cost of health care is defined as catastrophic when its share as a fraction of the total 
consumption expenditure exceeds a pre-defined threshold value. This study uses a range of 
threshold values between 10% and 40%, with equal intervals of 10%. This approach controls 
for the possibility of introducing a subjective bias in the choice of threshold value. The 
numerator for the current analysis is the individual level health care cost for the three months 
prior to the study. The two denominators used separately in the analysis are total 
consumption expenditure and non-food consumption expenditures. Both are equivalised to 
account for the heterogeneity of household size. A consistent pattern of consumption across 
four quarters of the year was assumed, and therefore annual consumption was appropriately 
divided by four to match the duration of health care costs incurrence.  
In the literature, two standard approaches of catastrophic cost analyses have commonly been 
used. The first involves measuring the incidence and intensity of financial catastrophe based 
on the observed cost of care (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). The second uses binary 
regression models to estimate the probability of a catastrophic event after controlling for need 
and non-need variables (O’Donnell and van Doorslaer 2005; Ekman 2007a). Both of these 
approaches have been employed in the literature to measure the impact of voluntary health 
insurance on the catastrophic cost of care (Ranson 2002; Cavagnero et al 2006; Joglekar 
2008).  
The current study goes a step further by correcting for any potential self-selection bias in the 
regression-based approach. Furthermore, based on results from the regression models, the 
catastrophic risk reduction attributable to insurance membership, and the ‘number needed to 
treat’ in order to avoid catastrophic event will be evaluated. These results will be presented 
separately for each socioeconomic quintile, in order to draw equity conclusions about the 
impact of the insurance programme.  
6.2.1 Measuring the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health care 
costs  
Catastrophic event incidence is defined as the percentage of individuals for whom the cost of 
care, as a proportion of the socioeconomic measure of their ability-to-pay, is greater than the 
threshold value [] (O’Donnell and van Doorslaer 2005). For an individual: 
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8 = 1  EF >  , PP 0             [6.1] 
Here 8 represents a catastrophic event, E is the cost of care variable and F represents 
consumption expenditure (the socioeconomic variable). The threshold values are defined at 
10%, 20%, 30% and 40%, and the incidence is obtained through a simple process of 
headcount of those incurring catastrophic costs. If the total sample size is represented by N, 
the proportion of individuals in the sample with catastrophic costs is represented by R and is 
calculated in equation [6.2]: 
R = d1ge ~ 8

L6
       [6.2] 
The catastrophic cost overshoot, defined as the amount by which an individual exceeds the 
threshold, can be calculated as: 
 = EF −    8 = 1        [6.3] 
The average cost overshoot, , is simply the mean of  represented as 6 ∑ L6 .  
6.2.2 Modelling the probability of a catastrophic event 
The observed headcount does not control for the differences in any covariates that may 
influence the catastrophic event rate. In order to control for the observed need and non-need 
determinants, a probit function was used to model the probability of a catastrophic event. 
This model is represented below: 
Pr [8] =  Φ "%           [6.4] 
Here, Pr [8] represents the probability of a catastrophic event and  represents the 
independent variables that influence this probability. The analysis includes all the individuals 
with one or more reported illnesses in the three months prior to the survey, irrespective of 
whether or not they sought health care for their illness.  
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6.3 Correcting for care-seeking and insurance-seeking self-
selection bias in catastrophic event models 
The naive probit model for the occurrence of a catastrophic event is based on the observed 
health care costs. This analysis may be biased due to the non-random distribution of care-
seeking decision, particularly if care-selection is not independent of the probability of a 
catastrophic event. In principle, the bias would be similar to that observed in chapter 4 when 
modelling the cost of care; however in this case, the dependent variable models the 
probability of extreme values of health care costs, rather than the mean expected values. To 
correct for the potential selection issue, the care-seeking decision is modelled independently, 
using the probit function below: 
M[ = 1| ] = Φ           [6.5] 
Here  represents the care-seeking decision and  represents the predictor variables. 
Equation [6.6] is subsequently used to generate an inverse Mills ratio (IMR) for care-seeking 
decision in the same way as was implemented in chapter 4. The IMR represents the ratio of 
the probability density function to the cumulative density function for care-seeking decision 
[equation 6.6].  
m[ =  
nop
oqϕ  Φ s                for  = 1
ϕ  [1 − Φ ]s      for  = 0
        [6.6] 
Since self-selection bias is effectively an omitted variable bias, the inclusion of the 
unobserved propensity of seeking care m[ as an additional covariate in the catastrophic 
event model, aims to correct the bias [equation 6.7]. 
Pr [8] =  Φ [[ +  m[        [6.7] 
Catastrophic event models may also suffer selection bias, due to the endogeneity of insurance 
self-selection, if the unobserved propensity of insurance decision is systematically associated 
with the catastrophic event rate. Again, the underlying principle of bias is the same as 
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discussed in chapter 4. In order to correct for the potential insurance-seeking bias, we employ 
a probit model for insurance decision [equation 6.8]. 
M[) = 1|* ] = Φ *          [6.8] 
An inverse Mills ratio λ/ is generated, so that insurance decision can be used as an 
additional regressor in the catastrophic incidence model [equation 6.9]. 
Pr [8] =  Φ [[ +  m+        [6.9] 
Finally, in order to simultaneously correct for the two self-selection biases, the IMRs from 
both the care-seeking and insurance-seeking equations are included into the catastrophic 
incidence model [equation 6.10]: 
Pr [8] =  Φ [[ + m[ +  m+        [6.10] 
 
6.4 Absolute risk reduction and the number needed to treat 
analysis 
The predicted probabilities from the catastrophic event models can also be presented in the 
form of a reduction in risk that is attributable to insurance membership. The concept of 
absolute risk reduction (ARR) is borrowed from epidemiological literature (Griffith et al 
2009; Barratt et al 2004; Schechtman 2002; Cook and Sackett 1995) and applied to the 
context of catastrophic event analysis. ARR is defined as the absolute amount by which the 
risk of a catastrophic event is reduced due to insurance membership. If the absolute risk is 
represented by the predicted probability of financial catastrophe, the absolute risk reduction 
can be expressed as the difference between the predicted probabilities in the uninsured and the 
insured groups [6.11]:  
I = Pr [8]  − Pr [8]+          [6.11] 
Here Pr [8]  represents the predicted probability of financial catastrophe in the uninsured 
group, and Pr [8]+ represents the same variable for the insured group. If the sign of ARR is 
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positive, it would suggest that the uninsured are more likely to suffer a catastrophic event, and 
vice versa. 
Another important concept borrowed from the epidemiological literature for this study is that 
of the number needed to treat (NNT). This metric is highly relevant to the policy context, as it 
provides an assessment of the potential impact of investment on a programme. Conceptually, 
an NNT estimate represents the number of individuals who need to be treated in order to 
prevent one adverse event. In the case of the current study, treatment refers to insurance 
membership and adverse event refers to a catastrophic event. Hence, NNTs provides an 
estimate of the potential gain, in terms of prevention of catastrophic events, from improving 
access to insurance membership. To the best of my knowledge, the concept of NNT has not 
been applied before to the context of catastrophic event analysis. 
Computationally, NNT is the reciprocal of absolute risk reduction, and can be represented as: 
gg¡ =  1|Pr [8]  − Pr [8]+|           [6.12] 
In this study, the results from ARR and NNT analyses are presented for each socioeconomic 
quintile of the insured and uninsured groups, to estimate the potential equity implication of 
insurance membership on catastrophic incidence.  
6.5 Results 
The catastrophic cost analysis was carried out using all observations with at least one episode 
of reported illness in the three months prior to the survey. The total number of eligible 
observations was 1,192, of whom 207 individuals did not seek any care, and thus had zero 
costs and hence no catastrophic financial costs due to health care expenditure.  
The results are presented in three parts:  
1) The incidence and intensity of catastrophic events based on the observed costs, and 
their distribution across socioeconomic quintiles [section 6.5.1];  
2) Regression results based on probit models for catastrophic event probability before 
and after correction for self-selection biases [section 6.5.2]; 
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3) The estimates of absolute risk reduction and the number needed to treat, and their 
distribution across the socioeconomic quintiles [section 6.5.3].  
6.5.1 Incidence and intensity of catastrophic events 
Tables 6-1 (a) and (b) summarise the catastrophic headcount and mean overshoot at threshold 
levels of 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%. Table 6-1 (a) uses total consumption expenditure as the 
denominator while table 6-1 (b) uses non-food consumption expenditure as the denominator.  
Table 6-1 (a): Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health costs 
(Denominator: total consumption expenditure) 
 
Catastrophe measure: Out-of-pocket cost 
of care as share of total consumption 
expenditure 
Threshold budget share 
Catastrophic payment 
measure 
Insurance status 10% 20% 30% 40% 
Headcount Uninsured 15.19% 8.12% 4.43% 3.39% 
       Std Error  1.60% 1.19% 0.89% 0.79% 
Headcount Insured 5.59% 0.28% 0.16% 0.11% 
       Std Error  4.95% 0.11% 0.07% 0.06% 
Overshoot Uninsured 3.10% 1.99% 1.36% 0.95% 
       Std Error  0.50% 0.41% 0.33% 0.26% 
Overshoot Insured 0.39% 0.05% 0.02% 0.01% 
       Std Error  0.30% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 
 
 
Table 6-1 (b): Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health costs  
(Denominator: non-food consumption expenditure) 
 
Catastrophe measure: Out-of-pocket cost of 
care as share of non-food expenditure Threshold budget share 
Catastrophic payment 
measure 
Insurance status 10% 20% 30% 40% 
Headcount Uninsured 30.77% 18.59% 9.60% 6.27% 
         Std Error  2.15% 1.81% 1.32% 1.09% 
Headcount Insured 6.07% 5.60% 0.38% 0.35% 
         Std Error  4.95% 4.95% 0.13% 0.12% 
Overshoot Uninsured 5.69% 3.38% 2.05% 1.28% 
         Std Error  0.61% 0.48% 0.37% 0.28% 
Overshoot Insured 0.94% 0.36% 0.11% 0.08% 
         Std Error  0.70% 0.21% 0.04% 0.03% 
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The results show that the incidence of financial catastrophe in the insured group was 
consistently lower than that observed in the uninsured group. When the threshold was defined 
at 10% of total consumption expenditure, the insured headcount was 9.6% lower than the 
uninsured headcount. The difference increased to 24.7% when non-food consumption 
expenditure was used as the denominator at the same threshold value. At a higher threshold 
value of 40%, the underlying risk of catastrophic expenditure significantly reduced for both 
insured and uninsured groups; as a result the absolute difference between the two groups was 
reduced to 3.3% (denominator: total consumption expenditure) and 5.9% (denominator: non-
food consumption expenditure).  
The intensity of financial catastrophe, as measured by mean overshoot, suggests that, when a 
catastrophic event is experienced, the intensity for the insured individuals was lower than that 
for the uninsured group. Although these figures support the argument that insurance 
membership has a protective role at all threshold values, the results should be interpreted 
carefully, since the individuals were not randomised to insured or uninsured groups. 
The thesis also assessed the distribution of catastrophic incidence and intensity across 
socioeconomic quintiles. Figure 6-1 (below) shows the difference between the uninsured and 
insured, in their catastrophic incidence at each socioeconomic quintile. A positive difference 
suggests that the incidence is higher in the uninsured group. Although the observed pattern 
does not show a consistent gradient when total consumption expenditure is used as the 
denominator, when compared against non-food consumption expenditure, the difference is 
observed to be higher in the poorer quintiles. Figure 6-2 (below) presents results for the 
difference between the uninsured and insured in catastrophic intensity across socioeconomic 
quintiles. Again, a positive difference suggests that the intensity is higher in the uninsured 
group. The observed pattern does not show a consistent difference; however, at least at lower 
thresholds of 10% and 20%, the protective role of insurance appears to be greater in the lower 
socioeconomic quintiles.  
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Figure 6-1: The difference between uninsured and insured catastrophic headcounts 
([Headcount]
 uninsured - [Headcount] insured) 
 
Figure 6-2: The difference between uninsured and insured catastrophic overshoot 
([Mean overshoot]
 uninsured - [Mean overshoot] insured) 
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6.5.2 Results from regression models for catastrophic event 
Tables 6-2 and 6-3 present the results of regression models for the probability of a 
catastrophic event defined at threshold values of 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%, against two 
alternative denominators: total and non-food consumption expenditures.  
Table 6-2: Probit models for incidence of catastrophic health care cost 
(Denominator: total consumption expenditure) 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Catastrophic 
event (yes/no) 
  
Probability of health 
expenditure>10% of 
total expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>20% of 
total expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>30% of 
total expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>40% of 
total expenditure 
No bias 
correction 
Self- 
selection 
bias 
corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self - 
selection 
bias 
corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self - 
selection 
bias 
corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self - 
selection 
bias 
corrected 
 
Insurance 
membership = 
yes 
 
-0.91** -1.08*** -2.04*** -2.17*** -1.86*** -1.95*** -1.82*** -1.91*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        
Log of 
equivalent 
consumption 
expenditure 
-0.24* -0.26* -0.14 -0.14 -0.24 -0.22 -0.29 -0.25 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.38) (0.39) (0.12) (0.20) (0.13) (0.25) 
Age 0.04** 0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.57) (0.96) (0.90) (0.56) (0.37) (0.17) 
Age-squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.19) (0.46) (0.97) (0.75) (0.53) (0.30) (0.13) (0.05) 
Female sex 0.15 0.07 0.24 0.10 0.71 0.60 0.58 0.47 
 (0.80) (0.90) (0.69) (0.87) (0.38) (0.45) (0.49) (0.57) 
Interaction 
between age and 
sex 
-0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.98) (0.87) (0.62) (0.39) (0.71) (0.53) (0.56) (0.43) 
Rural residence 0.55** 0.58** 0.58** 0.64** 0.26 0.33 0.01 0.10 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.46) (0.36) (0.97) (0.81) 
Residence: Hai 
Phong 
-0.02 -0.58 -0.15 -0.65* -0.53 -1.24** -0.40 -1.13 
 (0.96) (0.21) (0.69) (0.06) (0.24) (0.03) (0.36) (0.11) 
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Residence: Ninh 
Binh 
-0.00 -0.19 0.05 -0.10 -0.18 -0.42 -0.40 -0.66** 
 (0.98) (0.33) (0.81) (0.63) (0.52) (0.18) (0.14) (0.05) 
Occupation: 
service 
0.29 0.44 0.51* 0.68** -0.04 0.11 -0.42 -0.32 
 (0.33) (0.14) (0.07) (0.02) (0.92) (0.79) (0.25) (0.41) 
Occupation: 
farmer 
-0.21 -0.18 -0.11 -0.07 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.18 
 (0.29) (0.36) (0.45) (0.68) (0.72) (0.58) (0.39) (0.33) 
Occupation: 
hired 
-0.76** -0.63** -0.10 0.07 -0.42** -0.25 -0.18 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.80) (0.86) (0.05) (0.28) (0.53) (0.99) 
Years of 
schooling 
0.10** 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.16) (0.31) (0.55) (0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.34) 
Interaction 
between gender 
and years of 
schooling 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
(0.86) (0.88) (0.92) (0.95) (0.61) (0.52) (0.86) (0.82) 
Interaction 
between age and 
education 
-0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.07) (0.13) (0.44) (0.67) (0.61) (0.68) (0.79) (0.81) 
Health status: 
fairly good 
0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.09 -0.31* -0.11 -0.52** -0.30 
 (0.98) (0.51) (0.89) (0.70) (0.07) (0.67) (0.02) (0.36) 
Health status: 
fairly bad 
0.71*** 0.83*** 0.28 0.37* 0.18 0.31 0.29 0.43* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.05) (0.28) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) 
Health status: 
long-term illness 
0.57** 0.90*** 0.46** 0.72*** 0.23 0.61* 0.19 0.58 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.37) (0.05) (0.51) (0.15) 
Chronic illness 
(yes = 1) 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.14 -0.17 -0.38 -0.45 -0.26 -0.35 
 (0.97) (0.91) (0.64) (0.55) (0.21) (0.15) (0.47) (0.35) 
Number of 
illnesses in last 
3 months 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 
(0.33) (0.31) (0.51) (0.48) (0.84) (0.97) (0.45) (0.39) 
Inpatient care 
(yes = 1) 
1.62*** 1.80*** 1.71*** 1.83*** 1.47*** 1.55*** 1.42*** 1.47*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Days stopped 
normal activities 
due to illness 
0.20*** 1.71*** 0.20*** 1.55*** 0.24*** 1.93 0.19* 1.97 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.05) (0.21) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio for care-
seeking 
- 0.21*** - 0.20*** - 0.24*** - 0.19* 
- (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.07) 
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Constant -1.6 -1.65 -2.35 -2.41 -1.49 -1.77 -0.48 -0.88 
 (0.19) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.33) (0.28) (0.79) (0.66) 
Observations 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.             Robust p-values in parentheses 
 
 
 
Table 6-3: Probit models for incidence of catastrophic health care cost 
(Denominator: non-food consumption expenditure) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Catastrophic 
event (yes/no) 
  
Probability of health 
expenditure>10% of 
non-food expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>20% of 
non-food expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>30% of 
non-food expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>40% of 
non-food expenditure 
No bias 
correction 
Self -
selection 
bias 
corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self - 
selection 
bias 
corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self - 
selection 
bias 
corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self - 
selection 
bias 
corrected 
 
        
Insurance 
membership = 
yes 
-1.26*** -1.54*** -0.85*** -1.07*** -1.73*** -1.84*** -1.83*** -1.89*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of 
equivalent 
consumption 
expenditure 
-0.62*** -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.71*** -0.66*** -0.70*** -0.52*** -0.56*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05** 0.04* 0.02 0.01 0.03** 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.23) (0.47) (0.05) (0.11) 
Age-squared -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.52) (0.82) (0.38) (0.60) 
Female sex 0.04 -0.01 -0.29 -0.31 -0.16 -0.15 0.87 0.85 
 (0.91) (0.99) (0.57) (0.59) (0.74) (0.78) (0.19) (0.22) 
Interaction 
between age 
and sex 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.004 -0.01 -0.007 
(0.31) (0.17) (0.36) (0.29) (0.65) (0.65) (0.45) (0.53) 
Rural 
residence 
0.21 0.28 0.60** 0.72** 0.28 0.298 0.31 0.326 
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.04) (0.02) (0.29) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) 
Residence: Hai 
Phong 0.24 -0.44 0.03 -0.93 -0.70** 
-
1.477*** -0.58* 
-
1.364*** 
 (0.39) (0.14) (0.94) (0.16) (0.02) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) 
Chapter 6                                               Impact of VHI on catastrophic incidence and intensity 
 
147 | P a g e  
 
Residence: 
Ninh Binh 
0.10 -0.17 -0.14 -0.50* 0.03 -0.187 -0.10 -0.309 
 (0.62) (0.41) (0.46) (0.07) (0.87) (0.42) (0.63) (0.24) 
Occupation: 
service 
-0.10 -0.01 0.47** 0.63*** 0.49 0.622** 0.29 0.418 
 (0.54) (0.96) (0.04) (0.00) (0.11) (0.05) (0.38) (0.21) 
Occupation: 
farmer 
-0.65*** -0.71*** -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.13 -0.101 -0.23 -0.198 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.55) (0.24) (0.32) 
Occupation: 
hired 
-0.52* -0.36 -0.66*** -0.38 -0.45** -0.270 -0.38* -0.213 
 (0.07) (0.28) (0.00) (0.17) (0.02) (0.22) (0.08) (0.32) 
Years of 
schooling 
-0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.018 0.07 0.049 
 (0.83) (0.40) (0.55) (0.90) (1.00) (0.76) (0.28) (0.55) 
Interaction 
between 
gender and 
years of 
schooling 
-0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.027 -0.03 -0.030 
(0.42) (0.41) (0.87) (0.91) (0.48) (0.47) (0.53) (0.55) 
Interaction 
between age 
and education 
0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.000 -0.00 -0.001 
(0.87) (0.41) (0.42) (0.82) (0.83) (0.94) (0.49) (0.60) 
Health status: 
fairly good 
-0.48** -0.28 -0.19 0.14 0.05 0.290 0.27 0.524* 
 (0.03) (0.23) (0.40) (0.64) (0.85) (0.31) (0.19) (0.08) 
Health status: 
fairly bad 
0.40* 0.59** 0.38* 0.61*** 0.40* 0.584** 0.56*** 0.750*** 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Health status: 
long-term 
illness 
0.28 0.76** 0.60*** 1.26*** 0.42* 0.841*** 0.30 0.717 
(0.32) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.35) (0.10) 
Chronic illness 
(yes = 1) 
0.07 0.03 0.21 0.17 -0.19 -0.228 -0.04 -0.075 
 (0.73) (0.86) (0.31) (0.39) (0.52) (0.45) (0.88) (0.78) 
Number of 
illnesses in last 
3 months 
-0.07 -0.08* -0.08* -0.09* -0.06 -0.076 -0.08 -0.101 
(0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.34) (0.21) (0.22) (0.11) 
Inpatient care 
(yes = 1) 
1.16*** 1.52*** 1.46*** 1.77*** 1.50*** 1.694*** 1.64*** 1.797*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Days stopped 
normal 
activities due 
to illness 
0.19*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Inverse Mills 
Ratio for care-
seeking 
- 2.38*** - 3.21** - 2.24** - 2.21* 
- (0.00) - (0.02) - (0.01) - (0.07) 
Constant 
3.30*** 3.34*** 2.61** 2.28* 2.53* 2.51* 0.24 0.24 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.87) (0.88) 
Observations 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.                    Robust p-values in parentheses 
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Table 6-4: Marginal effects estimated in the probit models for incidence of catastrophic health care cost 
(Denominator: total consumption expenditure) 
Probability of health expenditure>10% 
of total expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>20% of total 
expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>30% of total 
expenditure 
Probability of health expenditure>40% 
of total expenditure 
Dependent 
variable: 
Catastrophic 
event (yes/no) 
No bias 
correction 
Self- selection 
bias corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self- selection 
bias corrected 
No bias correction 
Self- selection 
bias corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self- selection bias 
corrected 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Insurance 
member -0.30 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
Log of equivalent 
consumption 
expenditure 
-0.22 0.00 -0.04 0.09 -0.18 0.00 -0.01 0.44 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.38 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.38 
Age 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.22 
Age-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.12 
Female sex 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.90 -0.08 0.57 0.01 0.87 -0.03 0.73 0.02 0.55 0.11 0.28 0.01 0.62 
Interaction 
between age and 
sex 
0.00 0.30 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.36 
Rural residence 0.07 0.21 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.26 0.01 0.36 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.79 
Residence: Hai 
Phong 0.09 0.40 -0.07 0.07 0.01 0.94 -0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.04 
Residence: Ninh 
Binh 0.03 0.62 -0.03 0.32 -0.04 0.46 -0.01 0.65 0.01 0.87 -0.01 0.28 -0.01 0.65 -0.02 0.09 
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Occupation: 
service -0.04 0.53 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.81 0.04 0.45 -0.01 0.40 
Occupation: 
farmer -0.22 0.00 -0.03 0.40 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.68 -0.02 0.46 0.00 0.55 -0.03 0.27 0.01 0.36 
Occupation: 
hired -0.16 0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.01 0.86 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.24 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.99 
Years of 
schooling 0.00 0.83 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.53 0.00 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.31 0.00 0.38 
Interaction 
between gender 
and years of 
schooling 
-0.01 0.42 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.82 
Interaction 
between age and 
education 
0.00 0.87 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.81 
Health status: 
fairly good -0.17 0.03 0.03 0.48 -0.05 0.42 0.01 0.69 0.01 0.85 0.00 0.70 0.03 0.17 -0.01 0.48 
Health status: 
fairly bad 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.13 
Health status: 
long-term illness 0.10 0.33 0.23 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.41 0.03 0.28 
Chronic illness 0.02 0.73 -0.01 0.90 0.06 0.33 -0.01 0.51 -0.03 0.48 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.88 -0.01 0.23 
Number of 
illnesses in last 3 
months 
-0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.32 -0.02 0.10 0.00 0.50 -0.01 0.37 0.00 0.97 -0.01 0.22 0.00 0.42 
Inpatient care 0.44 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.17 0.02 
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Days stopped 
normal activities 
due to illness 
0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio for care-
seeking 
- - 0.29 0.00 - - 0.14 0.00 - - 0.08 0.12 - - 0.06 0.16 
 
Table 6-5: Marginal effects estimated in the probit models for incidence of catastrophic health care cost 
(Denominator: non-food consumption expenditure) 
Probability of health 
expenditure>10% of total 
expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>20% of total 
expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>30% of total 
expenditure 
Probability of health 
expenditure>40% of total 
expenditure 
Dependent 
variable: 
Catastrophic 
event (yes/no) 
No bias 
correction 
Self- selection 
bias corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self- selection 
bias corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self- selection 
bias corrected 
No bias 
correction 
Self- selection 
bias corrected 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
p-
value 
Insurance 
member 
-0.30 0.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.01 
Log of 
equivalent 
consumption 
expenditure 
-0.22 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.06 0.04 
Age age     0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.19 
Age-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.62 
Female sex 0.01 0.91 0.00 0.99 -0.08 0.57 -0.07 0.59 -0.03 0.73 -0.02 0.78 0.11 0.28 0.09 0.31 
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Interaction 
between age 
and sex 
0.00 0.30 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.56 
Rural residence 
0.07 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.25 
Residence: Hai 
Phong 
0.09 0.40 -0.13 0.09 0.01 0.94 -0.13 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.01 
Residence: Ninh 
Binh 
0.03 0.62 -0.06 0.40 -0.04 0.46 -0.10 0.03 0.01 0.87 -0.02 0.44 -0.01 0.65 -0.03 0.26 
Occupation: 
service 
-0.04 0.53 0.00 0.97 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.45 0.06 0.31 
Occupation: 
farmer 
-0.22 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.46 -0.01 0.57 -0.03 0.27 -0.02 0.37 
Occupation: 
hired 
-0.16 0.04 -0.11 0.24 -0.14 0.00 -0.07 0.12 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.25 
Years of 
schooling 
0.00 0.83 -0.01 0.41 0.01 0.53 0.00 0.90 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.77 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.58 
Interaction 
between gender 
and years of 
schooling 
-0.01 0.42 -0.01 0.40 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.57 
Interaction 
between age 
and education 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.61 
Health status: 
fairly good 
-0.17 0.03 -0.10 0.25 -0.05 0.42 0.03 0.63 0.01 0.85 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.04 
Health status: 
fairly bad 
0.15 0.11 0.22 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.01 
Health status: 
long-term illness 0.10 0.33 0.29 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.02 0.05 0.41 0.11 0.20 
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Chronic illness 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.86 0.06 0.33 0.04 0.43 -0.03 0.48 -0.03 0.39 -0.01 0.88 -0.01 0.77 
Number of 
illnesses in last 
3 months 
-0.02 0.17 -0.03 0.10 -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.37 -0.01 0.27 -0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.15 
Inpatient care 
0.44 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.45 0.00 
Days stopped 
normal activities 
due to illness 
0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio for care-
seeking - - 0.82 0.00 - - 0.05 0.00 - - 0.32 0.00 - - 0.23 0.00 
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The results show that insurance has a statistically significant protective effect on the 
probability of financial catastrophe at all threshold levels. The effect is more pronounced at 
higher catastrophic thresholds; this can be explained by the fact that those who spend a higher 
proportion of their consumption expenditure on health care are more likely to be the ones 
needing inpatient hospital care, which is highly subsidised by insurance.  
The results also show that the coefficient on log of consumption expenditure was consistently 
negative in all models, albeit this was not always statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that richer individuals are less likely to incur catastrophic health care costs at all 
threshold values. The regression coefficients on inpatient hospital care are significantly 
positive in all models, suggesting that those who seek inpatient care are significantly more 
likely to experience catastrophic events at all threshold values. Also, those in poor health 
status, or with long-term illness, are more likely to experience financial catastrophe. Finally, 
rural residents are observed to be more likely to experience catastrophe at all threshold levels. 
This may be due to higher incidence of infectious diseases in rural communities, and the level 
of poverty in rural villages.   
The probit models observed that the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) for care-seeking self-selection 
decisions was statistically significant in all models; however the IMR for insurance-seeking 
was not significant at any threshold value. This suggests that, while the unobserved 
heterogeneity of care-seeking decision influences the probability of catastrophic incidence, 
the unobserved determinants of the insurance-seeking decision are not associated with this 
probability. The positive and significance IMR for care-seeking suggests that the unobserved 
factors that positively affect the decision to seek care are also positively associated with the 
probability of experiencing a catastrophic financial event. The non-significance of insurance-
seeking IMR is also plausible, because the insurance decision was made before the three-
month period during which health care costs (in this survey) were incurred. While one may 
be able to anticipate the regular health care expenditure in the following quarter, based on 
current health status, the extreme values of health care costs could not necessarily be 
anticipated or predicted in advance. Hence, the determinants of insurance decisions could not 
necessarily be associated with the unobserved determinants of catastrophic costs of care. This 
argument finds further support in Thuan et al (2006), who noted that the catastrophic OOP 
payments in Vietnam were incurred mostly as a result of relatively minor communicable 
illnesses, that included respiratory infections, diarrhoea and fever. Since it is difficult to 
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predict episodes of infectious diseases a few months in advance, it is not likely that the 
unobserved determinants of insurance decision would have influenced the catastrophic 
probability. 
Tables 6-2 and 6-3 also show that, after correcting for self-selection bias, the coefficient on 
insurance membership increased, on an average, by 1.19 times [at 10% threshold] and 1.05 
times [at 40% threshold]. The smaller increase at higher threshold level suggests that, when 
the need for health care expenditure is very high (such that the health care expenditure would 
be more than 40% of the consumption expenditure), then the unobserved heterogeneity of 
care-seeking plays a less significant role than at lower thresholds.  
6.5.3 Absolute risk reduction and number needed to treat analyses 
This section presents results for ARR and NNT analyses. The coefficients on the insurance 
variable in probit model are converted into catastrophic probabilities; these are presented 
separately for insured and uninsured groups in figure 6-4, along with the difference in 
probabilities, defined as ARR. The figure shows that the VHI membership consistently 
reduces the absolute risk of catastrophic events at all threshold values.  
Table 6-4 presents results for the number needed to treat analysis. NNTs are useful measures 
of absolute effectiveness of the VHI programme, providing intuitive and easy-to-interpret 
results for policy makers. The analysis suggests that, at a 10% catastrophic threshold, 
approximately nine individuals should be provided with insurance membership to prevent 
one catastrophic event (defined against total consumption expenditure). The NNT increases 
to 17.42 at a threshold of 40%. Table 6-4 also suggests that NNTs are underestimated at all 
threshold values if care-seeking self-selection was not taken into account.  
Table 6-4: Number needed to treat to prevent one catastrophic event 
(Before and after correcting for self-selection bias) 
 
Threshold 10% Threshold 20% Threshold 30% Threshold 40% 
  
Total 
exp 
Non-food  
exp 
Total 
exp 
Non-food  
exp 
Total 
exp 
Non-food  
exp 
Total 
exp 
Non-food 
exp 
Uncorrected 11.36 4.22 11.36 8.73 14.17 6.60 17.23 8.24 
Corrected 8.54 3.74 9.69 6.50 14.25 6.47 17.42 8.03 
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Figure 6-5: Predicted probabilities and Absolute Risk Reduction (ARR) of catastrophic 
events based on insurance status 
(Before and after correcting for care-seeking self-selection bias) 
 
Figure 6-4 plots the ARR across socioeconomic quintiles; the figure suggests that the 
influence of insurance on catastrophic risk reduction was highest in the poorest quintile at all 
threshold values. Also, this difference was, in most cases, underestimated by the uncorrected 
models; hence correction for care-seeking self-selection bias was warranted. Similarly, the 
distribution of NNTs across socioeconomic quintiles suggests that a lesser number of poor 
individuals with insurance need to be treated to achieve the same results, in terms of 
protection from financial catastrophe. In other words, when insurance coverage is targeted at 
the poorest quintiles, the policy makers can achieve a greater reduction in catastrophic 
incidence, for a given amount of resources.  
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6.6 Discussion 
Reduction in the incidence of financial catastrophe was one of the primary objectives of the 
Vietnamese VHI programme (Solan and Tien, 1997). This study shows that the insurance 
membership reduced both the incidence and intensity of financial catastrophe. Furthermore, 
the current analysis found that the standard probit model had underestimated the protective 
effect of VHI due to uncorrected self-selection bias. Finally, the absolute risk reduction 
attributable to insurance membership was found to be most pronounced for the poorest 
quintile. However, it should be noted that the NNT analysis is more relevant when applied to 
the whole sample, rather than a sub-sample of sick individuals. This is because when 
insurance is offered to members of a community it is not known who will be sick beforehand. 
Since the sick are more likely to experience catastrophic expenditure, NNT analysis of the 
sick alone is likely to bias the estimates in favour of insurance. Furthermore, if the insured 
were more likely to become sick (or report sickness) compared to the uninsured, the 
insurance effect would be biased further. However, the potential application of the NNT 
approach for catastrophic analysis should be noted. 
The above mentioned findings are significant from both analytical and policy perspectives. In 
two recent studies, Ekman (2007a) and Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) found that voluntary 
insurance membership appeared to increase the risk of catastrophic events in Zambia and 
China respectively. Both the studies point out that when self-selection biases are not 
accounted for, such counterintuitive results may be expected. Thus the current study proposes 
methodological advancement by suggesting models that aim to correct for self-selection 
biases. From a policy perspective, the findings of this study strengthen the argument that 
governments in the developing countries should devote resources to expand the VHI 
programmes, especially to the poor households whose risk reduction due to insurance 
membership is greater than that observed for richer quintiles. Also, this study, for the first 
time, also quantified the numbers-needed-to-treat with insurance to prevent one episode of 
financial catastrophe. The results clearly suggest that, with the given level of resources, 
targeting the poor with insurance programme can have much greater impact on catastrophic 
risk reduction. Hence, policy-makers in the developing countries should be looking towards 
voluntary insurance as an important mechanism to reduce impoverishing consequences of 
health care. 
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Figure 6-3: Absolute risk reduction attributable to insurance membership (with and without correction for selection bias) 
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Figure 6-4: Number needed to treat to prevent one catastrophic event (before and after correction for self-selection bias) 
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7.1 Introduction 
The final chapter summarises the methodological and empirical findings generated by the 
thesis. Implications of the findings regarding health insurance in Vietnam and in the general 
policy context are discussed, together with limitations of the current thesis and the agenda for 
future research.  
Chapter 1 had outlined that the focus of this research was methodological, and that Vietnam 
was used as a case study to demonstrate limitations of the current standard methodological 
practice, and to propose improvement that could be generalised to other contexts. The aim of 
this thesis was to measure the impact of VHI on individual level OOP cost of health care, and 
its distribution across the socioeconomic gradient. More specifically, the study objectives 
were to measure:  
i. The impact of VHI on average OOP cost of health care;  
ii. The effect of VHI in reducing inequalities in health care costs and promoting 
progressivity of health financing;  
iii. The effect of VHI in reducing the incidence and intensity of financially 
catastrophic events.  
This thesis contributed to the wider literature by proposing econometric models that can also 
be employed in other studies with similar concerns about potential sources of measurement 
bias associated with self-selection and unmet need for health care. 
The remaining chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 will summarise the main 
methodological and empirical findings of the thesis. Section 7.3 will discuss the policy 
implications of these findings. Section 7.4 will point out the limitations of the current thesis, 
followed by section 7.5, which will outline the agenda for further research. Section 7.6 will 
conclude the chapter. 
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7.2 Methodological and empirical findings 
The thesis identified three main methodological challenges in measuring the impact of VHI 
on average cost of care and its socioeconomic distribution. These challenges are attributed to 
potential biases associated with:  
a) care-seeking self-selection decision;  
b) insurance-seeking self-selection decision; and  
c) non-random distribution of unmet need for health care. 
Below, I will summarise the contributions made by the thesis to correct for these potential 
sources of bias. 
7.2.1 Correcting for self-selection biases 
Care-seeking self-selection bias occurs when the decision to seek health care, given illness, is 
not distributed randomly in the population, and is also associated with the expected cost of 
health care. Similarly, insurance-seeking self-selection occurs when individuals who expect 
high cost of care are selectively more likely to purchase insurance membership. If these 
biases are not accounted for, the potential impact of VHI membership on the cost of care may 
be underestimated.  
While some recent studies have taken account of either the insurance-seeking self-selection 
(Jowett et al 2003; Waters 1999), or less commonly, the care-seeking self-selection bias 
(Sepehri, Simpson and Sarma 2006), there are no studies in the context of developing 
countries that model OOP cost of care after simultaneously accounting for the two sources of 
bias. Furthermore, some of the studies that corrected for either of the two biases, including 
the previous analysis of the current study dataset (Jowett et al 2003), relied solely on the non-
linearity of Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) to identify the self-selection decision. The current 
thesis tested for the presence of the two sources of bias, and proposed an econometric model 
that aimed to simultaneously correct for care-seeking and insurance-seeking decisions. 
Furthermore, appropriate instrumental variables were proposed to independently identify the 
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insurance-seeking decision, although the care-seeking equation relied on the non-linearity of 
IMR because of unavailability of appropriate instruments. The thesis demonstrated that, when 
the naive OLS model was used to model health care costs, the insurance coefficient was 
underestimated by 42.6% (TPM) or 39.7% (Heckman sample selection model). Similarly, 
when the insurance-seeking self-selection was not accounted for, the coefficient on the 
insurance variable in the cost of care model was underestimated by 60.2%. When both types 
of self-selection were simultaneously taken into account, it became apparent that the naive 
OLS model had underestimated the insurance coefficient by 82.3%.  
A similar modelling approach was used to evaluate interaction between socioeconomic status 
and insurance membership. The results suggested that, when self-selection biases were not 
corrected for, the OLS coefficient on the interaction term had underestimated the coefficient 
by 15.3%. Finally, the same approach was applied to catastrophe probability models. When 
the corrective approach was applied to the catastrophic probability models, the coefficient on 
insurance membership increased by 18.68%, 6.3%, 4.8% and 4.9% at threshold values of 
10%, 20%, 30% and 40% respectively, suggesting that the uncorrected models 
underestimated the protective effect of VHI.  
Overall, the econometric approaches presented in this thesis have attempted to correct for the 
methodological limitations in the standard approach of modelling cost of care. The proposed 
methods will improve the process of estimating the true impact of voluntary health insurance 
on the cost of care in the developing countries. 
7.2.2 Accounting for unmet need for health care 
This thesis also evaluated the standard practice of measuring vertical equity and progressivity 
of health care financing, and highlighted the potential for seriously misleading results when 
this method is applied to the context of OOP financing. This study has highlighted that a 
health financing system that provides limited access to health care to the poor by imposing 
costly financial barriers, may produce apparently good results in terms of vertical equity in 
financing. However, this will be misleading for the purpose of policy making, since the 
approach does not take account of the unmet need for care (horizontal equity in use).  
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In order to overcome the potential bias associated with the standard practice of measuring 
vertical equity, this thesis proposed a need standardised equity index which takes account of 
the unmet need for care by standardising for the differences in the observed need variables. 
The process of need standardisation has enabled the study to highlight the inequalities 
attributable to non-need determinants of health care costs. This index is particularly useful 
when data on health care utilisation is not comprehensive, and therefore it is not possible to 
standardise on use. Using the proposed methodology, this study has also shown that a) the 
need standardisation procedure increased the level of pro-poorness of cost distribution and 
reduced the level of regressivity for insured and uninsured groups; and b) insurance is 
associated with more pro-poor distribution of health care costs and less pro-rich distribution 
of progressivity of financing.  
The study found that the socioeconomic-related cost distribution was more pro-poor for the 
insured than the uninsured. Furthermore, the study noted that insurance was associated with 
progressive health financing for the poorest half of the cost distribution. Hence, insurance 
was not only associated with pro-poor cost distribution; its equity effect seems to benefit the 
poorest the most. The findings of this study have important relevance to policy making in the 
developing countries. 
7.3 Policy implications of thesis findings 
Governments in the developing countries have been looking for affordable and accessible 
options of health care financing for the poor. When the tax base is low, and formal 
mechanisms of social protection are absent for the poor, voluntary health insurance is a 
potential option to improve financial access, especially for those employed in the informal 
sector.  
The obvious policy recommendation based on this thesis is to expand the VHI programme to 
all provinces of Vietnam. At the time of data collection for this study, approximately 6% of 
the population was enrolled with VHI. Expanding the programme will provide financial 
protection to greater numbers and may reduce regressivity of financing associated with OOP 
payments. Expansion of VHI will also increase size of the risk pool and (probably) 
heterogeneity of risk distribution within the pool which will enable the programme to better 
cope with financial shocks. Smaller risk pools may suffer from bankruptcy if few people 
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requiring expensive treatments deplete the resources. This is more likely to happen in VHI 
programmes since they do not practice risk rating or cream-skimming of bad risk.  
The study also suggests that more households can be protected from financial catastrophe if 
VHI specifically targets the poor households. In other words, given the financial resources 
required to expand VHI, the programme can get greater output (‘bigger bang for the buck’) 
by targeting the poor households for insurance membership.  
The benefit package offered by voluntary insurance programmes is also an important issue 
for policy debate. The benefit package of the Vietnamese VHI was known to be broad and 
poorly defined at the time of this study. It not only covered services at the level of primary 
care, but also included an extensive list of high-tech treatments. Since most of the expensive 
treatments were available only at the level of tertiary care, the distribution of government 
subsidies systematically favoured the better off. Ekman et al (2008) suggests that Vietnamese 
VHI can learn from the Mexican voluntary health insurance programme, which has a 
comprehensive list of affordable and cost-effective services included in the benefit package. 
This decision may need to trade-off between the variety of services on offer and their 
relevance to financial protection.  
Finally, purchasing decisions are crucial in influencing the demand for insurance. At the time 
of this study, members of Vietnamese VHI had to select one public institution where the 
insurance card would be accepted. Given that the users may have a preference for private 
health care providers, the programme may wish to consider purchasing part of the services 
from private practitioners to influence demand for voluntary insurance.  
7.4. Limitations of the current study  
The following limitations should be considered in this thesis.  
Limitation 1: The current study used cross-sectional data to analyse the impact of VHI on 
cost of care. Since cross-sectional analysis is based on observations at one time point, it was 
not possible to estimate the long-term financial impact of insurance membership. 
Limitation 2: The available data on health service utilisation was not sufficiently detailed to 
be able to standardise for health service use. The available data included binary variables for 
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the health care utilisation decision and for seeking inpatient hospital care. There was no data 
on the quantity, quality and type of care received. Therefore, it was not possible to control for 
the differences in health care utilisation. 
It can be argued that, since insurance membership reduces the price of health care, it may 
have an elastic demand effect, resulting in an increase in frequency and intensity of health 
care sought. In such case, it would be important to control for the differences in health service 
utilisation; however, due to the limitation of available data, this thesis could not standardise 
on the quantity and quality of health care received. If insurance status does have an elastic 
demand effect, the estimates from the above analyses may be underestimation of the effect of 
health insurance. 
Limitation 3: In this study, assessment of the need for health care relied on self-assessed 
health status and self-reported illnesses. Although self-assessed health is commonly used in 
survey analysis, it may be influenced by self-perception, level of education, reference system, 
beliefs about illness and attitude towards risk. In addition, self-reported illness may be 
correlated with insurance status; for instance, the insured may be more likely to report illness 
because of their higher level of awareness of personal health and disease. 
If, given a particular health status, the insured are more likely to report poor health, it would 
reflect their higher expectation about health. This will have an impact on their care-seeking 
behaviour and, in turn, their health care expenditure. Hence, the insured will be 
systematically more likely to incur higher cost of care, given a particular health status. If such 
systematic association between self-assessed health and insurance status exists, then the 
effect of insurance in the cost of care model is likely to be conservative. 
Limitation 4: This thesis analysed the impact of voluntary health insurance on cost of care 
using a sub-sample of individuals who reported being sick in the last three months. Since the 
analysis was restricted to the sick population, the effect of insurance on the expected 
expenditure could not be generalised to the entire population of sick and non-sick. The 
decision to restrict the analysis to the sick was made due to high proportion of missing 
expenditure data in the non-sick population, and due to potential complexity of using a three-
part model that would also accommodate the probability of reporting sickness.  
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For the results of the effects of insurance, as estimated in this thesis, to be generalisable to the 
entire population of sick and non-sick, we would need to assume that insurance does not 
affect the probability of self-reporting of illness. However, as mentioned earlier, if the insured 
are more likely to report sickness and in turn have higher expected cost of care, then the 
estimates of the impact of health insurance on health care expenditure are likely to be 
conservative. 
Limitation 5: The use of consumption expenditure data to establish the socioeconomic status 
of an individual has its limitations. It provides no information about the coping mechanism 
used by individuals to overcome the financial consequences of health care. However, within 
the limitations of the available data, consumption expenditure was a reasonable proxy to the 
socioeconomic status. 
Limitation 6: The survey data used for this study collected information on health care costs 
incurred during the last three months; here there is a potential for recall bias and seasonal 
variations in illness and expenditure pattern, which were not taken into account. If the recall 
bias systematically under or over-estimated the actual expenditure and this over/under-
estimation was systematically associated with insurance status, then the estimates obtained in 
our analysis may be biased. However, in the data, there was no indication of such systematic 
reporting errors. 
Limitation 7: While the study used reliable instrumental variables to identify the insurance-
seeking decision, it could not find appropriate instruments for care-seeking decision. It is not 
certain how, if at all, the use of instruments in the care-seeking equation would have changed 
the results.  
These limitations can be overcome in future research by designing studies that take account 
of the above-mentioned concerns. 
7.5 Agenda for further research 
This study proposes the following agenda for further research: 
• This study recommends that the econometric models proposed in this thesis should be 
used in further empirical contexts to test the robustness of the proposed tools.  
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• In the current study, data on utilisation and need of health care was limited. Further 
research work should collect more comprehensive data on need and use variables and 
then apply the standardisation procedures to establish the impact of VHI after 
standardising for need and use variables. 
• In order to establish long-term financial consequences of VHI membership, the 
proposed methods should be applied to longitudinal data.  
• Further research is required to establish the long-term consequences of VHI 
programme on public sector resources. This is relevant especially to the policy 
context, since VHI programmes may be too costly or difficult to financially sustain 
for the public sector. 
• Further research is required to establish whether VHI membership has such effect on 
the behaviour of health care providers. It has been argued in the literature that the 
attitude of health professionals may depend on whether an individual is a full fee-
paying patient or member of a scheme that subsidises user fees.  
• Further research can also inform the long-term changes due to VHI programmes on 
quality of care provided at public and private facilities, utilisation patterns and choice 
of providers by members and non-members. 
• Research is also required to evaluate any change in risk behaviours as a result of VHI 
membership.  
7.6 Final thoughts 
Providing access to affordable health care is one of the top policy priorities for health sectors 
in the developing countries. The prevailing mechanism of out of pocket payments tends to 
suppress demand for health care and in turn have a detrimental effect on equity of health care 
use and progressivity of health financing. This can negatively influence poor households in 
two ways: if poor individuals consume all the needed health care, they can potentially end up 
in financial catastrophe; whereas if the required health care is not consumed, the available 
health stocks may be seriously compromised. Hence, improving access to affordable health 
care is fundamental to the policy context in developing countries. 
Policy makers have also highlighted that health financing methods have a bearing on broader 
development objectives. Four of the eight ‘Millennium Development Goals’ targeted for 
2015 are directly or indirectly related to affordable financing of health care (The MDG 
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Report 2008); these include the health sector goals of reducing child mortality, improving 
maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and socioeconomic 
goal of eradicating extreme poverty. These goals can only be achieved if access to health care 
is made affordable for the poor, and its impoverishing effects are minimised. 
The current study has demonstrated that voluntary health insurance has a desirable role in the 
context of developing countries. The findings suggest that the Vietnamese VHI programme 
not only reduced the average cost of care but also improved progressivity of financing whilst 
reducing the probability of financial catastrophe. This thesis has highlighted potential biases 
in the standard modelling approach and has contributed to the wider literature by proposing 
methodological advancement that will help inform the evidence base.  
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Appendix 1: Map of Vietnam and neighbouring countries in south-east 
Asia 
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Appendix 2: Membership of health insurance in Vietnam 1997 
 
  
ALL HEALTH INSURANCE VOLUNTARY HEALTH 
INSURANCE 
  
TOTAL Compulsory Voluntary School 
children 
Other 
voluntary 
Humanitarian 
1 Viet Nam 164,197 164,197 0 0 0 0 
2 Chi Nhanh 148,636 148,636 0 0 0 0 
3 Ha Noi 596,000 376,000 220,000 150,000 0 70,000 
4 Tp.Hcminh 1,123,352 421,160 702,192 696,194 0 5,998 
5 Hai Phong 649,100 231,000 418,100 294,600 61,500 62,000 
6 Ha Giang 37,760 29,910 7,850 7,850 0 0 
7 T/Quang 64,967 49,317 15,650 12,864 2,786 0 
8 Cao Bang 43,240 41,930 1,310 1,310 0 0 
9 Lang Son 70,202 44,402 25,800 25,000 500 300 
10 Lai Chau 40,549 29,549 11,000 10,000 1,000 0 
11 Yen Bai 66,190 59,190 7,000 7,000 0 0 
12 Lao Cai 44,557 37,470 7,087 6,655 422 0 
13 Thai Nguyen 234,900 108,200 126,700 125,000 1,700 0 
14 Son La 53,400 53,400 0 0 0 0 
15 Phu Tho 196,807 123,387 73,420 71,095 2,239 86 
16 Bac Giang 88,000 88,000 0 0 0 0 
17 Q/Ninh 259,918 116,370 143,548 138,823 0 4,725 
18 Hoa Binh 64,301 53,563 10,738 9,200 1,500 38 
19 Ha Tay 167,420 164,064 3,356 2,867 0 489 
20 Hai Duong 159,594 142,648 16,946 16,700 60 186 
21 Thai Binh 283,655 158,440 125,215 118,998 6,000 217 
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22 Nam Dinh 315,358 174,599 140,759 133,119 7,640 0 
23 Ninh Binh 229,127 91,347 137,780 100,800 1,055 35,925 
24 Than Hoa 368,458 255,690 112,768 98,000 13,703 1,065 
25 Nghe An 336,879 233,179 103,700 95,000 1,500 7,200 
26 Ha Tinh 117,426 106,345 11,081 11,024 0 57 
27 Q/Binh 85,173 65,964 19,209 19,191 0 13 
28 Quang Tri 66,929 45,050 21,879 19,414 2,396 9 
29 TT Hue 193,288 64,400 128,888 125,000 1,300 2,583 
30 TP Da Nang 122,898 74,250 48,648 48,638 0 10 
31 Q/Ngai 98,594 65,594 33,000 33,000 0 0 
32 Binh Dinh 228,215 79,880 148,335 145,000 200 3,135 
33 Kh/Hoa 80,695 57,106 23,589 14,493 0 9,096 
34 Ninh Thuan 56,695 18,429 38,266 38,090 0 176 
35 Binh Thuan 120,500 40,500 80,000 80,000 0 0 
36 Phu Yen 52,901 34,432 18,469 17,691 618 160 
37 Gia Lai 57,775 57,500 275 275 0 0 
38 Kontum 20,712 20,641 71 71 0 0 
39 Daklak 136,889 86,889 50,000 50,000 0 0 
40 Lam Dong 80,431 43,600 36,831 35,000 1,822 9 
41 Binh Duong 125,500 55,500 70,000 70,000 0 0 
42 Tay Ninh 37,966 37,966 0 0 0 0 
43 Dong Nai 124,468 114,189 10,279 9,000 0 1,279 
44 Long An 162,701 63,894 98,807 98,165 642 0 
45 Dong Thap 109,748 43,850 65,898 65,000 870 28 
46 An Giang 92,451 48,800 43,651 40,000 3,169 482 
47 Tien Giang 101,051 69,420 31,631 31,631 0 0 
48 Ben Tre 71,209 64,157 7,052 7,052 0 0 
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49 Vinh Long 67,821 36,367 31,454 30,927 463 64 
50 Tra Vinh 38,552 38,552 0 0 0 0 
51 Can Tho 98,999 68,497 30,502 29,950 250 302 
52 Soc Trang 47,040 35,605 11,435 10,000 591 844 
53 Kien Giang 76,670 46,050 30,620 30,000 600 20 
54 Ca Mau 49,241 48,497 744 0 0 744 
55 Br-Vtau 95,431 45,337 50,094 50,000 0 94 
56 Gia 
Thong/Transport 
115,480 111,480 4,000 3,000 0 1,000 
57 Dau Khi/Petroleum 12,500 12,120 380 380 0 0 
58 Cao Su/Rubber 93,740 74,400 19,340 0 19,340 0 
59 Than/Coal-Energy 69,086 63,584 5,502 4,098 1,404 0 
60 Bac Can 25,164 17,402 7,762 7,762 0 0 
61 Bac Ninh 108,300 63,300 45,000 40,000 5,000 0 
62 Hung Yen 73,252 73,252 0 0 0 0 
63 Bac Lieu 67,198 28,770 38,428 36,220 2,051 157 
64 Ha Nam 96,008 48,300 47,708 47,708 0 0 
65 Quang Nam 141,800 87,500 54,300 54,000 0 300 
66 Binh Phuoc 41,200 16,200 25,000 25,000 0 0 
67 Vinh Phuc 80,265 67,013 13,252 12,615 637 0 
 
TOTAL 9,548,529 5,736,230 3,812,299 3,460,47
0 
142,958 208,791 
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Appendix 3: Survey Questionnaire 
 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION (Adult member sample) 
 
                   
a) Individual ID:                                                             Interviewer code: 
                                     Province     Commune    Household       Supervisor code: 
 
b) Name of respondent:  ___________________________________________ 
c) Type of sampling group: 
Member of voluntary health insurance  1 
Non- member of voluntary health insurance  2 
d. Assigned to interview children 6 -17 years old (if has):    Yes  1  No 2 
e. Year of birth:       ................... 
f. Sex of respondent:   Male = 1  Female = 2 
g. Home address: 
Province:............................District:........................  
Commune/ Ward:........................... 
This place is:                      Rural = 1  Urban = 2 
 
i) Insurance details (taken from the Health Insurance Office): 
                    dd       mm       yy                                  dd       mm      yy 
Card issued date:      Card expired date: 
 
Health facility nominated by HI Card:_________________ 
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j) Other details: 
 dd       mm      yy 
Date of interview:       Time interview begins:  
        Time interview ends: 
k) Visit record 
 Date 
 
Available 
 
Not present / 
unavailable  
Dead 
 
Refusal 
 
Appointment date 
and time  
Other notes  
Visit 1        
Visit 2        
Visit 3        
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INTRODUCTION 
Locate respondent and say… 
I am from the Institute of Sociology in Hanoi and we are undertaking a research project in 
partnership with the University of York in England. The research is investigating how much 
people use and spend on health care, and what they think about the health insurance 
system. The aim of the research is to provide information to Vietnamese Health Insurance 
and the Ministry of Health. The survey will provide vital information to help improve the 
health services that you use. We are not trying to sell you health insurance. We would like to 
ask you some questions about a variety of issues and ask you to be as honest as possible. All 
the answers you give will be treated confidentially and no-one apart from key members of 
the research team will be able to trace them back to you. We expect the interview to last less 
than one hour. Are you available?  
 
If NO then fill in details on cover page making an appointment if possible. 
If YES then ask: 
 
1.  If the respondent is from MEMBER'S SAMPLING GROUP  
 
 
a) Do you currently have a valid health insurance card (respondent is the Card holder) ? 
          Yes  1 
            No  2       go to  c) 
              Don’t know/can’t remember  3       go to  c) 
 
 
b) Which health insurance scheme are you a member of? 
 
    State compulsory health insurance   1          
 
    Humanitarian / Welfare (free card)   2 
    State voluntary health insurance   3 
    Bao Viet      4 
    Bao Minh       5         go to Part I 
    Local community health insurance scheme 6 
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    Other (WRITE IN) ............................................ 7 
 
c)  Have you ever had a state voluntary health insurance card? 
 
          Yes  1    
 
           No  2  end interview 
            Don’t know/can’t remember  3  end interview 
 
d)  When did your last insurance card expire? 
 
     Before 1st January 1997  1       end interview 
     On or after 1st January 1997 2       go to Part I 
     Don’t know/can’t remember  3       go to Part I 
 
e)  Do you have any children between 6 and 17 years old (born in 1982-1993) who currently live in the 
household? 
 
         Yes  1    go to Part I 
          No  2    end interview 
           Don’t know/can’t remember  3    end interview 
 
2.  If the respondent is from NON - MEMBER'S SAMPLING GROUP: 
 
 
a) Do you currently have a valid health insurance card? 
         Yes  1 
           No  2 go to c) 
             Don’t know/can’t remember  3        go to c) 
 
 
b) Which health insurance scheme are you a member of? 
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   State compulsory health insurance   1       go to e) 
   Humanitarian / Welfare (free card)   2       go to e) 
 
   State voluntary health insurance   3 
   Bao Viet      4 
   Bao Minh       5            end interview 
   Local community health insurance scheme6 
   Other (WRITE IN) ............................................ 7 
 
c)  Have you ever had a state voluntary health insurance card? 
 
         Yes  1    
          No  2    go to Part I 
           Don’t know/can’t remember  3    go to Part I 
 
d)  When did your last insurance card expire? 
 
     Before 1st January 1997  1     goto Part I 
     On or after 1st January 1997 2     end interview 
     Don’t know/can’t remember  9     go to Part I 
 
e)  Do you have any children between 6 and 17 years old (born in 1982-1993) who currently live in the 
household? 
 
         Yes  1    go to Part I 
          No  2    end interview 
           Don’t know/can’t remember  3    end interview 
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PART I: HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
a. Code:  
 
                              Province     Commune    Household          
 
A. HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
I’d now like to ask you a few questions about the people that live in the household?  
1. Please, tell me about the people who live in your household:  
N 
Common 
name/ 
Relation to 
head of 
household 
Year of 
birth 
Sex Marital 
Status 
Current main 
occupation  
WRITE IN/ 
Code 
Other 
jobs/ ways 
of making 
money 
(code) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Name      Relation 
  
 
     Write in           Code Code as  
column 7 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
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Note: If interview children: Circle the order of children (of Respondent) on the Number Column who 
were born between the period 1982 to 1993. 
 Religion 
Level of  
education 
Health 
insurance 
member 
Health status in 
last 12 months 
Details of 
long-term 
illness if 
relevant 
(WRITE 
IN) 
Pregnan
t 
(yes/no) 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 
       
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9                 
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
  
2. Now code the type of house 
Apartment       1 
Villa        2 
Permanent house (1 floor)     3 
Permanent house (2 or more floors)    4 
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Tiled roof, brick wall      5 
Thatch roof, brick wall     6 
Thatch roof, wood/mud wall     7 
Other________________________________________  8 
Don’t know       9 
 
3. What type of latrine do you have in your house? 
 
Primitive latrine      1 
Private - 2 tank system     2 
Private – flush system     3 
Shared toilet       4 
No latrine       5 
Other________________________________________ 6 
Don’t know       9 
 
4. What is your main source of drinking water from? 
 
Piped water       1 
Rain water       2 
Well/pump well      3 
Lake/pond/river      4 
Other________________________________________ 5 
Don’t know      9 
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5. Which of the following does your household have in working order? (still in good 
conditions) 
ITEMS YES NO NOTES 
a) Motorbike 
1 2  
b) Car / van / lorry / motor boat 1 2  
c) Video 1 2  
d) Colour TV 1 2  
e) Refrigerator / washing machine 1 2  
f) Telephone 1 2  
g) Agricultural machine 1 2  
h) Air conditioner 1 2  
i) Electric water pump (bought 
themselves) 1 2 
 
j) Salon / bed (valuable furniture) 1 2  
k) Other luxury items 1 2  
 
6. For each of the following items (paddy and cereal crops and husbandry) can you tell me how many you have, 
or have produced. (READ OUT) 
ITEM UNIT 
(kg) 
VALUE 
(‘000s Dong) 
a) Crop 1 
……………………………………………………… 
  
b) Crop 2 
……………………………………………………… 
 
c) Crop 3 
……………………………………………………… 
 
d) Cereal 1 
……………………………………………………… 
  
e) Cereal 2 
……………………………………………………… 
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f) Animal 1 
……………………………………………………… 
  
g) Animal 2 
…………………………………………………… 
 
h) Animal 3 
……………………………………………………… 
 
i) Animal 4 
……………………………………………………… 
 
 TOTAL=  
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I’d now like to ask you a few more questions about the income of the household… 
7. Approximately how much income did the household make in the last month, in VND from the following.   
(READ OUT)       
  
PERSON 1 
 
 
PERSON 2 
 
PERSON 3 
 
OTHERS 
 
TOTAL 
a) Salary from main non-
agricultural occupation  
(including suplement) 
     
b) Bonuses      
c) Earnings from extra jobs      
d) Pension      
e) Remittances / 
    support from family 
     
f) Interest on savings      
e) Other (specify)      
 
TOTAL= 
     
 
TOTAL FOR  12 MONTHS = 
  
 
 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR TO COMPLETE  QUESTION 8 BELOW : 
8.  ADD THE INCOME TOTALS FROM Q6 and Q7 AND WRITE IN BELOW 
 
     _________________VND 
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Now thinking about household expenditure: 
9. Approximately how much does the household spend each day on food and drink, including food you have 
grown? 
 
_____________________VND Total for 12 months =  
 
10. Approximately how much did the household spend on electricity last month? 
 
 
_____________________VND  Total for 12 months =  
 
11. About how much did the household spend on education in the last 12 months / for one school year? 
 
 CHILD 1 CHILD 2 CHILD 3 OTHERS ALL CHILDREN 
a) Annual  fee  
 
     
b) Other fee 
 
     
c) Fee for extra 
lessons 
     
d) Other ( gifts....)      
 
TOTAL = 
     
 
12. Approximately how much did the household spend on health services in the last 12 months? 
 
 PERSON 1 PERSON 2 PERSON 3 PERSON 4 OTHERS TOTAL 
a) 1st visit        
b) 2nd visit       
c) 3rd visit       
TOTAL =       
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13. How much did the household spend on production and investment in the last 12 months? (E.g. machinery, 
fertiliser  for farmers; furniture, computers for urban residents, etc.). 
TOTAL    _____________________VND 
 
14. In the last 12 months how much did the household spend on ceremonies? 
a. Festivals    _____________________'000 VND 
b. Holiday, entertainment  _____________________'000 VND 
c. Funeral, wedding   _____________________'000 VND 
TOTAL    _____________________'000 VND 
 
15. In the last 12 months how much did the household spend paying off regular debts? (READ OUT) 
     _____________________VND 
 
16. INTERWIER TO COMPLETE THE BOX BELOW: 
 
 
 ADD THE TOTALS FROM Q9 to Q15 INCLUSIVE AND WRITE IN:                                                   VND 
 
 
I’d now like to ask you a few questions about savings and credit …….. 
17. In the last 12 months what methods did the household use to save money, and how much was set aside with 
each method? (READ OUT) 
 YES NO AMOUNT SAVED 
‘000s VND 
a) Money pooling circle 1 2  
b) Credit book at bank 1 2  
c) Community fund (local official scheme) 1 2  
d) Secret place 1 2  
e) Make a special purchase/investment (e.g. gold, 
foreign currencies) 1 2  
f) Other ( write in) 1 2  
TOTAL= 
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18. What was your main reason for setting money aside?  (CIRCLE ONLY THE MAIN REASON) 
 
In case of bad harvest   1 
To pay for children's education  2 
To pay future health fees   3 
To repay debt    4 
To help relatives    5 
To help buy extra land/extend house 6 
Save for household item   7 
To invest in production   8 
Other (specify)______________________ 9 
 
Don’t know    99 
 
19. In the last 12 months, did the household have to borrow or loan money/paddy? 
 
         Yes  1 
          No  2     go to Q21 
        Don’t know  3     go to Q21 
 
20. FILL IN FOLLOWING TABLE (3 MAIN REASONS) 
 
What was the money borrowed for? 
(WRITE IN) 
How much money 
was borrowed?  
(‘000s VND) 
Where was the money 
borrowed from? 
(WRITE IN) 
1 = Production        
2 = buying/construct house/land     
3 = buying  consumption goods 
4 = ceremonies 
5 = Education         
6 = Health/medicines 
 1 = Family/ relative 
2 = Friend 
3 = Formal savings scheme 
4 = Informal savings scheme 
5 = Money lender 
6 = Bank 
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7 = Holiday/entertainment 
8 = Other 
7 = other sources 
a) 
 
  
b) 
 
  
c) 
 
  
 
TOTAL= 
  
 
 
21. How do you feel your household compares economically to other households in the commune? 
 
Much poorer than average   1 
A little poorer than average  2 
About average    3 
A little better off than average  4 
Much better off than average  5 
Don't know    9 
 
 
22. INTERVIEWER TO FILL IN THE FOLLOWING BOX FOR CROSS CHECK 
           
 '000 VND 
 
TOTAL FROM  Q8 PLUS Q20 = 
(INCOME PLUS BORROWINGS) 
 
TOTAL FROM Q16 PLUS Q17 = 
(EXPENDITURE PLUS SAVINGS) 
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B) RISK ATTITUDES, RESOURCE POOLING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
I’d now like to ask you some questions about your local community. First of all…… 
 
23. Which of the following organisations, if any, are you a member of?  (READ OUT) 
 
GROUP / ORGANISATION YES NO 
a) Farmers Union 1 2 
b) Women’s Union 1 2 
c) Veterans Union 1 2 
 
 
24. And which of the following groups, if any, are you a member of?   (READ OUT) 
 
GROUP / ORGANISATION YES NO 
a) Peer Union 1 2 
b) Native  Union 1 2 
c) Longevity Union 1 2 
d) Elderly Union 1 2 
e) Funeral group 1 2 
f) Savings / credit / money-pooling scheme 1 2 
g) Other (WRITE IN) 
……………………………………………………… 
1 2 
 
 
25. If you could join only one group which one would it be; which group do you like to join most? 
 
Farmers Union 1 
Women’s Union 2 
Veterans organisation 3 
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Peer group 5 
Native Union 7 
Longevity Union 8 
Elderly Union 9 
Funeral group 10 
Savings / credit / money-pooling scheme 11 
 
If not a member of any group - GO TO Q33 
26. Which of the groups involve credit, savings or money-pooling programmes, or types of social support 
mechanisms ? 
 
 POOLING/ 
SAVING 
SCHEMES 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
9 = Don’t know 
 
PAYING FEE 
 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
9 = Don’t know 
Which of the groups that 
involve saving/credit 
scheme is the most 
important to you? 
(select only 1) 
a) Farmers Union   1 
b) Women’s Union   2 
c) Veterans organisation   3 
d) Peer group   4 
e) Native Union   5 
f)  Longevity Union   6 
g) Elderly Union   7 
h) Funeral group   8 
i) Savings / credit / money-pooling scheme   9 
j) Other ( write in)   10 
 
- Ask following Questions if respondent belongs to groups that have saving/or pooling 
  if Not,  skip to Q. 33 
- If Respondent is member of many different saving/pooling groups, ask the main group. 
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27. Can you tell me what the purpose of the group is? For example can you use the scheme to raise money for 
health services, or must it be used for another purpose? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Who are the group’s members? Are they………. (READ OUT) 
a) Close relatives 1 
b) Close friends 2 
c) Business partners 3 
d) People from local community 4 
e) Other (WRITE IN) 5 
f) All the above  6 
g) Don’t know 9 
 
29. Are all members from the same economic group? 
 
All are the same 1 
Most are the same 2 
Mixture 3 
Other (WRITE IN)                        4 
Don’t know 9 
30. If a new person wants to join the group, what conditions should they meet? 
 
Must be friend/relative 1 
Must be from same commune 2 
Must be recommended 3 
Pay a fee 4 
Other (WRITE IN) 5 
No conditions 6 
Don’t know 9 
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31. Overall, how would you rate the functioning of the group? 
 
Very poorly functioning 1 
 Poorly/weakly 2 
 Average 3 
 Good 4 
Excellent 8 
 Don’t know 9 
 
32. Why don’t you put this money in the bank instead ? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. SHOW THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO THE RESPONDENT 
 
In general how cohesive would you say the community you live in is ? Circle the number you think is closest.  
 
1   2        3               4              5 
 
 
VERY LOW COHESION       VERY HIGH COHESION 
 
34. In general how would you say you think about the future in terms of your health and your family’s health? IF 
NECESSARY PROMPT: For example would you say that in general you worry about the future or do you take 
each day as it comes ? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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35. Please circle the number you think is closest to your attitude. 
 
1        2   3    4                  5 
 
DON’T WORRY AT ALL                              WORRY A LOT 
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C) ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES 
I’d now like to ask you some questions about health facilities. First of all……. 
36. Think about the last time when members of your household used health services at health facilities, how 
would they usually travel there and about how long would it take?  If going to health facilities which you have not 
ever been there, what type of transportation would you use and how long would it take you there? 
 
  
Distance 
(Kms) 
 
Method of 
transport 
 
1 =  Less than 15 minutes  
2 = 15-30 minutes 
3 = 31-59 minutes 
4 = 1 hour or more 
9 = Don’t know/ never been 
a) Commune health centre   
 
 
b) Inter-communal polyclinic   
 
 
c) District Hospital   
 
 
d) Provincial Hospital   
 
 
e) Traditional / spiritual 
healer 
  
 
 
f) Private health worker   
 
 
g) State pharmacy   
 
 
h) Private pharmacy 
 
   
i) Drug seller (unlicensed) 
 
   
j) Other (WRITE IN) 
 
…………………………….. 
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 CODES FOR METHOD OF TRANSPORT 
 
1 Car/taxi 
2 Bus 
3 Motorbike 
4 Motor Boat 
5 Rowing boat 
6 Bicycle/cyclo 
7 Walk 
8 Others 
 
 
 
GO TO INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
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PART II: INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
a. Code:     
 
                            Province     Commune    Household         Individual  
 
a. This individual questionnaire refers to:         
    Adult (respondent)  1 
 Child of respondent  2         Name of the child: .............................     
 
(If refers to the child, use this name instead of word "CHILD" in questionnaire) 
 
Province: ............................ District: ........................  
Commune/Ward: ........................... 
 
Name of Respondent: ......................................... 
 
D) UTILISATION OF HEALTH SERVICES 
 
I’d now like to ask you some questions about your visit to health workers, for personal 
health issues. First of all: 
 
37. How many times have you / CHILD been ill in the last 3 months?    (CIRCLE ONLY ONE RESPONSE) 
 
 None     0   Member: go to Q39   Non-member: go to Q41 
 Once     1 
 Twice     2 
 Three times    3 
 Four times    4 
 Five or more times   5 
 Don’t know/can’t remember  9 
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38. How many times did you / CHILD visit a health facility or call a health worker to your house? 
    None     0 
    Once     1 
    Twice     2 
    Three times    3 
    Four times    4 
    Five or more times   5 
    Don’t know/can’t remember  9 
 
This box for Member only: 
 
39. When was the last time you/ CHILD used the health insurance card? 
 
 Never    0  1997     4 
 1994    1  1998     5 
 1995    2  1999     6 
 1996    3  Don’t know/can’t remember  9 
 
NOW IDENTIFY THE MONTH USING THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR 
JAN     Tet             National Day          DEC 
  
 
 
IF USED CARD SINCE 1997 GO TO Q41 
 
40. Why didn’t you use your / CHILD health insurance card since 1997? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
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41. When was the last time you / CHILD visited a health facility or called a health worker to your house ? 
(CIRCLE ONLY ONE RESPONSE)  
 
 One month or less ago   1 
 2-6  months ago    2 
 7-12 months ago    3 
 1 - 2 years ago    4 
 Over 2 years ago    5 
 Never      7  => Member:  go to Q68   Non-member:  go to Q67 
 Don’t know/Can’t remember   8   
 
42. What were main reasons for  you / CHILD to look for medical advice the last time?  
 
Routine preventive care/ante-natal care  1 
Felt ill      2  
Chronic illness / long-term care   3 
Accident      4 
Other (please specify)____________________  5       go Q44 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Don't know     8 
       No answer              9 
 
43. Thinking about the last time you  / CHILD were ill and got medical advice, what was the reason?  
 
Felt ill    1 
Chronic illness / long-term care 2 
Accident    3 
Other    4 
(please specify:_____________________________________) 
 
Never    8  => Member:  go to Q68          Non-member:  go to Q67 
Don't know/ No answer  9   
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44. Refer to the last illness, how long did you / CHILD have to stop normal activities for? 
     Not at all    1 
     Less than one day    2 
     2-7 days     3 
     1-2 weeks     4 
     3-4 weeks     5 
     2-6 months     6 
     Over 6 months    7 
     Don’t know/Can’t remember   9 
 
45. What did you / CHILD do when you started to feel ill ?  (UP TO FOUR ACTIONS MAY BE CODED - CODE 
CHRONOLOGICALLY) 
 
 
First Second Third Fourth 
1. Used home-made medicine 
2. Bought drugs from drug-seller (unlicensed) 
3. Bought drugs from private pharmacy  
4. Bought drugs from state pharmacy 
5.Visited commune health centre / CHW at home 
6.Visited inter-communal polyclinic 
7. Visited district hospital 
8.Visited provincial hospital 
9. Visited private health worker 
10. Visited traditional / spiritual healer 
11. Other (please specify)....... ....................... 
 
…………………………………………………… 
12.  Carried on as normal 
13. Don't know / can’t remember 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
 
 
98 
99 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
 
 
98 
99 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
 
 
98 
99 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
 
 
98 
99 
Variables Name     
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46. How long was it between when you / CHILD felt ill to when you……… (READ OUT) 
 
 BOUGHT DRUGS CONTACT WITH 
HEALTH 
PROFESSIONAL 
Less than one day 1 1 
2 - 7 days 2 2 
1 - 2 weeks 3 3 
3 - 4 weeks 4 4 
2 - 6 months 5 5 
Over 6 months 6 6 
Don’t know/can’t remember 9 9 
 
47. Why did you / CHILD delay going to the health facility when you felt ill?  
 
  Thought it might go away/wait and see 1 
  Too much work    2  
  Charges too expensive   3 
  Too far away     4 
  Wait until  health facility open  5 
  Other        6   
   
  (WRITE IN:______________________________) 
 
  Don’t know/can’t remember   9 
 
48. Did you  / CHILD need in-patient services? 
 
  Yes        1 
  No              2   => go to Q.50 
  Don’t know/can’t remember    3   =>  go to Q.50 
 
=> Goto Q 48 
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49. How long did you / CHILD spend in hospital? 
 
  < 3 days     1 
  3 - 7 days     2 
  8 - 14 days     3 
  15 - 30 days     4 
  Over one month    5   
  (WRITE IN:_________  Months)   
  Don’t know/can’t remember   9 
50. About how long would you say you / CHILD spent in total at health facilities waiting to see and being 
treated by health workers for this illness episode?    
 
  Less than 30 minutes   1 
  30 - 59 minutes    2 
  1 - 2 hours     3 
  Over 2 hours but less than 4 hours  4 
  Over 4 hours but less than 6 hours  5 
  Over 6 hours     6 
  Don’t know/can’t remember   9 
 
 
51. Did you have difficulties getting an examination when you / CHILD arrived at the health facility ? 
 
    Yes (WRITE IN DETAILS)   1 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    No             2 
    Don’t know/can’t remember   9 
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E) HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
 
I’d like to ask you some questions about your/ CHILD last visit(s) to the health facility 
 
 
52. Did you have to spend any money during your last visit to a health facility?  
 
          Yes  1     go to Q54 
           No  2 
            Don’t know/can’t remember  9     go to Q60 
 
 
53. Why didn’t you need to make any payment? 
 
 No fee required for consultation  1  
 No medicines received   2  
 Exempt - poor   3  
 Covered under health insurance  4 
 Has relative, acquaintance there  5   
 Other        6 
 (Write in:_____________________________________________________________________) 
 
 Don’t know/can’t remember   9  
 
      (GO TO Q60) 
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54. For that visit, can you estimate how much in Dong you had to pay for each of the following items?  
(IF PAYMENT NOT MADE IN CASH ASK FOR EQUIVALENT CASH AMOUNT AND WRITE IN) 
 
 VND ‘000s Don't know/ can't 
remember 
a) Bill for treatment and medicines   
b) Food/bed for patient/carer   
c) Extra fee   
d) Extra payment, gift   
e) Other (WRITE IN)   
TOTAL=   
 
 (IF THERE IS NO GIFT OR EXTRA PAYMENT IN Q54/d => GO TO Q.58) 
 
 
55. Thinking about the extra payment/gift you made, who did you make it to? 
 
 VND ‘000s Can't remember 
a) Doctor / doctor assistant   
b) Nurse / midwife   
c) Receptionist   
d) Manager/administrator   
e) Other (WRITE IN                                                                 )   
f)  Don’t know/can’t remember   
TOTAL   
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56. Why did you make this extra payment/gift? 
 
      To get better treatment    1 
      To get quicker treatment    2 
      To get better treatment next time   3 
      Custom / workers expect it    4 
      To say thank-you / gift from the heart  5 
      Other        6 
 
(If “other” WRITE 
IN:__________________________________________________________________________ ) 
 
      Don’t know/can’t remember    9 
 
57. Where did you get the gift / the money for the gift from? (CIRCLE ALL REASONS) 
 
 Readily available cash / savings     1 
 Reduce main spending ( food for example) 2 
 Reduce spending on non-essentials  3 
 Sell personal belongings/animals  4 
 Borrow money    5  
              Other (WRITE IN)  6 
 
 ………………………………………................ 
      Don’t know/can’t remember          9 
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This box for Member only: 
 
58. Can I just check that even though you had a health insurance card you still had to make additional payments, 
is that correct? 
           Yes  1 
            No  2      => go to Q60 
             Don’t know/can’t remember  3      => go to Q60 
59. Why did you have to make this payment? 
 Loss the card, forgot at home    1 
 Not used facility named on the card   2 
 Use special drugs      3 
 Use special services      4 
 Suggestion/ requirement of  health worker   5 
 Want to receive more attention from health worker 6 
 Has to pay extra-fees (20%)     7 
 Was a out-patient only     8 
 For the items, which are not covered by VHI  9 
 Used private sesrvices, not want to use card  10 
 The card expired      11 
 Did not have card at that time    12 
 Too complicated to use card    13 
 Don’t know why      98 
 Don’t remember      99 
 
 
60. About how much did you pay in total for transportation travelling to and from that health facility? 
(IF PARENT WENT WITH CHILD ASK FOR TOTAL COST FOR BOTH) 
 
_________________  (’000s VND) 
(WRITE IN IF NECESSARY: 
_____________________________________________________________________
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F. PATIENT SATISFACTION 
I’d now like to ask you some questions about the quality of health services and how 
satisfied you are with them. Thinking again about the last time you/CHILD visited a 
government health facility…... 
61. How satisfied were you overall with the quality of service you received last time at the GOVERNMENT health 
facility?  
 Very 
satisfied 
Quite 
satisfied 
Neither satisfied 
not dissatisfied 
Quite 
dissatisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Don't 
know 
a) Commune health centre 1 2 3 4 5 9 
b) Inter-communal polyclinic 1 2 3 4 5 9 
c) Government district hospital 1 2 3 4 5 9 
d) Government provincial hospital 1 2 3 4 5 9 
e) Other gov. facility (WRITE IN) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
 
62. How did you satisfy with the service you received the last time you visited a GOVERNMENT facility? 
 
 
READ OUT BELOW 
Very 
satisfied 
Quite 
satisfied 
Neither 
satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
Quite 
dissatisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Not 
applicable 
a) Waiting time 1 2 3 4 5 9 
b)Quality of facility/equipment  1 2 3 4 5 9 
c)Attitude of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 9 
d) Advice/ explaination 1 2 3 4 5 9 
e) Skill of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 9 
f) Official bill payment 1 2 3 4 5 9 
g) un official payment 1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
63. Do you have any (other) comments about the  quality of GOVERNMENT health services? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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64. Thinking now about PRIVATE health services that you/CHILD ever used, how satisfactory do you think the 
services they provide are?   
 
 Very 
satisfied 
Quite 
satisfied 
Neither 
satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
Quite 
dissatisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Never 
visited 
a) Drug-seller (unlicensed) 1 2 3 4 5 9 
b) Private pharmacy 1 2 3 4 5 9 
c) Private doctor/nurse/midwife/CHW 1 2 3 4 5 9 
d) Other private facility (WRITE IN) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
65. How did you satisfy with the service you /CHILD received the last time you visited a PRIVATE facility? 
 
 
 
READ OUT BELOW 
Very 
satisfied 
Quite 
satisfied 
Neither 
satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
Quite 
dissatisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Not 
applicable 
a) Waiting time 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b)Quality of facility/equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c)Attitude of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d) Advice/ explaination 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e) Skill of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f) Bill payment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
g) Other ( write in) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
66. Do you have any other comments about the service at PRIVATE health facilities? 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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G) HEALTH INSURANCE 
This Box for Non-member only: 
Finally I’d like to ask you some questions about the Vietnamese voluntary health insurance 
scheme whereby individuals can buy insurance cards and get a reduction in the cost of 
care at government hospitals...... 
67.  First of all have you ever heard of the Vietnamese state voluntary health insurance scheme (for adults- 
children, school chilren)? 
 
  Yes      1  Name of card:.................................... 
 
  No            2    go to Page 9 
  Don’t know/can’t remember   9    go to Page 9 
 
This Box for Member only: 
 
Finally I’d like to ask you some questions about your /CHILD CURRENT/or LASTEST 
voluntary health insurance card (do not ask about previous cards) 
 
68. What was your main reason for buying the card ? (CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY) 
 
   DID NOT BUY CARD / GOT FOR FREE   0 
   Reduces cost of health care     1 
   I /CHILD often get ill       2 
   In case getting serious sick     3 
   Currently I/CHILD use services a lot   4 
   Propaganda/encouragement    5 
   Follow other people      6 
   Other (WRITE IN)________________________  7 
 
   Don’t know/can’t remember     9 
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69. How did you first hear about the scheme (for adult or children insurance)? 
    
   Newspaper / radio / TV     1 
   Family / friends /neighbours     2 
   VHI office representative     3 
   Commune Peoples Committee    4 
   School /teachers      5 
   Health facility       6 
   Women’s Union      7 
   Other______________________________________ 8 
 
   Don’t know/can’t remember     99 
 
 
This Box for Member only: 
 
70. Where did you get your /CHILD health insurance card from ? 
 
 Bought from VHI office /travelling representative 1    
 Bought from school     2    
 Bought from local health centre    3  (WRITE IN NAME.........................................) 
 Provided free by CPC    4   
 Provided free by NGO    5   
 Other (WRITE IN................................................) 6    =>    go to Q77 
 
 Don’t know/can’t remember    9   
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70a) I’d now like to ask you a few questions about how you would value the state voluntary health 
insurance scheme. Imagine that you are currently not covered by an insurance scheme and that you 
could buy a card for yourself only, which would last for one year. You would have to pay the full 
amount in cash at the time you buy the card, which would give you certain benefits. You must pay 
20% of the total cost of consultations, medicines, and other diagnostic procedures yourself, as well as 
20% of any in-patient stay. The card covers the remaining 80% of the cost. 
 
What is the maximum amount of money you would be prepared to pay for a card ? Remember that the money 
will be taken from your personal income and will hence decrease the money you have available to spend on 
other goods and services. 
 
____________________________________________VDN 
 
70b)   How certain would you say you were of your answer to previous question? (MARK THE SCALE) 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Absolutely uncertain       Absolutely certain 
 
 
70c) Why would you/would you not be willing to buy a card? 
 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
 
70d) Do you think you would actually use the benefits included in the scheme? 
 
        Yes definitely   1 
        Yes probably   2 
        No probably not  3 
        No definitely not  4 
        Don’t know   5 
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71.  How long was it from when you first heard about the scheme, to when you bought the card? 
 
   Less than 3 months      1 
   3-6 months       2 
   7-12 months       3 
   Over one year      4 
   Don’t know/can’t remember     9  
72. How long was it between when you wanted to buy the card, and when you actually bought it? 
 
   Less than 1 month      1    => go to Q.74 
   1-2 months       2 
   3-6 months       3 
   7-12 months       4 
   Over one year      5 
   Don’t know/can’t remember     9 
 
 
73. Why didn't you buy card right after you intend to buy card? 
 
   Scheme not operating in district    1 
   Lack of finances      2 
   Do not need       3 
   Complicated application procedure    4 
   Other (WRITE IN)___________________________ 5 
 
   Don’t know/can’t remember     9 
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This Box for Member only: 
 
74. Did you have any difficulties in getting the card ? 
 
  None       1 
  Waiting to long     2 
  Complicated administrative procedures  3 
  Bad attitude of VHI’s worker    4 
  They issue card not often    5 
  VHI office not want to issue card   6 
  Lack of advice/ explaination    7 
  Has been forced to buy card  8 
  Financial difficulty     9 
 
75. Who paid for your card ? 
 
   Myself      1 
   Parent      2 
   Child      3         Amount............'000 NVD 
   Other (WRITE IN)………………  4 
 
   Don’t know/can’t remember   9 
 
76.  Where did you / the person get the money from to pay for the card? 
    
   Readily available cash     1 
   Savings       2 
   Sale of assets     3 
   Borrowed / credit      4 
   Other (WRITE IN)________________________  5 
   Don’t know/can’t remember     9 
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77.  Did you receive any written or verbal information about the benefits of the card? 
 
 Yes No Don’t know/can’t remember  
 
   a. Directly from the HI office 1 2 9 
   b. From newspapers/radio/TV 1 2 9 
   c. Other sources 1 2 9 
 
 
78.  Which health service benefits were covered with your/CHILD health insurance card? (If you buy card) 
   
 Free of 
charge 
Receive price 
reduction 
As non-
member 
Don’t 
know/can’t 
remember 
a) Treatment in emergencies 1 2 3 9 
b) Examination only 1 2 3 9 
c) Medicines only 1 2 3 9 
d) In-patient services 1 2 3 9 
e) Other (WRITE IN) 1 2 3 9 
 
 
This Box for Member only: 
 
79. Did you use a facility other than that named on your/CHILD card?  
 
      Yes     1 
      Never     2 go to Q. 80 
      Can't remember   3 
 
79a.    If Yes, write in that health facility and  ask Why : 
 
    a1. Health facility: 
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 Commune health center  1  Provincial hospital   4 
 Inter-communal polilinic  2  Private health service  5 
 Districr hospital   3  Private health worker  6 
        Other     7 
   
    a2. Reason:    __________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
80.  Did you ever use your/CHILD health insurance card?  
 
      Yes     1    go to Q82 
      No     2 
      Don’t know/can’t remember  9    go to Q84 
 
81.  You say you had a card but have never used it. Why is this?   (WRITE IN) 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________       go to Q84 
 
 
82.  Did you use the card for inpatient services, outpatient services or both? If so how many times have you used 
the card for each?  
                                                                                             Don’t know/ Can’t remember  
a. Number of Outpatient only                    _____   99 
b. Number of both inpatient and outpatient          _____      99 
 
83.  How long was it between when you bought your most recent card and first used it?  
 
   Less than 3 months      1 
   3-6 months       2 
   7-12 months       3 
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   Over one year      4 
   Don’t know/can’t remember     9 
 
 
 
84.  Did you hear of anybody in the commune lending their card to someone else, or borrow someone else’s 
card? 
 
       Never heard   1 
       Yes, few cases  2 
       Yes, rather popular  3 
       Don’t know/no answer 9 
 
This Box for Member only: 
 
85. What comments would you make to Vietnamese Health Insurance about improving the scheme? 
 
a)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
b)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
c)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
I’d now like to do a short exercise with you, in order to find out what you think about different aspects of the state 
voluntary health insurance scheme. Under the scheme you buy a card for yourself/child only, which then lasts for 
one year. Once you become a member of the scheme you get certain benefits. For example if you need health 
care at the hospital you can receive it without paying anything extra for consultations, drugs or inpatient care. 
 
 
86. If you would buy a card for yourself/child, which level of health insurance do you 
prefer?  
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Registerd facility Premium  
+Commune/Ward health clinic 
    
40,000 VND 1 
  
 
+District hospital 
+ Commune/Ward health clinic  
60,000 VND 
2 
  
 
+Provincial/city hospital  
+ District 
 + Commune/ward  
 
90,000 VND 3 
  
 
+National hospital 
+ Provincial/city  
+ District 
+ Commune/ward 
 
120,000 VND 
4 
 
 
87. You have the option to make one full payment, as listed above, or make several payments across the year. 
However, the more times you pay, the more money you have to pay in total. Please consider the options below 
and tell me which you prefer.  
 
ONE time, paying right at the rate selected above   1 
 
TWO times, paying at the rate selected above add 10%  2 
 
FOUR times, paying at the rate selected above add 20%  3 
88. Would you consider buying another health insurance card? 
 
 Definitely yes   1  =>  Member: go to Q.91         Non-member: go to Q.90  
 Probably yes   2  =>  Member: go to Q.91         Non-member: go to Q.90 
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 Undecided / it depends 3 
 Probably not   4   
 Definitely not   5 
 Don’t know    9    
 
 
89.  Member:   Why would you not continue to buy another health insurance card for you/CHILD? 
       Non-member:  Why would you not to buy a health insurance card for you/CHILD? 
 
  I have just heard about health insurance today   1 
  Waite until have stable job      2 
  Fin no need because I/CHILD feel healthy    3 
  Receive few benefit from  card     4 
  Too high premium       5 
  Bad treatment to card holder by health worker   6 
  Facility is to far to go       7 
  Not  confident in the health insurance policy   8 
  If you already paid tax you don't need to buy card   9 
  It's not easy to buy health insurance card    10 
  Other ( write in) ______________________________  11 
  Don't know        99 
   
  (END INTERVIEW HERE) 
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This Box for Non-member only: 
 
90. What was  main reason that  you intend to buy the card for you/CHILD? 
   Reduces cost of health care     1 
   I /CHILD often get ill       2 
   In case getting serious sick     3 
   Currently I/CHILD use services a lot   4 
   Propaganda/encouragement    5 
   Follow other people      6 
   Other (WRITE IN)________________________  7 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
   Don’t know/       9 
 
 
91. Where would you get the money from to pay for the insurance? 
 
 Readily available cash 1 
 From household savings 2 
Household work longer hours 3 
Reduce expenditure on essentials 4 
Reduce expenditure on non-essentials 5 
Sell personal belongings 6      
Sell products/livestock 7 
Borrow from friend or relative 8 
Borrow from money lender 9 
     Other (WRITE IN)_______________________    10 
                                             Don't know                                                             98 
     No answer      99 
END INTERVIEW.   THANK RESPONDENT  
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